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@ -4,14 +4,16 @@ title = "The Quest for Representation"
Jafari’s film begins on the shores of the Greek island of Lesvos, with images that have become iconic for Europe’s borders today. At Greece’s closest point to Turkey across the Mediterranean, volunteers on the shoreline and local fishermen in their boats welcome and help the passengers of a black rubber dinghy, filled to capacity, as they disembark. As quietly compelling as they start out, these scenes of first encounter soon become dramatic as a thrilling soundtrack accompanies a fisherman’s pursuit of a trafficker in coastal waters. I was immediately gripped by these events, and while the film introduced me to these scenes for the first time, the images also seemed strangely familiar. The way we know that since 2015, similar boats have been inundating these very shores is a result of European audiences having been flooded with similar news media images. But even before that, the internationally-used term, “boat people”, had become a way to refer to a group of migrants who are the most vulnerable to becoming the object of visual media sensationalism. Given this opening, I immediately wondered whether the film would manage to move beyond the usual representations that saturate the discussion, framing refugees as symbols of either extreme suffering or threat. Jafari’s film begins on the shores of the Greek island of Lesvos, with images that have become iconic for Europe’s borders today. At Greece’s closest point to Turkey across the Mediterranean, volunteers on the shoreline and local fishermen in their boats welcome and help the passengers of a black rubber dinghy, filled to capacity, as they disembark. As quietly compelling as they start out, these scenes of first encounter soon become dramatic as a thrilling soundtrack accompanies a fisherman’s pursuit of a trafficker in coastal waters. I was immediately gripped by these events, and while the film introduced me to these scenes for the first time, the images also seemed strangely familiar. The way we know that since 2015, similar boats have been inundating these very shores is a result of European audiences having been flooded with similar news media images. But even before that, the internationally-used term, “boat people”, had become a way to refer to a group of migrants who are the most vulnerable to becoming the object of visual media sensationalism. Given this opening, I immediately wondered whether the film would manage to move beyond the usual representations that saturate the discussion, framing refugees as symbols of either extreme suffering or threat.
From these opening scenes of arrival on that rocky beach, the film takes us along a journey that includes stops at a series of refugee camps and the passages between them. Ultimately, the route leads to a camp on the Greek-Macedonian border at Idomeni, Europe’s largest informal refugee camp, whose very presence is a form of resistance to the EU border regime. This is also where the film suddenly ends, leaving us at the frontline of an unresolved standoff between police in full riot gear and a group of asylum seekers. We are left with scenes of riot police standing steadfastly in lines that absurdly guard a small portion of the invisible frontier in an open field, and the protesters’ enduring resistance. Jafari’s film makes no pretense of showing us anything beyond this segment of an unfinished journey. And I think this is precisely why it succeeds. By focusing on the spaces *inside* Europe’s formal borders as the open-ended continuation of a punishing passage, it lays bare the reality of the harsh habitability of contemporary Europe, itself. From these opening scenes of arrival on that rocky beach, the film takes us along a journey that includes stops at a series of refugee camps and the passages between them. Ultimately, the route leads to a camp on the Greek-Macedonian border at Idomeni, Europe’s largest informal refugee camp, whose very presence is a form of resistance to the EU border regime. This is also where the film suddenly ends, leaving us at the frontline of an unresolved standoff between police in full riot gear and a group of asylum seekers. We are left with scenes of riot police standing steadfastly in lines that absurdly guard a small portion of the invisible frontier in an open field, and the protesters’ enduring resistance. Jafari’s film makes no pretense of showing us anything beyond this segment of an unfinished journey. And I think this is precisely why it succeeds. By focusing on the spaces _inside_ Europe’s formal borders as the open-ended continuation of a punishing passage, it lays bare the reality of the harsh habitability of contemporary Europe, itself.
# A Compassionate but Impersonal Gaze # A Compassionate but Impersonal Gaze
A Greek narrator tells us that this is the work of an Iranian filmmaker, himself a refugee in Greece. This information stayed with me as a viewer, affecting, for instance, how I saw Jafari’s decision to pass his camera over such a great number of people so briefly. This came across not as detachment from their personal pain, but as a reflection of Jafari’s invested desire to make us bear witness to as much of it as possible, all at once. With no particular case being explored in any depth, hardly any face appearing twice, and no names, the film refuses to make the narrative choices typically used by character-driven reportage to draw viewers in, emotionally. And yet the anonymity of the people captured affords a certain respect. That is, the film does not pry into anyone’s story or push to tag along in order to represent a sympathetic but depoliticized experience of trauma. Instead it offers us fragment after fragment of life lived under these particular conditions, showing us that a compassionate gaze does not need to be a profoundly personal one. And it is in this sense that the film does something interesting with its goal of sharing a particular truth with the audience. A Greek narrator tells us that this is the work of an Iranian filmmaker, himself a refugee in Greece. This information stayed with me as a viewer, affecting, for instance, how I saw Jafari’s decision to pass his camera over such a great number of people so briefly. This came across not as detachment from their personal pain, but as a reflection of Jafari’s invested desire to make us bear witness to as much of it as possible, all at once. With no particular case being explored in any depth, hardly any face appearing twice, and no names, the film refuses to make the narrative choices typically used by character-driven reportage to draw viewers in, emotionally. And yet the anonymity of the people captured affords a certain respect. That is, the film does not pry into anyone’s story or push to tag along in order to represent a sympathetic but depoliticized experience of trauma. Instead it offers us fragment after fragment of life lived under these particular conditions, showing us that a compassionate gaze does not need to be a profoundly personal one. And it is in this sense that the film does something interesting with its goal of sharing a particular truth with the audience.
The reality depicted is not moving because of the spectacle of its intensity or intimacy, but first and foremost because it reveals the characters’ own awareness of, and insights about their predicament, told in their own words, in their languages. This depiction of refugee crossings goes beyond giving a voice and face to a flow of bodies that have been made to endure extreme hardship. It portrays its characters as acutely aware of their political position with relation to the wider world, a portrayal that rarely enters current debates in Europe. We see this keen self-awareness nowhere more clearly in the film than in its abovementioned scenes from Idomeni, where protest erupts after the border is selectively opened to Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghani refugees. Bangladeshis, Iranians, and many others are left in limbo at the border, save for their ability to express their opposition to this exclusion through further protest. The reality depicted is not moving because of the spectacle of its intensity or intimacy, but first and foremost because it reveals the characters’ own awareness of, and insights about their predicament, told in their own words, in their languages. This depiction of refugee crossings goes beyond giving a voice and face to a flow of bodies that have been made to endure extreme hardship. It portrays its characters as acutely aware of their political position with relation to the wider world, a portrayal that rarely enters current debates in Europe. We see this keen self-awareness nowhere more clearly in the film than in its abovementioned scenes from Idomeni, where protest erupts after the border is selectively opened to Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghani refugees. Bangladeshis, Iranians, and many others are left in limbo at the border, save for their ability to express their opposition to this exclusion through further protest.
 
# The Lived Border # The Lived Border
In the scenes of protest that follow, the specific forms of resistance people choose emerge from the traditions of protest that are particular to the contexts from which they have migrated, from the sewing of lips, to rhythmic group chants, to the silent brandishing of self-made signboards and banners. An Iranian man explains that some refugees have begun a hunger strike as a last resort, a form of protest strongly associated with political prisoners in Iran and other authoritarian contexts. These are protest forms familiar to those who have faced violent repression, cultivated as a necessity under conditions of persecution, and now used to address the governments of the very nations that might offer sanctuary from such attacks. Across the groups, their message is a clear and shared one, directed to European leaders and their governments: open the borders and let people pass. In the scenes of protest that follow, the specific forms of resistance people choose emerge from the traditions of protest that are particular to the contexts from which they have migrated, from the sewing of lips, to rhythmic group chants, to the silent brandishing of self-made signboards and banners. An Iranian man explains that some refugees have begun a hunger strike as a last resort, a form of protest strongly associated with political prisoners in Iran and other authoritarian contexts. These are protest forms familiar to those who have faced violent repression, cultivated as a necessity under conditions of persecution, and now used to address the governments of the very nations that might offer sanctuary from such attacks. Across the groups, their message is a clear and shared one, directed to European leaders and their governments: open the borders and let people pass.
@ -34,8 +36,6 @@ Finally, I wonder whether more reflexive and less realist styles of documentary
# References # References
[^alinejad_1] Cp. Dimitris Dalakoglou, “Europe’s last frontier: The spatialities of the refugee crisis”, *City*, 20 (2) , 2016, pp. 180–185. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13604813.2016.1170467 (accessed June 11, 2017). [^alinejad_1]: Cp. Dimitris Dalakoglou, “Europe’s last frontier: The spatialities of the refugee crisis”, _City_, 20 (2) , 2016, pp. 180–185. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13604813.2016.1170467 (accessed June 11, 2017).
[^alinejad_2]: Cp. Sandra Ponzanesi, “On the Waterfront”, _Interventions_, 18(2), 2016, pp. 217–233. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369801X.2015.1079501 (accessed June 11, 2017).
[^alinejad_2] Cp. Sandra Ponzanesi, “On the Waterfront”, *Interventions*, 18(2), 2016, pp. 217–233. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369801X.2015.1079501 (accessed June 11, 2017). [^alinejad_3]: Cp. Donya Alinejad, _The Internet Formations of Iranian American-ness. Next Generation Diaspora_, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
[^alinejad_3] Cp. Donya Alinejad, *The Internet Formations of Iranian American-ness. Next Generation Diaspora*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Today, ten years later, the patterns described by Xiang and Aneesh continue to b
The nature of IT labour, or the nature of its product, has a certain quality that complicates the demarcation between the categories of mobility of labour and the mobility of goods. By means of the internet, (a certain form of) data can be sent almost instantaneously, at a small cost and other friction over great distances. Networked infrastructures and software allow the global transmission of data in milliseconds so that, for example, different labourers can work simultaneously on the same project while being on two different continents. This of course concerns mobility patterns and challenges our understanding of migration and racism. The nature of IT labour, or the nature of its product, has a certain quality that complicates the demarcation between the categories of mobility of labour and the mobility of goods. By means of the internet, (a certain form of) data can be sent almost instantaneously, at a small cost and other friction over great distances. Networked infrastructures and software allow the global transmission of data in milliseconds so that, for example, different labourers can work simultaneously on the same project while being on two different continents. This of course concerns mobility patterns and challenges our understanding of migration and racism.
Far from striving for a comprehensive picture of these developments, we want to trace a few of these tendencies and emerging geographies and connect some existing analytical tools in order to better understand them. First, we take up the notion of ‘virtual migration’ and relate it to forms of digital labour beyond the case of Indian IT workers, namely to Chinese gaming workers, the so-called ‘gold farmers’. We discuss this as a particular form of labour in the gaming industry, also evoking questions about the implicit processes of racialisation in such forms of mobile digital labour. Moving on, we connect the entailed challenges to the concept of migration to the idea of the *multiplication of labour* as developed by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson,[^altenried_7] who offer a helpful approach to understand the complex and heterogeneous spatiality of global, not only digitally mediated, labour. Far from striving for a comprehensive picture of these developments, we want to trace a few of these tendencies and emerging geographies and connect some existing analytical tools in order to better understand them. First, we take up the notion of ‘virtual migration’ and relate it to forms of digital labour beyond the case of Indian IT workers, namely to Chinese gaming workers, the so-called ‘gold farmers’. We discuss this as a particular form of labour in the gaming industry, also evoking questions about the implicit processes of racialisation in such forms of mobile digital labour. Moving on, we connect the entailed challenges to the concept of migration to the idea of the _multiplication of labour_ as developed by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson,[^altenried_7] who offer a helpful approach to understand the complex and heterogeneous spatiality of global, not only digitally mediated, labour.
# From Offshoring to Virtual Migration? # From Offshoring to Virtual Migration?
@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ However, in spite of the maybe unfortunate word ‘virtual’, we can begin to e
# Gold Farming, or, the past of Steve Bannon # Gold Farming, or, the past of Steve Bannon
Steve Bannon, the right-wing chief strategist of Donald Trump, once invested $60 million in a business based on the labour of digital migrants. In 2006, Bannon convinced his former employer, Goldman Sachs, to invest this amount in a company called *Internet Media Entertainment* (IGE).[^altenried_9] At the time, IGE was one of the most important actors in a shadow economy connected to massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) like World of Warcraft. World of Warcraft was – and still is – one of the most important of these games, with over seven million players at the time. This digital world, called Azeroth, is an impressive graphic medieval landscape of dark forests, vast plains, green hills, large mountains, wide seas, big cities and quiet villages inhabited by a multitude of human and magical creatures. Here the players kill monsters, explore the landscape, socialise and complete quests, thereby developing the skills of their avatars and accumulating gold and virtual goods in order to patiently advance through the game’s levels. For those who lacked patience or time to do so, IGE had an offer: They sold gold, the in-game currency, for real money. On their site, they also offered virtual goods like weapons, clothing or even fully-developed characters so that players could begin in high levels. A player could even hand over his account for a few hours and get it back at any level they wished, in exchange for money. Steve Bannon, the right-wing chief strategist of Donald Trump, once invested $60 million in a business based on the labour of digital migrants. In 2006, Bannon convinced his former employer, Goldman Sachs, to invest this amount in a company called _Internet Media Entertainment_ (IGE).[^altenried_9] At the time, IGE was one of the most important actors in a shadow economy connected to massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) like World of Warcraft. World of Warcraft was – and still is – one of the most important of these games, with over seven million players at the time. This digital world, called Azeroth, is an impressive graphic medieval landscape of dark forests, vast plains, green hills, large mountains, wide seas, big cities and quiet villages inhabited by a multitude of human and magical creatures. Here the players kill monsters, explore the landscape, socialise and complete quests, thereby developing the skills of their avatars and accumulating gold and virtual goods in order to patiently advance through the game’s levels. For those who lacked patience or time to do so, IGE had an offer: They sold gold, the in-game currency, for real money. On their site, they also offered virtual goods like weapons, clothing or even fully-developed characters so that players could begin in high levels. A player could even hand over his account for a few hours and get it back at any level they wished, in exchange for money.
Although officially forbidden by the game’s publisher and frowned upon by many players, the trade of real money for virtual goods is a multimillion-dollar business. In 2006, IGE was its biggest player, with offices in Los Angeles, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Unfortunately for the investors Bannon had gained, they soon run into trouble. Players launched a class action lawsuit against the trading of in-game currency for real money, claiming it would “substantially impair” and “diminish” their enjoyment of the game. Beyond that, Blizzard Entertainment, the publisher of the game, started harsh measures against the practice of real money trade, making it even harder for IGE to sustain its profits. In the end, IGE’s virtual currency business was sold abroad, the investment a failure, and the company restructured and renamed itself *Affinity Media*, running a number of gaming websites and communities. Bannon became its CEO, a post he held until 2012, when he became chair of the infamous Breitbart News. Although officially forbidden by the game’s publisher and frowned upon by many players, the trade of real money for virtual goods is a multimillion-dollar business. In 2006, IGE was its biggest player, with offices in Los Angeles, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Unfortunately for the investors Bannon had gained, they soon run into trouble. Players launched a class action lawsuit against the trading of in-game currency for real money, claiming it would “substantially impair” and “diminish” their enjoyment of the game. Beyond that, Blizzard Entertainment, the publisher of the game, started harsh measures against the practice of real money trade, making it even harder for IGE to sustain its profits. In the end, IGE’s virtual currency business was sold abroad, the investment a failure, and the company restructured and renamed itself _Affinity Media_, running a number of gaming websites and communities. Bannon became its CEO, a post he held until 2012, when he became chair of the infamous Breitbart News.
Like IGE, the industry trading in virtual goods and currency, took a hit in these years. However, the business is still alive in World of Warcraft and other games. After running into legal problems like IGE, most Western platforms moved their operations to places where their supply was already coming from: Asia, especially China. Already in 2006, professional player-workers located in China provided the overwhelming majority of IGE’s inventory. These digital migrants to the Western servers are commonly called “Chinese gold farmers”. Bannon had joined a company that was almost completely based on Chinese labour. Like IGE, the industry trading in virtual goods and currency, took a hit in these years. However, the business is still alive in World of Warcraft and other games. After running into legal problems like IGE, most Western platforms moved their operations to places where their supply was already coming from: Asia, especially China. Already in 2006, professional player-workers located in China provided the overwhelming majority of IGE’s inventory. These digital migrants to the Western servers are commonly called “Chinese gold farmers”. Bannon had joined a company that was almost completely based on Chinese labour.
@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ A typical Chinese gaming workshop has 20-100 computers and around 50-200 workers
> “The first gold farming company I was in was really big; I guess that this company owned at least 10,000 gold farming accounts. In my workshop there were 40 people who took turns to farm, some in the daytime, some at night. So the accounts are used for farming non-stop for 24 hours a day, 7 days a week […] every day I feel very tired. You can imagine, every day I need to do at least 10 hours farming. I’m always looking at the computer screen and always seeing the same instance and the same mobs. So I feel very tired.”[^altenried_11] > “The first gold farming company I was in was really big; I guess that this company owned at least 10,000 gold farming accounts. In my workshop there were 40 people who took turns to farm, some in the daytime, some at night. So the accounts are used for farming non-stop for 24 hours a day, 7 days a week […] every day I feel very tired. You can imagine, every day I need to do at least 10 hours farming. I’m always looking at the computer screen and always seeing the same instance and the same mobs. So I feel very tired.”[^altenried_11]
Even if many of the workers are also enthusiastic players of World of Warcraft, farming is mostly a repetitive, boring and exhausting job, as farmers mostly use simple and repetitive functions of a game’s architecture in order to earn gold and virtual goods. Even for normal players, and especially in the lower levels, “the majority of the play involved in advancing a World of Warcraft character is mindless and repetitive to the extent that it verges on Taylorism” as Scott Rettberg notices in the *World of Warcraft Reader*.[^altenried_12] Even if many of the workers are also enthusiastic players of World of Warcraft, farming is mostly a repetitive, boring and exhausting job, as farmers mostly use simple and repetitive functions of a game’s architecture in order to earn gold and virtual goods. Even for normal players, and especially in the lower levels, “the majority of the play involved in advancing a World of Warcraft character is mindless and repetitive to the extent that it verges on Taylorism” as Scott Rettberg notices in the _World of Warcraft Reader_.[^altenried_12]
To start a workshop, one needs considerable capital, one needs computers, a good internet connection and a credit card/PayPal account and language skills in order to do business with mediating platforms like IGE or directly with Western customers. The composition of the farming workforce has changed over the years. Some workers of the first generation, mostly students who did the farming in internet cafés, started their own gold farming workshops that increasingly employed migrants from rural areas. Wei Xiaoliang, owner of a farm in Shenzhen is quoted in the *South China Morning Post* explaining that they “prefer to hire young migrant workers rather than college students. The pay is not good for students, but it is quite attractive to the young migrants from the countryside”.[^altenried_13] Some of the gold farmers have been actual farmers before they became labour migrants to the rural areas and virtual migrants to servers of World Warcraft. Ironically, the reasons for these internal migrants to come to the Chinese cities are often the loss of farmland to capitalist development projects, many of which are connected to the growing Chinese electronics industry, as Nick Dyer-Witherford and Greig de Peuter note.[^altenried_14] To start a workshop, one needs considerable capital, one needs computers, a good internet connection and a credit card/PayPal account and language skills in order to do business with mediating platforms like IGE or directly with Western customers. The composition of the farming workforce has changed over the years. Some workers of the first generation, mostly students who did the farming in internet cafés, started their own gold farming workshops that increasingly employed migrants from rural areas. Wei Xiaoliang, owner of a farm in Shenzhen is quoted in the _South China Morning Post_ explaining that they “prefer to hire young migrant workers rather than college students. The pay is not good for students, but it is quite attractive to the young migrants from the countryside”.[^altenried_13] Some of the gold farmers have been actual farmers before they became labour migrants to the rural areas and virtual migrants to servers of World Warcraft. Ironically, the reasons for these internal migrants to come to the Chinese cities are often the loss of farmland to capitalist development projects, many of which are connected to the growing Chinese electronics industry, as Nick Dyer-Witherford and Greig de Peuter note.[^altenried_14]
# “Playing Chinese”, or, the Racialization of Labour # “Playing Chinese”, or, the Racialization of Labour
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ While many Western players use the services of gold farmers to advance through t
As the physical body cannot serve as a marker for race within an online game, the main marker becomes a specific style of playing, or better: labouring in the game. In many cases, it is quite easy to spot farmers in the game as they often stay in the same lucrative spot and fulfil the same repetitive tasks in order to earn gold. Every avatar that behaves in a certain way that suggests it is not playing but working, or even only stays in spots in the game that are known for their farming possibilities, is potentially subject to racist attacks. In other games, whole classes of avatars have become “unplayable” because of constant attacks by other players after becoming associated with Chinese gold farming.[^altenried_16] As the physical body cannot serve as a marker for race within an online game, the main marker becomes a specific style of playing, or better: labouring in the game. In many cases, it is quite easy to spot farmers in the game as they often stay in the same lucrative spot and fulfil the same repetitive tasks in order to earn gold. Every avatar that behaves in a certain way that suggests it is not playing but working, or even only stays in spots in the game that are known for their farming possibilities, is potentially subject to racist attacks. In other games, whole classes of avatars have become “unplayable” because of constant attacks by other players after becoming associated with Chinese gold farming.[^altenried_16]
Throughout the game’s landscapes, there is a constant racial profiling in order to differentiate between legitimate ‘leisure players’ and unwanted ‘player-workers’ who are represented as Asians, mostly as Chinese. Western players even form ‘vigilante’ groups in order to find and report, or kill ‘Chinese farmers’ – killing here means killing the avatar, making it harder for the player workers to do their work. The struggles in the landscape of the game and the Western players hunting Chinese farmers have characteristics of “a low-intensity resource war with echoes of ethnic cleansing”.[^altenried_17] Across various forums and websites, there are many conversations about where to find and how to report or kill gold farmers in the game, who are almost always portrayed as Chinese. Players have also produced a number of YouTube videos documenting the hunt of farmers and songs against ‘the Chinese destroying our game’.[^altenried_18] Thus, far from observing post-racial digital bodies in the game, what we can note is that race enters the space of the game in peculiar ways, one of which is based on digital workers becoming virtual migrants of the online world of the game. Thus, racism, as Theo Goldberg has argued in his book, *Are we all post-racial yet?*, in which he sets out to conceptualise the globalisation of racism and its variations based on very concrete and heterogeneous spatio-temporal conditions, while urging us to observe how the resulting multiplicity of racism contributes to its mutation and reproduction, and to its limits.[^altenried_19] Throughout the game’s landscapes, there is a constant racial profiling in order to differentiate between legitimate ‘leisure players’ and unwanted ‘player-workers’ who are represented as Asians, mostly as Chinese. Western players even form ‘vigilante’ groups in order to find and report, or kill ‘Chinese farmers’ – killing here means killing the avatar, making it harder for the player workers to do their work. The struggles in the landscape of the game and the Western players hunting Chinese farmers have characteristics of “a low-intensity resource war with echoes of ethnic cleansing”.[^altenried_17] Across various forums and websites, there are many conversations about where to find and how to report or kill gold farmers in the game, who are almost always portrayed as Chinese. Players have also produced a number of YouTube videos documenting the hunt of farmers and songs against ‘the Chinese destroying our game’.[^altenried_18] Thus, far from observing post-racial digital bodies in the game, what we can note is that race enters the space of the game in peculiar ways, one of which is based on digital workers becoming virtual migrants of the online world of the game. Thus, racism, as Theo Goldberg has argued in his book, _Are we all post-racial yet?_, in which he sets out to conceptualise the globalisation of racism and its variations based on very concrete and heterogeneous spatio-temporal conditions, while urging us to observe how the resulting multiplicity of racism contributes to its mutation and reproduction, and to its limits.[^altenried_19]
# Digital Labour/Digital Migration # Digital Labour/Digital Migration
@ -62,12 +62,14 @@ The labour of farming is illegalised and part of an informal economy. The only t
The attacks on gold farmers by other players and the game’s publisher, have economic effects on the workshops, some of which had to be closed due to bans on accounts and IP addresses. For individual workers, the attacks also make the job harder, both emotionally and in terms of the daily quotas most workers need to reach. The material risks, vulnerability and the affective dimension of working in illegal or informal economies, are characteristics the digital migrants share with many of their ‘offline’ counterparts. A gaming worker, featured in a YouTube video, reports of his interactions with Western players, “if they know you are a Chinese farmer, they would say you have no right to be here or even attack you with no reason”. He goes on to plea directly to those players: “If you see a professional gamer in the game, I wish you can understand his job and give him a little space. He will be very grateful. He will not go to other spaces and disturb you. He only needs a little space.” The attacks on gold farmers by other players and the game’s publisher, have economic effects on the workshops, some of which had to be closed due to bans on accounts and IP addresses. For individual workers, the attacks also make the job harder, both emotionally and in terms of the daily quotas most workers need to reach. The material risks, vulnerability and the affective dimension of working in illegal or informal economies, are characteristics the digital migrants share with many of their ‘offline’ counterparts. A gaming worker, featured in a YouTube video, reports of his interactions with Western players, “if they know you are a Chinese farmer, they would say you have no right to be here or even attack you with no reason”. He goes on to plea directly to those players: “If you see a professional gamer in the game, I wish you can understand his job and give him a little space. He will be very grateful. He will not go to other spaces and disturb you. He only needs a little space.”
The example of ‘Chinese gold farmers’ illuminates the role of race in the production of labour power and vice versa and here even more important the role of labour in the construction of race. An investigation into digital migration should then start with the border, take *the border as method*, in order to understand: The example of ‘Chinese gold farmers’ illuminates the role of race in the production of labour power and vice versa and here even more important the role of labour in the construction of race. An investigation into digital migration should then start with the border, take _the border as method_, in order to understand:
> “the tense and conflictual ways in which borders shape the lives and experiences of subjects who, due to the functioning of the border itself, are configured as bearers of labor power. The production of the subjectivity of these subjects constitutes an essential moment within the more general processes of the production of labor power as a commodity. Once seen from this perspective, both the techniques of power that invest the border and the social practices and struggles that unfold around it must be analyzed with regard to multiple and unstable configurations of gender and race, the production and reproduction of which are themselves greatly influenced by the border”.[^altenried_20] > “the tense and conflictual ways in which borders shape the lives and experiences of subjects who, due to the functioning of the border itself, are configured as bearers of labor power. The production of the subjectivity of these subjects constitutes an essential moment within the more general processes of the production of labor power as a commodity. Once seen from this perspective, both the techniques of power that invest the border and the social practices and struggles that unfold around it must be analyzed with regard to multiple and unstable configurations of gender and race, the production and reproduction of which are themselves greatly influenced by the border”.[^altenried_20]
Likewise, the work by anthropologist Anna Tsing on supply-chain-capitalism is instructive in this respect. Through the figure of the supply chain it is possible to think of globalisation (and digitisation) not as a simple process of global homogenisation, but to account for the structural role of difference and heterogeneity in the mobilisation of labour, capital and resources. Racism, patriarchal relations, cultural discourses and practices of different localities tied together by trans-border economies are activated, mobilised and made productive in order to “make labor possible”.[^altenried_21] Digital spaces, such as online games, are not post-racial spaces, quite the contrary. However, in the absence of physical bodies, race needs to be reconstituted, and the relation to labour becomes especially crucial and visible. This process shows originary qualities of digital cultures as well as actualisations of historical racist constellations. There are, for example, surprising similarities of the anti-gold farmer rhetoric to racist stereotyping of Chinese laundry workers in United States in the 19th century.[^altenried_22] Likewise, the work by anthropologist Anna Tsing on supply-chain-capitalism is instructive in this respect. Through the figure of the supply chain it is possible to think of globalisation (and digitisation) not as a simple process of global homogenisation, but to account for the structural role of difference and heterogeneity in the mobilisation of labour, capital and resources. Racism, patriarchal relations, cultural discourses and practices of different localities tied together by trans-border economies are activated, mobilised and made productive in order to “make labor possible”.[^altenried_21] Digital spaces, such as online games, are not post-racial spaces, quite the contrary. However, in the absence of physical bodies, race needs to be reconstituted, and the relation to labour becomes especially crucial and visible. This process shows originary qualities of digital cultures as well as actualisations of historical racist constellations. There are, for example, surprising similarities of the anti-gold farmer rhetoric to racist stereotyping of Chinese laundry workers in United States in the 19th century.[^altenried_22]
 
# Fragmented Geographies and the Multiplication of Labour # Fragmented Geographies and the Multiplication of Labour
As a shadow economy served by digital migrants, the case of gold farming in online video games represents a new matrix of differential inclusion,[^altenried_23] where the terms of offshoring and outsourcing are not sufficient in order to conceptualise the complex spatial, economic and social arrangements at play. Here, theoretical vocabulary of virtual or digital migration might be helpful to think further. If we use the vocabulary of virtual or digital migration, we are not arguing for a radical break from forms of outsourcing or offshoring. Rather, we see these concepts as additions in order to help us understand the current transformations of labour mobility enabled by digital technologies and infrastructures. In the same spirit, Mezzadra and Neilson propose to supplement the familiar concept of the division of labour through an understanding of the multiplication of labour. As a shadow economy served by digital migrants, the case of gold farming in online video games represents a new matrix of differential inclusion,[^altenried_23] where the terms of offshoring and outsourcing are not sufficient in order to conceptualise the complex spatial, economic and social arrangements at play. Here, theoretical vocabulary of virtual or digital migration might be helpful to think further. If we use the vocabulary of virtual or digital migration, we are not arguing for a radical break from forms of outsourcing or offshoring. Rather, we see these concepts as additions in order to help us understand the current transformations of labour mobility enabled by digital technologies and infrastructures. In the same spirit, Mezzadra and Neilson propose to supplement the familiar concept of the division of labour through an understanding of the multiplication of labour.
@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ The concept of the multiplication of labour is again thought of in terms of mult
# Digital Taylorism and Digital Migration # Digital Taylorism and Digital Migration
In the case of the ‘Chinese gold farmers’ the phenomenon of digital migration emerges clearly due to the shared lifeworld of the game, a space where most workers but also many players, spend the majority of their waking hours. However, we can find many other examples where we can not only observe economic and spatio-temporal integration, but also affective, social and legal forms of *integration and tension* that characterise digital migration. Well-known examples are call centres in India serving the United States. The temporal aspect becomes crucial, with local workers often being alienated from life in their own time frame. Customer contact via call centres is crucially also affective labour, it involves a complicated politics of language and accent, and call centre workers are frequently subjected to racial abuse by customers.[^altenried_25] A main reason why the Philippines have recently overtaken India as the “call centre capital of the world” is that many Filipino workers speak English with an American accent; hence their physical location is not immediately obvious to customers who believe they are speaking to an American worker rather than a virtual migrant.[^altenried_26] In the case of the ‘Chinese gold farmers’ the phenomenon of digital migration emerges clearly due to the shared lifeworld of the game, a space where most workers but also many players, spend the majority of their waking hours. However, we can find many other examples where we can not only observe economic and spatio-temporal integration, but also affective, social and legal forms of _integration and tension_ that characterise digital migration. Well-known examples are call centres in India serving the United States. The temporal aspect becomes crucial, with local workers often being alienated from life in their own time frame. Customer contact via call centres is crucially also affective labour, it involves a complicated politics of language and accent, and call centre workers are frequently subjected to racial abuse by customers.[^altenried_25] A main reason why the Philippines have recently overtaken India as the “call centre capital of the world” is that many Filipino workers speak English with an American accent; hence their physical location is not immediately obvious to customers who believe they are speaking to an American worker rather than a virtual migrant.[^altenried_26]
Another instantiation of the global circulation of digital labour is the case of content moderation for social media. In order to filter out violence, pornography, hate speech and other content deemed inappropriate, social media platforms need a huge amount of human labour as even the most sophisticated algorithms lack the cultural and contextual knowledge to completely take over this task. Content moderation is an extremely labour-intensive, politically-sensitive and crucial economic aspect of digital social media. Again, the Philippines have become a global hub for commercial content moderation, where tens of thousands of workers sort through the digital waste of social media.[^altenried_27] The labour of cleaning predominantly Western social media includes an important affective component. Scanning up to 6.000 pictures or 1.000 videos per day, many of which contain brutal torture or even murder, racism and sexual violence, leaves emotional traces with many workers. Many Filipino workers who become digital migrants to especially violent sections of Western sociality, often report depression, sleeping disorders and affective and sexual problems.[^altenried_28] In addition to offering relatively cheap labour, the Philippines have become a hub for content moderation due to its Spanish and US colonial and post-colonial history because of which it has a workforce that speaks (often American-accented) English, is predominantly catholic, and literate in US culture. It is precisely these histories that need to be foregrounded in the analysis the racialization of labour. ‘Ethnicization’ needs to be a crucial dimension but not in terms of fixed races. On the contrary, it needs to investigate precisely how ethnicity becomes a resource to be mobilised and exploited.[^altenried_29] Another instantiation of the global circulation of digital labour is the case of content moderation for social media. In order to filter out violence, pornography, hate speech and other content deemed inappropriate, social media platforms need a huge amount of human labour as even the most sophisticated algorithms lack the cultural and contextual knowledge to completely take over this task. Content moderation is an extremely labour-intensive, politically-sensitive and crucial economic aspect of digital social media. Again, the Philippines have become a global hub for commercial content moderation, where tens of thousands of workers sort through the digital waste of social media.[^altenried_27] The labour of cleaning predominantly Western social media includes an important affective component. Scanning up to 6.000 pictures or 1.000 videos per day, many of which contain brutal torture or even murder, racism and sexual violence, leaves emotional traces with many workers. Many Filipino workers who become digital migrants to especially violent sections of Western sociality, often report depression, sleeping disorders and affective and sexual problems.[^altenried_28] In addition to offering relatively cheap labour, the Philippines have become a hub for content moderation due to its Spanish and US colonial and post-colonial history because of which it has a workforce that speaks (often American-accented) English, is predominantly catholic, and literate in US culture. It is precisely these histories that need to be foregrounded in the analysis the racialization of labour. ‘Ethnicization’ needs to be a crucial dimension but not in terms of fixed races. On the contrary, it needs to investigate precisely how ethnicity becomes a resource to be mobilised and exploited.[^altenried_29]
@ -92,83 +94,42 @@ Behind these very visible forms of the mobility of people and goods, the forms o
# References # References
[^altenried_1] The article is based on a talk we gave during the conference “Diversity encounters”, held at Humboldt-University in May 2016, and organised by Humboldt-University in Berlin and the National University of Singapore. We would like to especially thank Sabrina Apicella for many discussions concerning the digitisation and mobility of labour. [^altenried_1]: The article is based on a talk we gave during the conference “Diversity encounters”, held at Humboldt-University in May 2016, and organised by Humboldt-University in Berlin and the National University of Singapore. We would like to especially thank Sabrina Apicella for many discussions concerning the digitisation and mobility of labour.
[^altenried_2]: Cp. Moritz Altenried, “Le container et l’algorithme: la logistique dans le capitalisme global”, _Période_, 2016. Available at: http://revueperiode.net/le-container-et-lalgorithme-la-logistique-dans-le-capitalisme-global/ [accessed February 20, 2017]; Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge, _Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life_, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2011.
[^altenried_2] Cp. Moritz Altenried, “Le container et l’algorithme: la logistique dans le capitalisme global”, *Période*, 2016. Available at: http://revueperiode.net/le-container-et-lalgorithme-la-logistique-dans-le-capitalisme-global/ [accessed February 20, 2017]; Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge, *Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2011. [^altenried_3]: Cp. Ned Rossiter, _Software, Infrastructure, Labor – A Media Theory of Logistical Nightmares_, New York, Routledge, 2016; Christoph Rosol, _RFID: Vom Ursprung einer (all)gegenwärtigen Kulturtechnologie_, Berlin, Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2007.
[^altenried_4]: Cp. Xiang Biao, _Global ‘Body Shopping’. An Indian Labor System in the Information Technology Industry_, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2007.
[^altenried_5]: Aneesh Aneesh, _Virtual Migration. The Programming of Globalization_, Durham/London, Duke University Press, 2006, p. 3.
[^altenried_3] Cp. Ned Rossiter, *Software, Infrastructure, Labor – A Media Theory of Logistical Nightmares*, New York, Routledge, 2016; Christoph Rosol, *RFID: Vom Ursprung einer (all)gegenwärtigen Kulturtechnologie*, Berlin, Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2007. [^altenried_6]: Aneesh Aneesh, _Virtual Migration_, p. 2.
[^altenried_7]: Cp. Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, _Border as Method, Or, the Multiplication of Labor_, Durham/London, Duke University Press, 2013.
[^altenried_4] Cp. Xiang Biao, *Global ‘Body Shopping’. An Indian Labor System in the Information Technology Industry*, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2007. [^altenried_8]: Xiang Biao, “The Would-Be Migrant: Post-Socialist Primitive Accumulation, Potential Transnational Mobility, and the Displacement of the Present in Northeast China”, _TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia_, 2(2), 2014, pp. 183-199.
[^altenried_9]: Cp. Julian Dibbell, “The Decline and Fall of an Ultra Rich Online Gaming Empire”, _Wired_, 2008. Available at: https://www.wired.com/2008/11/ff-ige/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_5] Aneesh Aneesh, *Virtual Migration. The Programming of Globalization*, Durham/London, Duke University Press, 2006, p. 3. [^altenried_10]: Richard Heeks, “Current analysis and future research agenda on ‘gold farming’: Real-world production in developing countries for the virtual economies of online games”, Development informatics working paper 32, Institute for Development Policy and Management, 2008. Available at: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/institutes/gdi/publications/workingpapers/di/di_wp32.pdf [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_11]: Nick Ryan, “Gold Trading Exposed: The Sellers”, _Eurogamer.net_, 2009. Available at: http://www.eurogamer.net/articles/gold-trading-exposed-the-sellers-article?page=3 [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_6] Aneesh Aneesh, *Virtual Migration*, p. 2. [^altenried_12]: Scott Rettberg, “Corporate Ideology in World of Warcraft”, in Hilde G. Corneliussen, Scott Rettberg and Jill Walker (eds.), _Digital Culture, Play, and Identity. A World of Warcraft Reader_, Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 2008, pp. 19-38, here: p. 30.
[^altenried_13]: He Huifeng, “Chinese ‘Farmers’ Strike Cyber Gold”, _South China Morning Post_, 2005. Available at: http://english.cri.cn/2238/2005-10-25/160@278526.htm [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_7] Cp. Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, Or, the Multiplication of Labor*, Durham/London, Duke University Press, 2013. [^altenried_14]: Cp. Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter, _Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Video Games_, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p. 145.
[^altenried_15]: Cp. Lisa Nakamura, “Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the Game: The Racialization of Labor in World of Warcraft”, _Critical Studies in Media Communication_, 26(2), 2009, pp. 128-144.
[^altenried_8] Xiang Biao, “The Would-Be Migrant: Post-Socialist Primitive Accumulation, Potential Transnational Mobility, and the Displacement of the Present in Northeast China”, *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia*, 2(2), 2014, pp. 183-199. [^altenried_16]: Cp. Constance Steinkuehler, “The mangle of play”, _Games and Culture_, 1(3), 2006, pp. 199-213, here: p. 208.
[^altenried_17]: Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, _Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Video Games_, p. 147.
[^altenried_9] Cp. Julian Dibbell, “The Decline and Fall of an Ultra Rich Online Gaming Empire”, *Wired*, 2008. Available at: https://www.wired.com/2008/11/ff-ige/ [accessed February 20, 2017]. [^altenried_18]: Cp. Nakamura, “Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the Game: The Racialization of Labor in World of Warcraft”, pp. 134ff.
[^altenried_19]: Cp. David Theo Goldberg, _Are We All Postracial Yet?_, Cambridge, Polity, 2015.
[^altenried_10] Richard Heeks, “Current analysis and future research agenda on ‘gold farming’: Real-world production in developing countries for the virtual economies of online games”, Development informatics working paper 32, Institute for Development Policy and Management, 2008. Available at: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/institutes/gdi/publications/workingpapers/di/di_wp32.pdf [accessed February 20, 2017]. [^altenried_20]: Mezzadra and Neilson, _Border as Method, Or, the Multiplication of Labor_, p. 20.
[^altenried_21]: Ann Tsing, “Supply Chains and the Human Condition”, _Rethinking Marxism_, 21(2), 2009, pp. 148-176, here: p. 161.
[^altenried_11] Nick Ryan, “Gold Trading Exposed: The Sellers”, *Eurogamer.net*, 2009. Available at: http://www.eurogamer.net/articles/gold-trading-exposed-the-sellers-article?page=3 [accessed February 20, 2017]. [^altenried_22]: Cp. Julian Dibbell, “The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer”, _New York Times Magazine_, 2007. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-t.html?pagewanted=all [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_23]: Cp. Mezzadra and Neilson, _Border as Method, or the Multiplication of Labour_, pp. 159ff.
[^altenried_12] Scott Rettberg, “Corporate Ideology in World of Warcraft”, in Hilde G. Corneliussen, Scott Rettberg and Jill Walker (eds.), *Digital Culture, Play, and Identity. A World of Warcraft Reader*, Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 2008, pp. 19-38, here: p. 30. [^altenried_24]: Mezzadra and Neilson, _Border as Method_, p. 23.
[^altenried_25]: Cp. Aimee Carrillo Rowe, Sheena Malhotra and Kimberlee Pérez, _Answer the Call. Virtual Migration in Indian Call Centers_, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2013.
[^altenried_13] He Huifeng, “Chinese ‘Farmers’ Strike Cyber Gold”, *South China Morning Post*, 2005. Available at: http://english.cri.cn/2238/2005-10-25/160@278526.htm [accessed February 20, 2017]. [^altenried_26]: Cp. Vikas Bajaj, “A New Capital of Call Centers”, _The New York Times_, 2011. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/business/philippines-overtakes-india-as-hub-of-call-centers.html [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_27]: Cp. Sarah T. Roberts, “Digital Refuse: Canadian Garbage, Commercial Content Moderation and the Global Circulation of Social Media’s Waste”, _Wi: Journal of Mobile Media_, 10(1), 2016. Available at: http://wi.mobilities.ca/digitalrefuse/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_14] Cp. Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter, *Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Video Games*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p. 145. [^altenried_28]: Cp. Adrian Chen, “The Laborers who Keep the Dick Pics and Beheadings out of your Facebook Feed”, _Wired_, 2014. Available at: https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_29]: Cp. Xiang, _Global ‘Body Shopping’_.
[^altenried_15] Cp. Lisa Nakamura, “Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the Game: The Racialization of Labor in World of Warcraft”, *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 26(2), 2009, pp. 128-144. [^altenried_30]: Cp. Lilly Irani, “Difference and Dependence among Digital Workers: The Case of Amazon Mechanical Turk”, _South Atlantic Quarterly_, 114(1), 2015, pp. 225-34.
[^altenried_31]: Nick Srnicek, _Platform Capitalism_, Cambridge, Polity, 2016.
[^altenried_16] Cp. Constance Steinkuehler, “The mangle of play”, *Games and Culture*, 1(3), 2006, pp. 199-213, here: p. 208. [^altenried_32]: Cp. Moritz Altenried, “Die Geburt der künstlich künstlichen Intelligenz. Crowdwork, Prekarisierung und digitale Selbstorganisierung”, _Zeitschrift Luxemburg_, 2015. Available at: http://www.zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/die-geburt-der-kuenstlich-kuenstlichen-intelligenz/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_33]: Cp. Lilly Irani, “Justice for ‘Data Janitors’”, _Public Books_, 2015. Available at: http://www.publicbooks.org/justice-for-data-janitors/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_17] Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, *Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Video Games*, p. 147. [^altenried_34]: Cp. Antonio A. Casilli, “Never Mind the Algorithms: The Role of Click Farms and Exploited Digital Labour in Trump’s Election”, 2016. Available at: http://www.casilli.fr/2016/11/20/never-mind-the-algorithms-the-role-of-exploited-digital-labor-and-global-click-farms-in-trumps-election/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_35]: Cp. Jennings Brown, “There’s something odd about Donald Trump’s Facebook page”, _Business Insider_, 2016. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trumps-facebook-followers-2015-6?IR=T [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_18] Cp. Nakamura, “Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the Game: The Racialization of Labor in World of Warcraft”, pp. 134ff. [^altenried_36]: Cp. Mary-Ann Russon, “Donald Trump outsourced a teen’s computer skills to create campaign video for youth votes”, _International Business Times_, 2016. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/donald-trump-outsourced-teens-computer-skills-create-campaign-video-youth-votes-1592089 [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_37]: Cp. Pun Ngai, _Migrant Labour in China_, Polity, Oxford, 2016.
[^altenried_19] Cp. David Theo Goldberg, *Are We All Postracial Yet?*, Cambridge, Polity, 2015. [^altenried_38]: Cp. Manuela Bojadžijev, “‘Najkraci put u svet’ – Der kürzeste Weg in die Welt. Migration, Bürgerrechte und die EU in den Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien”, in Forschungsgruppe Transit Migration (ed.), _Turbulente Ränder. Neue Perspekitven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas_, Bielefeld, transcript, 2007, pp. 87-106.
[^altenried_39]: Deborah Cowen, _The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade_, Minneapolis/London, University of Minnesota Press, 2014, p. 67.
[^altenried_20] Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method, Or, the Multiplication of Labor*, p. 20.
[^altenried_21] Ann Tsing, “Supply Chains and the Human Condition”, *Rethinking Marxism*, 21(2), 2009, pp. 148-176, here: p. 161.
[^altenried_22] Cp. Julian Dibbell, “The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer”, *New York Times Magazine*, 2007. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-t.html?pagewanted=all [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_23] Cp. Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method, or the Multiplication of Labour*, pp. 159ff.
[^altenried_24] Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method*, p. 23.
[^altenried_25] Cp. Aimee Carrillo Rowe, Sheena Malhotra and Kimberlee Pérez, *Answer the Call. Virtual Migration in Indian Call Centers*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2013.
[^altenried_26] Cp. Vikas Bajaj, “A New Capital of Call Centers”, *The New York Times*, 2011. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/business/philippines-overtakes-india-as-hub-of-call-centers.html [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_27] Cp. Sarah T. Roberts, “Digital Refuse: Canadian Garbage, Commercial Content Moderation and the Global Circulation of Social Media’s Waste”, *Wi: Journal of Mobile Media*, 10(1), 2016. Available at: http://wi.mobilities.ca/digitalrefuse/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_28] Cp. Adrian Chen, “The Laborers who Keep the Dick Pics and Beheadings out of your Facebook Feed”, *Wired*, 2014. Available at: https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_29] Cp. Xiang, *Global ‘Body Shopping’*.
[^altenried_30] Cp. Lilly Irani, “Difference and Dependence among Digital Workers: The Case of Amazon Mechanical Turk”, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 114(1), 2015, pp. 225-34.
[^altenried_31] Nick Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism*, Cambridge, Polity, 2016.
[^altenried_32] Cp. Moritz Altenried, “Die Geburt der künstlich künstlichen Intelligenz. Crowdwork, Prekarisierung und digitale Selbstorganisierung”, *Zeitschrift Luxemburg*, 2015. Available at: http://www.zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/die-geburt-der-kuenstlich-kuenstlichen-intelligenz/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_33] Cp. Lilly Irani, “Justice for ‘Data Janitors’”, *Public Books*, 2015. Available at: http://www.publicbooks.org/justice-for-data-janitors/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_34] Cp. Antonio A. Casilli, “Never Mind the Algorithms: The Role of Click Farms and Exploited Digital Labour in Trump’s Election”, 2016. Available at: http://www.casilli.fr/2016/11/20/never-mind-the-algorithms-the-role-of-exploited-digital-labor-and-global-click-farms-in-trumps-election/ [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_35] Cp. Jennings Brown, “There’s something odd about Donald Trump’s Facebook page”, *Business Insider*, 2016. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trumps-facebook-followers-2015-6?IR=T [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_36] Cp. Mary-Ann Russon, “Donald Trump outsourced a teen’s computer skills to create campaign video for youth votes”, *International Business Times*, 2016. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/donald-trump-outsourced-teens-computer-skills-create-campaign-video-youth-votes-1592089 [accessed February 20, 2017].
[^altenried_37] Cp. Pun Ngai, *Migrant Labour in China*, Polity, Oxford, 2016.
[^altenried_38] Cp. Manuela Bojadžijev, “‘Najkraci put u svet’ – Der kürzeste Weg in die Welt. Migration, Bürgerrechte und die EU in den Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien”, in Forschungsgruppe Transit Migration (ed.), *Turbulente Ränder. Neue Perspekitven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas*, Bielefeld, transcript, 2007, pp. 87-106.
[^altenried_39] Deborah Cowen, *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade*, Minneapolis/London, University of Minnesota Press, 2014, p. 67.

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title = "Politics of Disobedience – Ensuring Freedom of Movements in a B/Ordered World" title = "Politics of Disobedience – Ensuring Freedom of Movements in a B/Ordered World"
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Acts of border crossing bring territory and body together in deeply contrasting ways. As such, the border constitutes the space where different visions of mobility clash on an everyday basis. This raises questions as to what kind and scale of politics might work in that contested territory. Current migration policies guarantee a system of privileges in which *a few* are allowed to freely move while *many* are under attack throughout their journey. Indeed, in order to sustain such a hierarchical system, a high-tech matrix of violent surveillance mechanisms and exclusionary bureaucracies has developed inside and outside borderlines. This unequal way of dealing with human mobility, is slowly being normalised and if contested, usually focuses on the humanitarian consequences affecting a concrete set of people. Outraged by the unnecessary and ongoing human suffering that is institutionally induced, certain pro-migration activist initiatives work on exposing and avoiding the structural logics and practices of arbitrary restriction enacted by this border matrix. Movements are able to do this by not taking two main axes of migration control ideology for granted: the space of the border and the condition of illegality. Acts of border crossing bring territory and body together in deeply contrasting ways. As such, the border constitutes the space where different visions of mobility clash on an everyday basis. This raises questions as to what kind and scale of politics might work in that contested territory. Current migration policies guarantee a system of privileges in which _a few_ are allowed to freely move while _many_ are under attack throughout their journey. Indeed, in order to sustain such a hierarchical system, a high-tech matrix of violent surveillance mechanisms and exclusionary bureaucracies has developed inside and outside borderlines. This unequal way of dealing with human mobility, is slowly being normalised and if contested, usually focuses on the humanitarian consequences affecting a concrete set of people. Outraged by the unnecessary and ongoing human suffering that is institutionally induced, certain pro-migration activist initiatives work on exposing and avoiding the structural logics and practices of arbitrary restriction enacted by this border matrix. Movements are able to do this by not taking two main axes of migration control ideology for granted: the space of the border and the condition of illegality.
Such questioning is an exception in conventional thinking about migration, which is based on a double assumption in both territorial and identity terms: First, borders are conventionally understood as clearly marked lines between countries, and second; the ingrained dichotomy of *citizen/illegal* is taken as a given, as two tattoos distinguishing who belongs to the assumed *us* and who, to the risky *them*. Even some scholarly literature on irregular migration and border management runs the risk of normalising those categories. On the one hand, studies focused on state-centered approaches to international relations ignore the growing policies of border externalisation by the EU, US and Australia. On the other hand, empirical studies trying to quantify and qualify types of human mobility as well as map irregular itineraries in terms of origin, transit and destination, contribute to normalising and legitimising the controversial exclusionary logic of migration control policies. Such questioning is an exception in conventional thinking about migration, which is based on a double assumption in both territorial and identity terms: First, borders are conventionally understood as clearly marked lines between countries, and second; the ingrained dichotomy of _citizen/illegal_ is taken as a given, as two tattoos distinguishing who belongs to the assumed _us_ and who, to the risky _them_. Even some scholarly literature on irregular migration and border management runs the risk of normalising those categories. On the one hand, studies focused on state-centered approaches to international relations ignore the growing policies of border externalisation by the EU, US and Australia. On the other hand, empirical studies trying to quantify and qualify types of human mobility as well as map irregular itineraries in terms of origin, transit and destination, contribute to normalising and legitimising the controversial exclusionary logic of migration control policies.
In contrast, a growing literature of intertwined scholarly and activist analyses speak about migration control in “biopolitical” terms, genealogically exploring the social construction of policies, their corresponding practices of power/knowledge, and the intricate logics of visibility/invisibility. Thus, critical migration studies offer sharp deconstructive readings of borders,[^casascortes_1] citizenship,[^casascortes_2] and illegality.[^casascortes_3] For instance, border control beyond territorial lines, points to how the act of bordering not only takes place at expected points of entry, but how practices of policing, interception and deterrence are carried out within and outside the border lines of the destination state’s territory. Also, the notion of legality is presented as a spectrum of different existential conditions, marked by paper work and bureaucratic encounters. Such notions take us not only to more complex territorial arrangements of migration control, but also to a broader understanding of migration policy as a producer and reproducer of hierarchies among people, in terms of access to entitlements, mainly the freedom to move. The lack of implementation of the historical and legally-grounded “Right to Migrate”[^casascortes_4] allows for the normalisation of exclusionary practices, as the Nijmegen school puts it: “B/Ordering as Ordering and *Othering*.”[^casascortes_5] Current forms of *migration management* – to use the neutral-sounding terms of policy – are indeed selectively restrictive, designating who is permitted to move, who is not, and under what conditions.[^casascortes_6] When this approach to human mobility trickles down and gets materialised through an assemblage of laws, policies, bureaucracies, surveillance technologies, interceptions at sea, and military operations, the given result is the disproportionate distinction between populations. This is when certain international patterns of mobility that have occurred historically (e.g. between Morocco and Spain before Spain’s EEC membership) are *illegalised*. They become targets of surveillance and policing, since they are reconceived as potential channels for criminal activity, such as terrorism and the trafficking of drugs (more so since the European Security Strategy of 2003). In contrast, a growing literature of intertwined scholarly and activist analyses speak about migration control in “biopolitical” terms, genealogically exploring the social construction of policies, their corresponding practices of power/knowledge, and the intricate logics of visibility/invisibility. Thus, critical migration studies offer sharp deconstructive readings of borders,[^casascortes_1] citizenship,[^casascortes_2] and illegality.[^casascortes_3] For instance, border control beyond territorial lines, points to how the act of bordering not only takes place at expected points of entry, but how practices of policing, interception and deterrence are carried out within and outside the border lines of the destination state’s territory. Also, the notion of legality is presented as a spectrum of different existential conditions, marked by paper work and bureaucratic encounters. Such notions take us not only to more complex territorial arrangements of migration control, but also to a broader understanding of migration policy as a producer and reproducer of hierarchies among people, in terms of access to entitlements, mainly the freedom to move. The lack of implementation of the historical and legally-grounded “Right to Migrate”[^casascortes_4] allows for the normalisation of exclusionary practices, as the Nijmegen school puts it: “B/Ordering as Ordering and _Othering_.”[^casascortes_5] Current forms of _migration management_ – to use the neutral-sounding terms of policy – are indeed selectively restrictive, designating who is permitted to move, who is not, and under what conditions.[^casascortes_6] When this approach to human mobility trickles down and gets materialised through an assemblage of laws, policies, bureaucracies, surveillance technologies, interceptions at sea, and military operations, the given result is the disproportionate distinction between populations. This is when certain international patterns of mobility that have occurred historically (e.g. between Morocco and Spain before Spain’s EEC membership) are _illegalised_. They become targets of surveillance and policing, since they are reconceived as potential channels for criminal activity, such as terrorism and the trafficking of drugs (more so since the European Security Strategy of 2003).
Such a cross-disciplinary body of critical migration studies, calls for the recording of both the violent traces of borders on bodies[^casascortes_7] and of the ways in which the act of b/ordering is designed and implemented, tracking down the material practices of migration policy representatives, security experts and border authorities. This is precisely what *WatchtheMed* and *AlarmPhone* are carrying out, a methodology of ‘counter-mapping’ the border regime, showing how a repressive system is operationalised from the inside out. In this way, particular operations of the EU’s external border regime in the Mediterranean are tracked, mapped and dissected – not only to highlight and predict its lethal outcomes – but to try to efficiently intervene during a moment of distress within the ongoing biopolitical war on migrants, to ensure rescue, or clandestinity if that is what is needed. Such a cross-disciplinary body of critical migration studies, calls for the recording of both the violent traces of borders on bodies[^casascortes_7] and of the ways in which the act of b/ordering is designed and implemented, tracking down the material practices of migration policy representatives, security experts and border authorities. This is precisely what _WatchtheMed_ and _AlarmPhone_ are carrying out, a methodology of ‘counter-mapping’ the border regime, showing how a repressive system is operationalised from the inside out. In this way, particular operations of the EU’s external border regime in the Mediterranean are tracked, mapped and dissected – not only to highlight and predict its lethal outcomes – but to try to efficiently intervene during a moment of distress within the ongoing biopolitical war on migrants, to ensure rescue, or clandestinity if that is what is needed.
Existing activist practices that support transborder mobilities and migratory acts of escape grow out of a complex take on b/ordering. Indeed, those biopolitical readings of the border – including approaches inspired in the *Autonomy of Migration*[^casascortes_8] – materialise into a series of political practices for freedom of movement in times when representative democratic systems do not seem to represent many of its constituencies’ needs and opinions. This question of migration is well captured by the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights in his public address in early 2017: Existing activist practices that support transborder mobilities and migratory acts of escape grow out of a complex take on b/ordering. Indeed, those biopolitical readings of the border – including approaches inspired in the _Autonomy of Migration_[^casascortes_8] – materialise into a series of political practices for freedom of movement in times when representative democratic systems do not seem to represent many of its constituencies’ needs and opinions. This question of migration is well captured by the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights in his public address in early 2017:
>“Many ordinary people in Europe have welcomed and supported migrants, but political leaders increasingly demonstrate a chilling indifference to their fate. I am particularly disturbed by lurid public narratives which appear deliberately aimed at stirring up public fear and panic, by depicting these vulnerable people as criminal invading hordes.”[^casascortes_9] (Geneve, March 8, 2017) > “Many ordinary people in Europe have welcomed and supported migrants, but political leaders increasingly demonstrate a chilling indifference to their fate. I am particularly disturbed by lurid public narratives which appear deliberately aimed at stirring up public fear and panic, by depicting these vulnerable people as criminal invading hordes.”[^casascortes_9] (Geneve, March 8, 2017)
Given the political impasse regarding migration in EUrope, grassroots and independent organisations such as *Sans-Papiers*, *Welcome to Europe*, *No one is Illegal*, *Precarious and Migrants Unite*, *NoBorders*, *Frassantio Network*, *WatchtheMed*, *Ferrocarril Clandestino*, *Boats4People*, *Afrique Europe Interact*, *Borderline-Europe*, *No Borders Morocco*, *FFM*, *Voix des Migrants*, and the *AlarmPhone*, have been acting under the same political logic of the abolitionist movement against slavery a century ago. Addressing a fictional ‘public opinion’ by denouncing the brutal violence of a repressive system that denies ‘freedom’ to many, was not enough. Rather, this mode of political action runs ‘underground’, permeating the everyday, through practices of mutual aid and social media, aimed at preventing further containment of mobility, ensuring safe escape, arrival and stay. Heller, Pezzani and Stierl’s account of struggles against the EUropean border regime in the Mediterranean invoke the resistance by the Underground Railroad during the era of slavery in the USA. In a similar way, ‘disobedience’ emerges as a legitimate form of politics in advanced democracies, which discursively claim to represent but ignore their own supposed demos within their territories. Given the political impasse regarding migration in EUrope, grassroots and independent organisations such as _Sans-Papiers_, _Welcome to Europe_, _No one is Illegal_, _Precarious and Migrants Unite_, _NoBorders_, _Frassantio Network_, _WatchtheMed_, _Ferrocarril Clandestino_, _Boats4People_, _Afrique Europe Interact_, _Borderline-Europe_, _No Borders Morocco_, _FFM_, _Voix des Migrants_, and the _AlarmPhone_, have been acting under the same political logic of the abolitionist movement against slavery a century ago. Addressing a fictional ‘public opinion’ by denouncing the brutal violence of a repressive system that denies ‘freedom’ to many, was not enough. Rather, this mode of political action runs ‘underground’, permeating the everyday, through practices of mutual aid and social media, aimed at preventing further containment of mobility, ensuring safe escape, arrival and stay. Heller, Pezzani and Stierl’s account of struggles against the EUropean border regime in the Mediterranean invoke the resistance by the Underground Railroad during the era of slavery in the USA. In a similar way, ‘disobedience’ emerges as a legitimate form of politics in advanced democracies, which discursively claim to represent but ignore their own supposed demos within their territories.
Border regimes attempt to distinguish and separate populations according to mobility rights. Yet, there is a possibility of finding a common ground between ‘populations’ via sharing a politics of disobedience towards that very border regime. These include those deemed as *EU citizens*, the ones allowed to move. Disobedient citizens are claiming and enacting the right to look (*WatchtheMed*) and the right to listen (*AlarmPhone*) to the hidden violence of the border, “turning surveillance against itself”: Border regimes attempt to distinguish and separate populations according to mobility rights. Yet, there is a possibility of finding a common ground between ‘populations’ via sharing a politics of disobedience towards that very border regime. These include those deemed as _EU citizens_, the ones allowed to move. Disobedient citizens are claiming and enacting the right to look (_WatchtheMed_) and the right to listen (_AlarmPhone_) to the hidden violence of the border, “turning surveillance against itself”:
> “In its two years of existence, the phone project has gathered extraordinary momentum, supported about 1,800 boats in distress, and has thus proven to be one of the most important political interventions against the EU border regime in recent years”. > “In its two years of existence, the phone project has gathered extraordinary momentum, supported about 1,800 boats in distress, and has thus proven to be one of the most important political interventions against the EU border regime in recent years”.
Also, those produced as *irregular migrants*, people on the move despite not being granted the right to do so, are also engaging in practices of disobedience. As Heller, Pezzani and Stierl point out: Also, those produced as _irregular migrants_, people on the move despite not being granted the right to do so, are also engaging in practices of disobedience. As Heller, Pezzani and Stierl point out:
> “Illegalised migrants seize a right to move across borders which is denied to them, and contest through this very act, the dictatorial nature of all migration policies.” > “Illegalised migrants seize a right to move across borders which is denied to them, and contest through this very act, the dictatorial nature of all migration policies.”
These *illegalised* migrants can be morphed into security concerns as ‘irregular flows’, creating a need to trap them on time and contain them in space (Detention centres, Hot Spots, etc.), processed and categorised under a single legal status, and embodied by a non-white, male figure. An autonomous/disobedient gaze on migration[^casascortes_10] breaks with such a portrait of the ‘clandestine’ and offers a take on illegality as a fluid spectrum of legal statues and diverse existential conditions that a person accused of ‘illegalized movement’ goes through. By crossing borders, this person is not only addressing a historical human need and desire – mobility and transportation – but is also acting politically against a restrictive system. In this way, disobedient practices reframe and update the current political repertoire of collective action and personal identities. The same person who jumped the fence, might soon disobey the border regime through other acts of ensuring further movement and access to goods and services. These _illegalised_ migrants can be morphed into security concerns as ‘irregular flows’, creating a need to trap them on time and contain them in space (Detention centres, Hot Spots, etc.), processed and categorised under a single legal status, and embodied by a non-white, male figure. An autonomous/disobedient gaze on migration[^casascortes_10] breaks with such a portrait of the ‘clandestine’ and offers a take on illegality as a fluid spectrum of legal statues and diverse existential conditions that a person accused of ‘illegalized movement’ goes through. By crossing borders, this person is not only addressing a historical human need and desire – mobility and transportation – but is also acting politically against a restrictive system. In this way, disobedient practices reframe and update the current political repertoire of collective action and personal identities. The same person who jumped the fence, might soon disobey the border regime through other acts of ensuring further movement and access to goods and services.
Acts of disobedience under a regime that legitimises and implements obstacles to freedom of movement, are also practiced by holders of temporary work visas – including those highly skilled and with dependents – when ‘overstaying’ and taking their ‘illegal’ children to school and medical services, acting as a citizen without papers.[^casascortes_11] Thinking in terms of the irregular migrant as the extreme of total exclusion and unbearable suffering, does not allow seeing the long and changing spectrum of the machinery of exclusion. Moving away from the focus on the ‘illegal’ as a homogenous figure, broadens our horizon of political possibilities at the border zones. The border regime is not only producing and targeting those “irregular flows”, but also differentiating as *uneven mobilities* – temporary visa holders, refugees, deportees, asylum seekers, emigrants, etc. If we get stuck in the framework of two extremes – the totally excluded Other and the normal citizen – our gaze will turn to focus solely on suffering by a hard-to-relate-with Other, leading to forms of ‘top-down solidarity’, or its inversion, seeing every act of border crossing as a heroic act of resistance. While the witnessing of vast suffering created by the volumetric border regime is a must, *WatchtheMed* and *AlarmPhone* constitute exemplars of autonomous forms of intervention, which instead of homogenising and romanticising the figure of the clandestine,[^casascortes_12] sustain and call for a shared politics of disobedience. Acts of disobedience under a regime that legitimises and implements obstacles to freedom of movement, are also practiced by holders of temporary work visas – including those highly skilled and with dependents – when ‘overstaying’ and taking their ‘illegal’ children to school and medical services, acting as a citizen without papers.[^casascortes_11] Thinking in terms of the irregular migrant as the extreme of total exclusion and unbearable suffering, does not allow seeing the long and changing spectrum of the machinery of exclusion. Moving away from the focus on the ‘illegal’ as a homogenous figure, broadens our horizon of political possibilities at the border zones. The border regime is not only producing and targeting those “irregular flows”, but also differentiating as _uneven mobilities_ – temporary visa holders, refugees, deportees, asylum seekers, emigrants, etc. If we get stuck in the framework of two extremes – the totally excluded Other and the normal citizen – our gaze will turn to focus solely on suffering by a hard-to-relate-with Other, leading to forms of ‘top-down solidarity’, or its inversion, seeing every act of border crossing as a heroic act of resistance. While the witnessing of vast suffering created by the volumetric border regime is a must, _WatchtheMed_ and _AlarmPhone_ constitute exemplars of autonomous forms of intervention, which instead of homogenising and romanticising the figure of the clandestine,[^casascortes_12] sustain and call for a shared politics of disobedience.
Critical race studies and anti-racist organising have learned this lesson well, pointing to the inaccuracy and political disaster of thinking and acting in dichotomies. Biopolitical readings of illegality draw from studies on racialisation processes and are aware of the multiplicity and unexpected overlapping of axes of oppression. In this way, the figure of the *emigrant* comes into play when talking about disobedient politics and the migration regime. Many who hold EU passports are going through long-term periods of short-term contracts, loss of benefits and increasingly uncertain livelihoods. *Precarity*, as the induced condition of instability under neoliberal globalisation, is leading to growing numbers of EU citizens to migrate to north-Atlantic areas, but also, and less important for governmental statistics and the media, to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Engaging in no-border activism requires thinking in terms of both inward and outward migration, ensuring safe escape, arrival and stay to all those moving. Indeed, a shared politics of disobedience might well serve many of those EUropeans abroad who are going through situations of irregularity and *semi-compliance*.[^casascortes_13] Critical race studies and anti-racist organising have learned this lesson well, pointing to the inaccuracy and political disaster of thinking and acting in dichotomies. Biopolitical readings of illegality draw from studies on racialisation processes and are aware of the multiplicity and unexpected overlapping of axes of oppression. In this way, the figure of the _emigrant_ comes into play when talking about disobedient politics and the migration regime. Many who hold EU passports are going through long-term periods of short-term contracts, loss of benefits and increasingly uncertain livelihoods. _Precarity_, as the induced condition of instability under neoliberal globalisation, is leading to growing numbers of EU citizens to migrate to north-Atlantic areas, but also, and less important for governmental statistics and the media, to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Engaging in no-border activism requires thinking in terms of both inward and outward migration, ensuring safe escape, arrival and stay to all those moving. Indeed, a shared politics of disobedience might well serve many of those EUropeans abroad who are going through situations of irregularity and _semi-compliance_.[^casascortes_13]
As an immigrant under the Trump administration, I recall the productive grassroots organising in Spain right after the *15M* or *Indignados* movement during the Occupy wave: Increasingly precarious young people with “no job/no house/no future” about to migrate themselves, were linking arms with migrants from non-EU countries. While marked by racialised differences, a shared politics of disobedience might lead to an effective common struggle for access to b/ordered territories and their correspondent entitlements. When recognising how precarious conditions are spreading temporary arrangements and a continuous indeterminacy of life, the solidarity call of “we are all migrants” becomes even more real.[^casascortes_14] This is when a shared politics of disobedience makes sense in its assertiveness of contesting borders and ensuring freedom of movement for all. As an immigrant under the Trump administration, I recall the productive grassroots organising in Spain right after the _15M_ or _Indignados_ movement during the Occupy wave: Increasingly precarious young people with “no job/no house/no future” about to migrate themselves, were linking arms with migrants from non-EU countries. While marked by racialised differences, a shared politics of disobedience might lead to an effective common struggle for access to b/ordered territories and their correspondent entitlements. When recognising how precarious conditions are spreading temporary arrangements and a continuous indeterminacy of life, the solidarity call of “we are all migrants” becomes even more real.[^casascortes_14] This is when a shared politics of disobedience makes sense in its assertiveness of contesting borders and ensuring freedom of movement for all.
# References # References
[^casascortes_1] Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the ‘Lines in the Sand’ Agenda”, *Geopolitics*, 17(4), 2012, pp. 727–33. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.706111 [accessed June 14, 2017]. [^casascortes_1]: Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the ‘Lines in the Sand’ Agenda”, _Geopolitics_, 17(4), 2012, pp. 727–33. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.706111 [accessed June 14, 2017].
[^casascortes_2]: Vicki Squire, _The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity_, London/New York, Routledge, 2012.
[^casascortes_2] Vicki Squire, *The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity*, London/New York, Routledge, 2012. [^casascortes_3]: Nicholas De Genova, _The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement_, Durham, NC, Duke University Press Books, 2010.
[^casascortes_4]: Ángel G. Chueca Chueca-Sancho, _Derechos humanos, inmigrantes en situación irregular y Unión Europea_, Lex Nova, 2010.
[^casascortes_3] Nicholas De Genova, *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press Books, 2010. [^casascortes_5]: Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen, “Bordering, Ordering and Othering”, _Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie_, 93(2), 2002, pp. 125–36. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9663.00189 [accessed June 14, 2017].
[^casascortes_6]: EU Council, “EU Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy”, 1998. Available at: http://archiv.proasyl.de/texte/europe/eu-a-o.htm [accessed January, 31 2017].
[^casascortes_4] Ángel G. Chueca Chueca-Sancho, *Derechos humanos, inmigrantes en situación irregular y Unión Europea*, Lex Nova, 2010. [^casascortes_7]: Jason De León, _The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail_, California Series in Public Anthropology, 36, Oakland, California, University of California Press, 2015.
[^casascortes_8]: Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, _Border as Method, Or, the Multiplication of Labor_, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2013.
[^casascortes_5] Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen, “Bordering, Ordering and Othering”, *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie*, 93(2), 2002, pp. 125–36. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9663.00189 [accessed June 14, 2017]. [^casascortes_9]: UNOG, “UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein highlights current major human rights issues in more than 40 countries around the world in an address at the UN Human Right Council in Geneva, 8 March 2017”, UNOG. _The United Nations Office at Geneva_, 2017. Available at: http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/321DBF8562C5336BC12580DD003BF66E?OpenDocument [accessed June 14, 2017].
[^casascortes_10]: Sandro Mezzadra, “The Gaze of Autonomy: Capitalism, Migration, and Social Struggles”, in Vicki Squire (ed.), _The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity_, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 121–42.
[^casascortes_6] EU Council, “EU Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy”, 1998. Available at: http://archiv.proasyl.de/texte/europe/eu-a-o.htm [accessed January, 31 2017]. [^casascortes_11]: Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel (eds.), _Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement_, Routledge Research on the Global Politics of Migration, 2, London/New York, Routledge, 2012.
[^casascortes_12]: Stephan Scheel, “Studying Embodied Encounters: Autonomy of Migration beyond its Romanticization”, _Postcolonial Studies_, 16(3), 2013, pp. 279–288. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2013.850046 [accessed June 14, 2017].
[^casascortes_7] Jason De León, *The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail*, California Series in Public Anthropology, 36, Oakland, California, University of California Press, 2015. [^casascortes_13]: Bridget Anderson, _Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control_, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.
[^casascortes_14]: Gregory Feldman, _We Are All Migrants: Political Action and the Ubiquitous Condition of Migrant-Hood_, Stanford, California, Stanford Briefs, 2015.
[^casascortes_8] Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, Or, the Multiplication of Labor*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2013.
[^casascortes_9] UNOG, “UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein highlights current major human rights issues in more than 40 countries around the world in an address at the UN Human Right Council in Geneva, 8 March 2017”, UNOG. *The United Nations Office at Geneva*, 2017. Available at: http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/321DBF8562C5336BC12580DD003BF66E?OpenDocument [accessed June 14, 2017].
[^casascortes_10] Sandro Mezzadra, “The Gaze of Autonomy: Capitalism, Migration, and Social Struggles”, in Vicki Squire (ed.), *The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity*, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 121–42.
[^casascortes_11] Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel (eds.), *Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement*, Routledge Research on the Global Politics of Migration, 2, London/New York, Routledge, 2012.
[^casascortes_12] Stephan Scheel, “Studying Embodied Encounters: Autonomy of Migration beyond its Romanticization”, *Postcolonial Studies*, 16(3), 2013, pp. 279–288. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2013.850046 [accessed June 14, 2017].
[^casascortes_13] Bridget Anderson, *Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.
[^casascortes_14] Gregory Feldman, *We Are All Migrants: Political Action and the Ubiquitous Condition of Migrant-Hood*, Stanford, California, Stanford Briefs, 2015.

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@ -6,32 +6,32 @@ title = "Disobedient Sensing and Border Struggles at the Maritime Frontier of EU
In 2015, the phenomenon of migrants seeking to contest their legal exclusion from the territory of EUrope by crossing the sea, reached unprecedented dimensions. More than one million people crossed the Mediterranean Sea, while more than 3.700 people died in the attempt.[^heller_1] A year later, also due to novel and reinforced EUropean deterrence measures, crossings via the Aegean Sea dropped dramatically but increased via the Central Mediterranean Sea. By the end of 2016, more than 360.000 people had survived the journey. The official death toll, however, stood at 5.096 – a new harrowing record.[^heller_2] Over the past two decades, and in particular over the past few years, one has become accustomed to the images of overcrowded vessels and shipwrecked travellers which circulate nearly daily through the international media landscape. Only rarely do we learn about individual fates, such as the Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi, whose body washed ashore in Turkey. His image received global attention, symbolising the desperation of displaced people but did not, however, necessarily prompt a critical conversation on the economies of violence underlying contemporary border regimes, or on the political dimension of migrants’ movements across borders.[^heller_3] In 2015, the phenomenon of migrants seeking to contest their legal exclusion from the territory of EUrope by crossing the sea, reached unprecedented dimensions. More than one million people crossed the Mediterranean Sea, while more than 3.700 people died in the attempt.[^heller_1] A year later, also due to novel and reinforced EUropean deterrence measures, crossings via the Aegean Sea dropped dramatically but increased via the Central Mediterranean Sea. By the end of 2016, more than 360.000 people had survived the journey. The official death toll, however, stood at 5.096 – a new harrowing record.[^heller_2] Over the past two decades, and in particular over the past few years, one has become accustomed to the images of overcrowded vessels and shipwrecked travellers which circulate nearly daily through the international media landscape. Only rarely do we learn about individual fates, such as the Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi, whose body washed ashore in Turkey. His image received global attention, symbolising the desperation of displaced people but did not, however, necessarily prompt a critical conversation on the economies of violence underlying contemporary border regimes, or on the political dimension of migrants’ movements across borders.[^heller_3]
Illegalised migration across the Mediterranean Sea and its control is predominantly perceived through media images of indistinguishable masses of non-white bodies crammed onto unseaworthy vessels, images which are routinely embedded in a rhetoric of invasion and alarm in the face of the ‘Mediterranean migration crisis’.[^heller_4] These images operate within an ambivalent regime of (in)visibility at play at EUrope’s maritime frontier, a “partition of the sensible” in the terms of Jacques Rancière, which occludes as much as it reveals: It creates particular conditions of (dis)appearance, (in)audibility, (in)visibility.[^heller_5] As a result of migrants’ illegalisation, they seek to cross borders undetected, *clandestinely* in the etymological connotations and secrecy of this word. As opposed to the logic of clandestinity, what all agencies aiming to control migration try to do, is to *shed light* on migration and in particular on acts of unauthorised border crossings in order to make the phenomenon of migration more knowable, predictable and governable. To this effect, a vast dispositif of control has been deployed at the maritime frontier of EUrope, one made of mobile patrol boats but also of and an assemblage of surveillance technologies, through which border agents seek to detect and intercept migrants’ vessels.[^heller_6] Illegalised migration across the Mediterranean Sea and its control is predominantly perceived through media images of indistinguishable masses of non-white bodies crammed onto unseaworthy vessels, images which are routinely embedded in a rhetoric of invasion and alarm in the face of the ‘Mediterranean migration crisis’.[^heller_4] These images operate within an ambivalent regime of (in)visibility at play at EUrope’s maritime frontier, a “partition of the sensible” in the terms of Jacques Rancière, which occludes as much as it reveals: It creates particular conditions of (dis)appearance, (in)audibility, (in)visibility.[^heller_5] As a result of migrants’ illegalisation, they seek to cross borders undetected, _clandestinely_ in the etymological connotations and secrecy of this word. As opposed to the logic of clandestinity, what all agencies aiming to control migration try to do, is to _shed light_ on migration and in particular on acts of unauthorised border crossings in order to make the phenomenon of migration more knowable, predictable and governable. To this effect, a vast dispositif of control has been deployed at the maritime frontier of EUrope, one made of mobile patrol boats but also of and an assemblage of surveillance technologies, through which border agents seek to detect and intercept migrants’ vessels.[^heller_6]
However, the partition of the sensible at EUrope’s maritime borders is more ambivalent than this binary opposition would let us believe. Migrants in distress may do everything they can to be seen, so as to be rescued, and conversely border agents may seek *not to see* migrants in certain instances, as we documented in the left-to-die boat case described below, considering that rescuing them at sea would entail responsibility for disembarking them and processing their asylum claims and/or deporting them. This points to the fact that the light shed on the maritime frontier by agents of border control is highly selective. Through the constant circulation of images of overcrowded boats, the “border spectacle” so incisively analysed by Nicholas de Genova, simultaneously spectacularises the transgression of the border and the neutralisation of the “threat” of migration by state actors, and keeps the state production of illegality through policies of exclusion, the structural violations of migrant rights at the border, and their future exploitation in EUropean economies, in the dark.[^heller_7] However, the partition of the sensible at EUrope’s maritime borders is more ambivalent than this binary opposition would let us believe. Migrants in distress may do everything they can to be seen, so as to be rescued, and conversely border agents may seek _not to see_ migrants in certain instances, as we documented in the left-to-die boat case described below, considering that rescuing them at sea would entail responsibility for disembarking them and processing their asylum claims and/or deporting them. This points to the fact that the light shed on the maritime frontier by agents of border control is highly selective. Through the constant circulation of images of overcrowded boats, the “border spectacle” so incisively analysed by Nicholas de Genova, simultaneously spectacularises the transgression of the border and the neutralisation of the “threat” of migration by state actors, and keeps the state production of illegality through policies of exclusion, the structural violations of migrant rights at the border, and their future exploitation in EUropean economies, in the dark.[^heller_7]
Through selective spectacularisations, migrant death at sea is routinely folded into naturalising and depoliticising narratives, within which the fate of precarious travellers seems to depend on their struggle with the natural forces at work in the Mediterranean – the winds, the currents, the waves, and the cold.[^heller_8] Serving as EUrope’s alibi, the loss of thousands of lives can be conveniently blamed on the forces of the sea or on third parties, especially human smugglers. Within these narratives, critique of EUrope and its border authorities would revolve solely around a supposed passivity, a lack of engagement, and often give rise to calls for increased intervention, more militarisation, and for reinforced and externalised border control measures to pre-emptively halt migration movements before reaching the space of the sea in the first place. In these hegemonic narratives, EUrope’s border *activities*, always already at work to significantly shape this borderzone and to condition migrant experiences, become effaced and invisibilised. Through selective spectacularisations, migrant death at sea is routinely folded into naturalising and depoliticising narratives, within which the fate of precarious travellers seems to depend on their struggle with the natural forces at work in the Mediterranean – the winds, the currents, the waves, and the cold.[^heller_8] Serving as EUrope’s alibi, the loss of thousands of lives can be conveniently blamed on the forces of the sea or on third parties, especially human smugglers. Within these narratives, critique of EUrope and its border authorities would revolve solely around a supposed passivity, a lack of engagement, and often give rise to calls for increased intervention, more militarisation, and for reinforced and externalised border control measures to pre-emptively halt migration movements before reaching the space of the sea in the first place. In these hegemonic narratives, EUrope’s border _activities_, always already at work to significantly shape this borderzone and to condition migrant experiences, become effaced and invisibilised.
While the deaths of migrants at sea have long appeared as an obscene supplement of the border spectacle, recently a partial reversal has occurred within what William Walters has called the “humanitarian border” – a way of governing migration that seeks to compensate for the social violence embodied in the regime of migration control.[^heller_9] While rescue at sea by rescue agencies have long been the clear humanitarian counterpart of the illegalisation of migrants which forces them to resort to clandestine means of crossing in the first place, the deaths of migrants have come to be increasingly spectacularised, however only to denounce the practices of smugglers. As a result, the violence of borders still remains hidden, not only because the denunciation of smugglers serves to divert attention from it, but because border control becomes framed as an act of saving migrants and its violence is covered up by a humanitarian varnish. The aesthetic regime imposed by the EUropean border regime on the Mediterranean is thus a complex and conflictual field, where visibility and invisibility do not designate two discrete and autonomous realms, but rather a topological continuum, within which any practice that seeks to contest the deadly border regime must position itself carefully. While the deaths of migrants at sea have long appeared as an obscene supplement of the border spectacle, recently a partial reversal has occurred within what William Walters has called the “humanitarian border” – a way of governing migration that seeks to compensate for the social violence embodied in the regime of migration control.[^heller_9] While rescue at sea by rescue agencies have long been the clear humanitarian counterpart of the illegalisation of migrants which forces them to resort to clandestine means of crossing in the first place, the deaths of migrants have come to be increasingly spectacularised, however only to denounce the practices of smugglers. As a result, the violence of borders still remains hidden, not only because the denunciation of smugglers serves to divert attention from it, but because border control becomes framed as an act of saving migrants and its violence is covered up by a humanitarian varnish. The aesthetic regime imposed by the EUropean border regime on the Mediterranean is thus a complex and conflictual field, where visibility and invisibility do not designate two discrete and autonomous realms, but rather a topological continuum, within which any practice that seeks to contest the deadly border regime must position itself carefully.
# A Disobedient Gaze: Turning Surveillance Against Itself # A Disobedient Gaze: Turning Surveillance Against Itself
For several years now, transborder activists struggling against the EUropean border regime have sought to contest this *regime of selective (in)visibility*. Migrant and refugee rights organisations have long protested the mass dying at sea, and denounced it as a consequence of EUrope’s policies of deterrence, exclusion, and border militarisation.[^heller_10] They were, however, hardly able to document events within the maritime frontier to demand accountability for these deaths, and even less able to actually intervene *in real-time* into ongoing struggles at sea to avert them and enable the crossing of borders. Recently, researchers and activists have developed new practices that have enabled them to claim and enact the right to look and the right to listen in the unlikely and seemingly inaccessible spaces of the sea. In that way, they also began to challenge the borders of what could be seen and heard. For several years now, transborder activists struggling against the EUropean border regime have sought to contest this _regime of selective (in)visibility_. Migrant and refugee rights organisations have long protested the mass dying at sea, and denounced it as a consequence of EUrope’s policies of deterrence, exclusion, and border militarisation.[^heller_10] They were, however, hardly able to document events within the maritime frontier to demand accountability for these deaths, and even less able to actually intervene _in real-time_ into ongoing struggles at sea to avert them and enable the crossing of borders. Recently, researchers and activists have developed new practices that have enabled them to claim and enact the right to look and the right to listen in the unlikely and seemingly inaccessible spaces of the sea. In that way, they also began to challenge the borders of what could be seen and heard.
An initial intervention and a significant breach in the simultaneous spectacularisation and invisibilisation of the maritime frontier, came through the Forensic Oceanography project. Uncovering the case of the so-called “left-to-die boat” in 2011, the project’s first report offered an account and analysis of a particularly harrowing maritime tragedy.[^heller_11] At the height of the NATO-led military intervention in Libya, 72 travellers fleeing Libya were left to drift in the Central Mediterranean Sea for 15 days, despite distress signals sent out to all vessels navigating in this area, and despite several encounters with military aircrafts and a warship. While the testimonies of the nine survivors brought this crime of failing to render assistance that cost the lives of 63 people to light, its perpetrators remained, at first, unidentified. An initial intervention and a significant breach in the simultaneous spectacularisation and invisibilisation of the maritime frontier, came through the Forensic Oceanography project. Uncovering the case of the so-called “left-to-die boat” in 2011, the project’s first report offered an account and analysis of a particularly harrowing maritime tragedy.[^heller_11] At the height of the NATO-led military intervention in Libya, 72 travellers fleeing Libya were left to drift in the Central Mediterranean Sea for 15 days, despite distress signals sent out to all vessels navigating in this area, and despite several encounters with military aircrafts and a warship. While the testimonies of the nine survivors brought this crime of failing to render assistance that cost the lives of 63 people to light, its perpetrators remained, at first, unidentified.
In conjunction with a coalition of NGOs, and in collaboration with several parallel investigations, Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani reconstructed a composite image of the events by corroborating the survivors’ testimonies with information provided by the vast apparatus of remote sensing technologies that have transformed the contemporary ocean into a digital archive of sorts: optical and thermal cameras, radars, vessel tracking technologies, distress signals which contained geo-referenced coordinates, wind and current data, satellite imagery, and so forth. By interrogating this sensorium, we were able to model and reconstruct the drifting boat’s trajectory as well as to account for the presence of a large number of vessels in the vicinity of the drifting migrant boat that did not heed their calls for help. While these technologies are often used for the purpose of policing illegalised migration as well as the detection of other ‘threats’, they were repurposed to find evidence for the failure to render assistance. The reconstruction of events formed the basis of several ongoing legal cases against states whose assets were in operation at the time of the events.[^heller_12] Through our work on the ‘left-to-die’ case, we sought to put into practice a *disobedient gaze* that used some of the same sensing technologies of border controllers, but sought to redirect their ‘spotlight’ from unauthorised acts of border-crossing, to state and non-state practices violating migrants’ rights. We conceived this gaze as In conjunction with a coalition of NGOs, and in collaboration with several parallel investigations, Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani reconstructed a composite image of the events by corroborating the survivors’ testimonies with information provided by the vast apparatus of remote sensing technologies that have transformed the contemporary ocean into a digital archive of sorts: optical and thermal cameras, radars, vessel tracking technologies, distress signals which contained geo-referenced coordinates, wind and current data, satellite imagery, and so forth. By interrogating this sensorium, we were able to model and reconstruct the drifting boat’s trajectory as well as to account for the presence of a large number of vessels in the vicinity of the drifting migrant boat that did not heed their calls for help. While these technologies are often used for the purpose of policing illegalised migration as well as the detection of other ‘threats’, they were repurposed to find evidence for the failure to render assistance. The reconstruction of events formed the basis of several ongoing legal cases against states whose assets were in operation at the time of the events.[^heller_12] Through our work on the ‘left-to-die’ case, we sought to put into practice a _disobedient gaze_ that used some of the same sensing technologies of border controllers, but sought to redirect their ‘spotlight’ from unauthorised acts of border-crossing, to state and non-state practices violating migrants’ rights. We conceived this gaze as
> “[aiming] not to disclose what the regime of migration management attempts to unveil – clandestine migration – but unveil that which it attempts to hide, the political violence it is founded on and the human rights violations that are its structural outcome.”[^heller_13] > “[aiming] not to disclose what the regime of migration management attempts to unveil – clandestine migration – but unveil that which it attempts to hide, the political violence it is founded on and the human rights violations that are its structural outcome.”[^heller_13]
Through our critical observations and counter-mapping practices of the sea, we demonstrated how a variety of actors and technologies interact to shape this space, and how EUrope *actively* employs the sea and its forces for the purpose of migrant deterrence. Far from being an empty expanse where migrant tragedies occur seemingly ‘naturally’, the sea forms a deeply political space, where struggles over human movement and its policing are continuously being played out. While facing systematic forms of oppression that significantly condition irregularised attempts to traverse the Mediterranean, the subjects of sea crossings are protagonists of these struggles who enact their right to leave, move, survive and arrive. Hence, it is crucial to understand the ‘viapolitics’ of Mediterranean migration, where the migrant boat is, in fact, “a site of political action”, as Walters has argued.[^heller_14] Through our critical observations and counter-mapping practices of the sea, we demonstrated how a variety of actors and technologies interact to shape this space, and how EUrope _actively_ employs the sea and its forces for the purpose of migrant deterrence. Far from being an empty expanse where migrant tragedies occur seemingly ‘naturally’, the sea forms a deeply political space, where struggles over human movement and its policing are continuously being played out. While facing systematic forms of oppression that significantly condition irregularised attempts to traverse the Mediterranean, the subjects of sea crossings are protagonists of these struggles who enact their right to leave, move, survive and arrive. Hence, it is crucial to understand the ‘viapolitics’ of Mediterranean migration, where the migrant boat is, in fact, “a site of political action”, as Walters has argued.[^heller_14]
Through WatchTheMed, founded in 2012 in collaboration with a wide network of NGOs, activists, and researchers, we sought to collectivise and multiply this practice of disobedient observation as political intervention. In another detailed investigation, we contributed to uncover events that transpired in the Central Mediterranean Sea on the 11th of October 2013, leading to the loss of more than 260 lives.[^heller_15] By remapping the trajectory of the migrant boat that had fled from Libya, and by reconstructing distress calls, as well as the responses of responsible authorities, or rather the lack thereof, we showed how the many fatalities could have been prevented. However, as a result of Italy and Malta’s reluctance to carry out search and rescue operations, time was lost and rescue measures were delayed. When the rescue forces finally arrived at the scene, about half of the travellers had already drowned. Only years later, in May 2017, this case received wide public attention, following the release of an audio recording on which the pleas of passenger Dr Jammo to the Italian coastguards and the latter’s reluctance to help can be heard.[^heller_16] Through WatchTheMed, founded in 2012 in collaboration with a wide network of NGOs, activists, and researchers, we sought to collectivise and multiply this practice of disobedient observation as political intervention. In another detailed investigation, we contributed to uncover events that transpired in the Central Mediterranean Sea on the 11th of October 2013, leading to the loss of more than 260 lives.[^heller_15] By remapping the trajectory of the migrant boat that had fled from Libya, and by reconstructing distress calls, as well as the responses of responsible authorities, or rather the lack thereof, we showed how the many fatalities could have been prevented. However, as a result of Italy and Malta’s reluctance to carry out search and rescue operations, time was lost and rescue measures were delayed. When the rescue forces finally arrived at the scene, about half of the travellers had already drowned. Only years later, in May 2017, this case received wide public attention, following the release of an audio recording on which the pleas of passenger Dr Jammo to the Italian coastguards and the latter’s reluctance to help can be heard.[^heller_16]
# Disobedient Listening: Amplifying Migrants’ Mobile Commons # Disobedient Listening: Amplifying Migrants’ Mobile Commons
In light of this case and the ongoing mass suffering at sea, the need to find ways to intervene *directly* within maritime borders became ever more pressing.[^heller_17] Through the WatchTheMed monitoring platform, our hope was, on the one hand, to be able to multiply the documentation of violations, and, on the other, to move towards real-time interventions so as to shift from a post-fact analysis to actually preventing violations and deaths from occurring in the first place. The WatchTheMed platform, which was initially used as a tool in the service of the tradition of documenting, denouncing, and seeking accountability for violations, as exemplified by the work of the GISTI and Migreurop networks, was seized by another important militant tradition that explicitly referred to the abolitionist network of secret routes and safe houses used by escaping enslaved populations in the US: the ‘underground railroad’.[^heller_18] Regarding themselves as part of an existing transnational underground railroad that supports trans-border mobilities and migratory acts of escape, activist networks such as NoBorder and Welcome to Europe, have long directly supported unauthorised mobilities across EUropean borders. Migration is understood by these networks as a *social movement* in its own right, as a “creative force” that upsets the government of mobility imposed by the border regime not only by means of “explicit” legal and political claims (such as those grounded on the documentation and denunciation of specific episodes of violence at the border) but also through an everyday practice of refusing the border. This perspective opens up the field of struggles for freedom of movement to a whole series of “imperceptible” practices that would otherwise not be included in the political field, modifying the very borders of what we understand as political.[^heller_19] Brett Neilson and Angela Mitropoulos have tellingly made this point in a passage that is worth quoting at length: In light of this case and the ongoing mass suffering at sea, the need to find ways to intervene _directly_ within maritime borders became ever more pressing.[^heller_17] Through the WatchTheMed monitoring platform, our hope was, on the one hand, to be able to multiply the documentation of violations, and, on the other, to move towards real-time interventions so as to shift from a post-fact analysis to actually preventing violations and deaths from occurring in the first place. The WatchTheMed platform, which was initially used as a tool in the service of the tradition of documenting, denouncing, and seeking accountability for violations, as exemplified by the work of the GISTI and Migreurop networks, was seized by another important militant tradition that explicitly referred to the abolitionist network of secret routes and safe houses used by escaping enslaved populations in the US: the ‘underground railroad’.[^heller_18] Regarding themselves as part of an existing transnational underground railroad that supports trans-border mobilities and migratory acts of escape, activist networks such as NoBorder and Welcome to Europe, have long directly supported unauthorised mobilities across EUropean borders. Migration is understood by these networks as a _social movement_ in its own right, as a “creative force” that upsets the government of mobility imposed by the border regime not only by means of “explicit” legal and political claims (such as those grounded on the documentation and denunciation of specific episodes of violence at the border) but also through an everyday practice of refusing the border. This perspective opens up the field of struggles for freedom of movement to a whole series of “imperceptible” practices that would otherwise not be included in the political field, modifying the very borders of what we understand as political.[^heller_19] Brett Neilson and Angela Mitropoulos have tellingly made this point in a passage that is worth quoting at length:
>“In the case of struggles surrounding undocumented migration, the very notion of movement fractures along a biopolitical or racialised axis: between movement understood in a political register (as political actors and/or forces more or less representable) and movement undertaken in a kinetic sense (as a passage between points on the globe or from one point to an unknown or unreachable destination). To keep these two senses of movement separate not only denies political meaning to the passages of migration but, also, fails to think through the complexities of political movement as such, not simply as the incompleteness and risk of every politics but, more crucially, as the necessarily kinetic aspects of political movements that might be something more, or indeed other, than representational. […] It is in this nexus of ‘movement as politics’ and ‘movement as motion’ that the non-governmental struggles over undocumented migration take shape as challenges to the demarcations that define politics as always, inexorably, national and/or sovereign.”[^heller_20] > “In the case of struggles surrounding undocumented migration, the very notion of movement fractures along a biopolitical or racialised axis: between movement understood in a political register (as political actors and/or forces more or less representable) and movement undertaken in a kinetic sense (as a passage between points on the globe or from one point to an unknown or unreachable destination). To keep these two senses of movement separate not only denies political meaning to the passages of migration but, also, fails to think through the complexities of political movement as such, not simply as the incompleteness and risk of every politics but, more crucially, as the necessarily kinetic aspects of political movements that might be something more, or indeed other, than representational. […] It is in this nexus of ‘movement as politics’ and ‘movement as motion’ that the non-governmental struggles over undocumented migration take shape as challenges to the demarcations that define politics as always, inexorably, national and/or sovereign.”[^heller_20]
It is this reframing of the political meaning of ‘movement’ that grounds activist practices seeking to facilitate and sustain migrants’ unauthorised movements. Acknowledging that unauthorised migration in our bordered world are often enabled by ‘under the surface’ knowledge economies and networks composed of the very subjects of migration, their friends, relatives and connected communities and allies, activist networks sought to practice solidarity by creating further ‘pillars’ of the underground railroad. One such example is the creation of an online guide for migrants and refugees that provides practical information for their journeys towards and within EUrope. It is this reframing of the political meaning of ‘movement’ that grounds activist practices seeking to facilitate and sustain migrants’ unauthorised movements. Acknowledging that unauthorised migration in our bordered world are often enabled by ‘under the surface’ knowledge economies and networks composed of the very subjects of migration, their friends, relatives and connected communities and allies, activist networks sought to practice solidarity by creating further ‘pillars’ of the underground railroad. One such example is the creation of an online guide for migrants and refugees that provides practical information for their journeys towards and within EUrope.
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ In its two years of existence, the phone project has gathered extraordinary mome
Through its ability to directly follow trajectories of migrant boats in real-time, and to document and scandalise violations at sea based on information and data passed on by precarious passengers themselves, the Alarm Phone has significantly altered the ways in which in/visibility is being played out at sea and tapped into ‘migrant digitalities’, facilitating disobedient forms of irregularised migration, where migration can be conceived “as a multidirectional, dynamic movement, that is, a networked building system facilitated to a great extent by information and communication technologies”[^heller_26]. Several of the hotline’s members have experienced sea crossings themselves and now support the project by, for example, sharing their embodied expertise and offering linguistic capabilities fundamental to adjust to the many languages spoken on board, ranging from French, Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi to English, Tigrinya, and others. Through its ability to directly follow trajectories of migrant boats in real-time, and to document and scandalise violations at sea based on information and data passed on by precarious passengers themselves, the Alarm Phone has significantly altered the ways in which in/visibility is being played out at sea and tapped into ‘migrant digitalities’, facilitating disobedient forms of irregularised migration, where migration can be conceived “as a multidirectional, dynamic movement, that is, a networked building system facilitated to a great extent by information and communication technologies”[^heller_26]. Several of the hotline’s members have experienced sea crossings themselves and now support the project by, for example, sharing their embodied expertise and offering linguistic capabilities fundamental to adjust to the many languages spoken on board, ranging from French, Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi to English, Tigrinya, and others.
Crucial in the intervention of the Alarm Phone is thus not so much high-tech remote sensing devices such as satellite imagery that were central to report on the ‘left-to-die’ boat, but simple mobile and satellite phones and the interpersonal networks they connect. Furthermore, these mobile connections operate less through the sense of sight than the sense of sound. While it may seem paradoxical, the best instruments for the exercise of a critical right to look and observe in maritime borderzones are those that transfer sounds. This is consistent with many instruments required for oceanography, such as sonars that use sound waves to ‘see’ in the water and measure the sea’s depth instead of technologies relying on light which does not travel far beneath the ocean’s surface. Listening to those in the process of crossing maritime spaces then allows to disobediently observe the Mediterranean Sea. By employing the word *sensing*, we point precisely to how the entanglement of these different practices blurs the distinctions between rigid notions of “the senses”. Crucial in the intervention of the Alarm Phone is thus not so much high-tech remote sensing devices such as satellite imagery that were central to report on the ‘left-to-die’ boat, but simple mobile and satellite phones and the interpersonal networks they connect. Furthermore, these mobile connections operate less through the sense of sight than the sense of sound. While it may seem paradoxical, the best instruments for the exercise of a critical right to look and observe in maritime borderzones are those that transfer sounds. This is consistent with many instruments required for oceanography, such as sonars that use sound waves to ‘see’ in the water and measure the sea’s depth instead of technologies relying on light which does not travel far beneath the ocean’s surface. Listening to those in the process of crossing maritime spaces then allows to disobediently observe the Mediterranean Sea. By employing the word _sensing_, we point precisely to how the entanglement of these different practices blurs the distinctions between rigid notions of “the senses”.
Mobile lines of communication have long been a crucial means of connection amongst migrant and diaspora communities. Especially for precarious and illegalised travellers, mobile phones function as orientation devices and become, as Maurice Stierl has shown, “carriers of life signals and signs of survival”[^heller_27]. Several ‘private alarm hotlines’ established by relatives and friends of people on the move as well as by activists, have played a crucial role in countless cases of distress, including the ‘left-to-die’ boat case cited above, during which the initial information of distress was relayed by satellite phone to Father Mussi Zerai, an Eritrean priest who has become a point of reference for the East African diaspora. The Alarm Phone has been able to tap into these networks, operating under the surface and beyond the gaze of sovereign control. Vital information for crossing borders and unauthorised journeys circulate in real-time and allow for direct exchange, intervention, and assistance. Smart phones in particular function as a medium of immediate information transfer: snapshots of GPS locations can be forwarded via WhatsApp or Viber, distress situations are made public via Facebook, and border guard violence can be filmed, circulated, and denounced. In the activities of the Alarm Phone, the two activist traditions we have outlined above, one based on documentation/denunciation and the other based on assisting migrants’ while on their journey, find perhaps a new convergence, insofar as acts of documentation and denunciation of violence at the border are understood as tools that enable migrants’ movements rather than simply as claims for greater compliance with human rights standards. Mobile lines of communication have long been a crucial means of connection amongst migrant and diaspora communities. Especially for precarious and illegalised travellers, mobile phones function as orientation devices and become, as Maurice Stierl has shown, “carriers of life signals and signs of survival”[^heller_27]. Several ‘private alarm hotlines’ established by relatives and friends of people on the move as well as by activists, have played a crucial role in countless cases of distress, including the ‘left-to-die’ boat case cited above, during which the initial information of distress was relayed by satellite phone to Father Mussi Zerai, an Eritrean priest who has become a point of reference for the East African diaspora. The Alarm Phone has been able to tap into these networks, operating under the surface and beyond the gaze of sovereign control. Vital information for crossing borders and unauthorised journeys circulate in real-time and allow for direct exchange, intervention, and assistance. Smart phones in particular function as a medium of immediate information transfer: snapshots of GPS locations can be forwarded via WhatsApp or Viber, distress situations are made public via Facebook, and border guard violence can be filmed, circulated, and denounced. In the activities of the Alarm Phone, the two activist traditions we have outlined above, one based on documentation/denunciation and the other based on assisting migrants’ while on their journey, find perhaps a new convergence, insofar as acts of documentation and denunciation of violence at the border are understood as tools that enable migrants’ movements rather than simply as claims for greater compliance with human rights standards.
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ The mode of intervention of the Alarm Phone however was predicated on the presen
# The Subjects and Practices of Politics in the Interstitial Space of the Sea # The Subjects and Practices of Politics in the Interstitial Space of the Sea
Together, the movements of illegalised migrants across EUrope’s maritime frontier through which they contest the contemporary geography of banishment, the use of innovative technologies and methodologies to break the impunity for deaths and violations at sea, the creation of an Alarm Phone network to force actors at sea to carry out rescues, and the deployment of a humanitarian fleet to contest and partly make up for the retreat of state-led search and rescue operations, have all transformed the interstitial space of the Mediterranean into a fundamental arena of politics. Through these combined practices, illegalised migrants and those who support them seek to contest the government of migration across the sea. While we have described these distinct yet interconnected practices above, *how should we conceptualise them together as distinct forms of political practice?* To begin to answer this question, we must inscribe them within the particular political space in which they operate, the sea. Together, the movements of illegalised migrants across EUrope’s maritime frontier through which they contest the contemporary geography of banishment, the use of innovative technologies and methodologies to break the impunity for deaths and violations at sea, the creation of an Alarm Phone network to force actors at sea to carry out rescues, and the deployment of a humanitarian fleet to contest and partly make up for the retreat of state-led search and rescue operations, have all transformed the interstitial space of the Mediterranean into a fundamental arena of politics. Through these combined practices, illegalised migrants and those who support them seek to contest the government of migration across the sea. While we have described these distinct yet interconnected practices above, _how should we conceptualise them together as distinct forms of political practice?_ To begin to answer this question, we must inscribe them within the particular political space in which they operate, the sea.
The distinct characteristics of the political geography of the sea are well captured by the following comment by Commander Borg of the Armed Forces of Malta: “When you have a land border, here is country A and therefore the subject of law is country A, and here is country B, there is no limbo in between. At sea it’s different. Here you have country A, here you have the high seas and here begins the jurisdiction of country B. But in between, on the high seas, things are a little bit delicate.”[^heller_30] As the very name of the “Mediterranean” indicates, the sea is an interstitial space lying between territorial polities which divide the lands of our planet. While architects and scholars located in border studies and political geographies have, for several years, contested the spatial imaginary of the border as a line without thickness, the extended border zone of the sea challenges this imaginary particularly forcefully.[^heller_31] The distinct characteristics of the political geography of the sea are well captured by the following comment by Commander Borg of the Armed Forces of Malta: “When you have a land border, here is country A and therefore the subject of law is country A, and here is country B, there is no limbo in between. At sea it’s different. Here you have country A, here you have the high seas and here begins the jurisdiction of country B. But in between, on the high seas, things are a little bit delicate.”[^heller_30] As the very name of the “Mediterranean” indicates, the sea is an interstitial space lying between territorial polities which divide the lands of our planet. While architects and scholars located in border studies and political geographies have, for several years, contested the spatial imaginary of the border as a line without thickness, the extended border zone of the sea challenges this imaginary particularly forcefully.[^heller_31]
@ -68,74 +68,39 @@ In this sense, the space of the sea has bread novel forms of political practices
# References # References
[^heller_1] Our paper employs the term ‘EUrope’ throughout. In this way it seeks to problematise frequently employed usages that equate the EU with Europe and Europe with the EU and suggests, at the same time, that EUrope is not reducible to the institutions of the EU. [^heller_1]: Our paper employs the term ‘EUrope’ throughout. In this way it seeks to problematise frequently employed usages that equate the EU with Europe and Europe with the EU and suggests, at the same time, that EUrope is not reducible to the institutions of the EU.
[^heller_2]: Cp. UNHCR, “Mediterranean: Dead and Missing at Sea. January 2015 – 31 Decemeber 2016”, _UNHCR_. The UN Refugee Agency, 2017. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53632 [accessed February 24, 2017].
[^heller_2] Cp. UNHCR, “Mediterranean: Dead and Missing at Sea. January 2015 – 31 Decemeber 2016”, *UNHCR*. The UN Refugee Agency, 2017. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53632 [accessed February 24, 2017]. [^heller_3]: Cp. Kim Rygiel, “Dying to live: migrant deaths and citizenship politics along European borders: transgressions, disruptions, and mobilizations”, _Citizenship Studies_, 20(5), 2016, pp. 545–560.
[^heller_4]: Cp. New Keywords Collective, “Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of ‘the Crisis’ in and of ‘Europe’”, in Nicholas De Genova and Martina Tazzioli (eds.), Near Futures Online, 2016. Available at: http://nearfuturesonline.org/europecrisis-new-keywords-of-crisis-in-and-of-europe/ [accessed January 1, 2017].
[^heller_3] Cp. Kim Rygiel, “Dying to live: migrant deaths and citizenship politics along European borders: transgressions, disruptions, and mobilizations”, *Citizenship Studies*, 20(5), 2016, pp. 545–560. [^heller_5]: Cp. Nicolas De Genova, “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion”, _Ethnic and Racial Studies_, 36(7), 2013, pp. 1190–1198. Jacques Rancière, _The Politics of Aesthetics_, London, Continuum, 2006.
[^heller_6]: Cp. Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller, “Liquid Traces: Investigating the Deaths of Migrants at the Maritime Frontier of the EU”, in Forensic Architecture (ed.), _Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth_, Berlin, Sternberg Press, 2014.
[^heller_4] Cp. New Keywords Collective, “Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of ‘the Crisis’ in and of ‘Europe’”, in Nicholas De Genova and Martina Tazzioli (eds.), Near Futures Online, 2016. Available at: http://nearfuturesonline.org/europecrisis-new-keywords-of-crisis-in-and-of-europe/ [accessed January 1, 2017]. [^heller_7]: Nicholas De Genova, “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’”, p. 1183.
[^heller_8]: Cp. Maurice Stierl, “A Sea of Struggle – Activist Border Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea”, _Citizenship Studies_, 20(5), 2016, pp. 561–578.
[^heller_5] Cp. Nicolas De Genova, “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(7), 2013, pp. 1190–1198. Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, London, Continuum, 2006. [^heller_9]: William Walters, “Foucault and frontiers: notes on the birth of the humanitarian border”, in: Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke (eds.), _Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges_, New York, Routledge, 2011, pp. 138–164.
[^heller_10]: See in particular the database established by UNITED and the maps produced by Migreurop based upon them.
[^heller_6] Cp. Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller, “Liquid Traces: Investigating the Deaths of Migrants at the Maritime Frontier of the EU”, in Forensic Architecture (ed.), *Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth*, Berlin, Sternberg Press, 2014. [^heller_11]: For our reconstruction of these events, see our report: Charles Heller, Lorenzo Pezzani, and Situ Studio, “Forensic Oceanography. Report on the ‘Left-To-Die Boat’”, _Forensic Architecture_, 2011. Available at: www.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FO-report.pdf [accessed June 10, 2017]. Our video animation Liquid Traces summarises our findings.
[^heller_12]: Cp. fidh, “63 migrants morts en Méditerranée: des survivants poursuivent leur quête de justice”, _fidh_, June 18, 2013. Available at: https://www.fidh.org/La-Federation-internationale-des-ligues-des-droits-de-l-homme/droits-des-migrants/63-migrants-morts-en-mediterranee-des-survivants-poursuivent-leur-13483 [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_7] Nicholas De Genova, “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’”, p. 1183. [^heller_13]: Lorenzo Pezzani, and Charles Heller, “A disobedient gaze: strategic interventions in the knowledge(s) of maritime borders”, _Postcolonial Studies_, 16(3), 2013, pp. 289–298, here: p. 294 (emphasis in original).
[^heller_14]: William Walters, “Migration, vehicles, and politics: Three theses on viapolitics”, _European Journal of Social Theory_, 18(4), 2015, pp. 469–488, here: p. 481.
[^heller_8] Cp. Maurice Stierl, “A Sea of Struggle – Activist Border Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea”, *Citizenship Studies*, 20(5), 2016, pp. 561–578. [^heller_15]: Cp. Watch the Med, “Over 200 die after shooting by Libyan vessel and delay in rescue”, _Watch the Med_, 2013. Available at: http://watchthemed.net/reports/view/32 [accessed January 8, 2017].
[^heller_16]: Cp. Samuel Osborne, “Horrific phone calls reveal how Italian Coast Guard let dozens of refugees drown”, _Independent_, May 8, 2017. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italian-navy-lets-refugees-drown-migrants-crisis-asylum-seekers-mediterranean-sea-a7724156.html [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_9] William Walters, “Foucault and frontiers: notes on the birth of the humanitarian border”, in: Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke (eds.), *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges*, New York, Routledge, 2011, pp. 138–164. [^heller_17]: Cp. Watch the Med, “Guardia Civil runs over refugee boat near Lanzarote”, _Watch the Med_, 2012. Available at: http://watchthemed.net/index.php/reports/view/33 [accessed May 23, 2015].
[^heller_18]: For a discussion of the connection with the underground railway of anti-slavery within migrants’ rights activists discourse, see: Welcome to Europe Network, “From Abolitionism to Freedom of Movement? History and Visions of Antiracist Struggles”, _Noborder lasts forever_, Frankfurt am Main, 2010. Available at: http://conference.w2eu.net/files/2010/11/abolitionism.pdf [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_10] See in particular the database established by UNITED and the maps produced by Migreurop based upon them. [^heller_19]: Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, _Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century_, London, Pluto Press, 2008.
[^heller_20]: Angela Mitropoulos and Brett Neilson, “Exceptional Times, Non-Governmental Spacings, and Impolitical Movements”, _Vacarme_, January 8, 2006. Available at: http://www.vacarme.org/article484.html [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_11] For our reconstruction of these events, see our report: Charles Heller, Lorenzo Pezzani, and Situ Studio, “Forensic Oceanography. Report on the ‘Left-To-Die Boat’”, *Forensic Architecture*, 2011. Available at: www.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FO-report.pdf [accessed June 10, 2017]. Our video animation Liquid Traces summarises our findings. [^heller_21]: Cp. Watch the Med, “Safety at Sea. Instructions for a Distress Call”, _Watch the Med_. Available at: http://watchthemed.net/index.php/page/index/10 [accessed May 23, 2015].
[^heller_22]: Medhi Alioua and Charles Heller, “Transnational Migration, Clandestinity and Globalization: The Case of Sub- Saharan Transmigrants in Morocco”, in: Gerlinde Vogl, Susanne Witzgall, and Sven Kesselring (eds.), _New Mobilities Regimes in Art and Social Sciences_, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, pp. 175–84.
[^heller_12] Cp. fidh, “63 migrants morts en Méditerranée: des survivants poursuivent leur quête de justice”, *fidh*, June 18, 2013. Available at: https://www.fidh.org/La-Federation-internationale-des-ligues-des-droits-de-l-homme/droits-des-migrants/63-migrants-morts-en-mediterranee-des-survivants-poursuivent-leur-13483 [accessed June 10, 2017]. [^heller_23]: Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis S. Tsianos, “After Citizenship: Autonomy of Migration, Organisational Ontology and Mobile Commons”, _Citizenship Studies_, 17(2), 2013, pp. 178–196, here: p. 190; see also Ilker Ataç, Kim Rygiel, and Maurice Stierl, “The Contentious Politics of Refugee and Migrant Protest and Solidarity Movements: Remaking Citizenship from the Margins”, _Citizenship Studies_, 20(5), 2016, pp. 527–544.
[^heller_24]: Cp. Alarm Phone, _Official Website_. Available at: http://alarmphone.org/ [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_13] Lorenzo Pezzani, and Charles Heller, “A disobedient gaze: strategic interventions in the knowledge(s) of maritime borders”, *Postcolonial Studies*, 16(3), 2013, pp. 289–298, here: p. 294 (emphasis in original). [^heller_25]: Cp. WatchTheMed, “WatchTheMed Alarm Phone denounces illegal push-back operation with Frontex present”, Watch the Med. _Alarmphone_, 2016. Available at: https://alarmphone.org/en/2016/06/15/watchthemed-alarm-phone-denounces-illegal-push-back-operation-with-frontex-present/?post_type_release_type=post [accessed January 8, 2017]; see also: Maurice Stierl, “Every refugee boat a rebellion? Supporting border transgressions at sea”, _Open Democracy_, September 18, 2016. Available at: https://opendemocracy.net/maurice-stierl/every-refugee-boat-rebellion-supporting-border-transgressions-at-s [accessed January 8, 2017].
[^heller_26]: Andoni Alonso, and Pedro J. Oiarzabal, _Diasporas in the New Media Age_, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2010, p. 5.
[^heller_14] William Walters, “Migration, vehicles, and politics: Three theses on viapolitics”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 18(4), 2015, pp. 469–488, here: p. 481. [^heller_27]: Maurice Stierl, “A Sea of Struggle”, p. 561.
[^heller_28]: We have detailed this policy shift and its effects in our report deathbyrescue.org.
[^heller_15] Cp. Watch the Med, “Over 200 die after shooting by Libyan vessel and delay in rescue”, *Watch the Med*, 2013. Available at: http://watchthemed.net/reports/view/32 [accessed January 8, 2017]. [^heller_29]: Maurice Stierl, “A Fleet of Mediterranean Border Humanitarians”, _Antipode_, 2017. Available at: doi:10.1111/anti.12320 [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_30]: Quoted in Silja Klepp, “A Contested Asylum System: The European Union between Refugee Protection and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea”, _European Journal of Migration and Law_, 12, 2010, pp. 1–21.
[^heller_16] Cp. Samuel Osborne, “Horrific phone calls reveal how Italian Coast Guard let dozens of refugees drown”, *Independent*, May 8, 2017. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italian-navy-lets-refugees-drown-migrants-crisis-asylum-seekers-mediterranean-sea-a7724156.html [accessed June 10, 2017]. [^heller_31]: See for example Eyal Weizman, _Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation_, London, Verso, 2007.
[^heller_32]: Cp. Paolo Cuttitta, “Le monde-frontière. Le contrôle de l’immigration dans l’espace globalise”, _Cultures & Conflits_, 68, 2007, pp. 61–84.
[^heller_17] Cp. Watch the Med, “Guardia Civil runs over refugee boat near Lanzarote”, *Watch the Med*, 2012. Available at: http://watchthemed.net/index.php/reports/view/33 [accessed May 23, 2015]. [^heller_33]: Cp. Saskia Sassen, _Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages_, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006. See also Philip E. Steinberg, “Lines of Division, Lines of Connection: Stewardship in the World Ocean”, _Geographical Review_, 89(2), 1999, pp. 254–264 and Philip E. Steinberg, “Free sea”, in: Stephen Legg (ed.), _Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos_, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 268–275.
[^heller_34]: Brett Neilson, “Between Governance and Sovereignty: Remaking the Borderscape to Australia’s North”, _Local-Global Journal_, 8, 2010: pp. 124–140, here: p. 126. Available at: http://mams.rmit.edu.au/56k3qh2kfcx1.pdf [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_18] For a discussion of the connection with the underground railway of anti-slavery within migrants’ rights activists discourse, see: Welcome to Europe Network, “From Abolitionism to Freedom of Movement? History and Visions of Antiracist Struggles”, *Noborder lasts forever*, Frankfurt am Main, 2010. Available at: http://conference.w2eu.net/files/2010/11/abolitionism.pdf [accessed June 10, 2017]. [^heller_35]: Cp. Philip E. Steinberg, _The Social Construction of the Ocean_, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tanja E. Alberts, “Sovereignty at Sea: The Law and Politics of Saving Lives in the Mare Liberum”, _DIIS Working Paper_ 18, 2010; Juan Luis Suárez de Vivero, _Jurisdictional Waters in the Mediterranean and Black Seas_, Bruxelles, European Parliament, 2010.
[^heller_36]: Étienne Balibar, _We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship_, Princeton, University Press, 2004, p. 109.
[^heller_19] Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century*, London, Pluto Press, 2008.
[^heller_20] Angela Mitropoulos and Brett Neilson, “Exceptional Times, Non-Governmental Spacings, and Impolitical Movements”, *Vacarme*, January 8, 2006. Available at: http://www.vacarme.org/article484.html [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_21] Cp. Watch the Med, “Safety at Sea. Instructions for a Distress Call”, *Watch the Med*. Available at: http://watchthemed.net/index.php/page/index/10 [accessed May 23, 2015].
[^heller_22] Medhi Alioua and Charles Heller, “Transnational Migration, Clandestinity and Globalization: The Case of Sub- Saharan Transmigrants in Morocco”, in: Gerlinde Vogl, Susanne Witzgall, and Sven Kesselring (eds.), *New Mobilities Regimes in Art and Social Sciences*, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, pp. 175–84.
[^heller_23] Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis S. Tsianos, “After Citizenship: Autonomy of Migration, Organisational Ontology and Mobile Commons”, *Citizenship Studies*, 17(2), 2013, pp. 178–196, here: p. 190; see also Ilker Ataç, Kim Rygiel, and Maurice Stierl, “The Contentious Politics of Refugee and Migrant Protest and Solidarity Movements: Remaking Citizenship from the Margins”, *Citizenship Studies*, 20(5), 2016, pp. 527–544.
[^heller_24] Cp. Alarm Phone, *Official Website*. Available at: http://alarmphone.org/ [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_25] Cp. WatchTheMed, “WatchTheMed Alarm Phone denounces illegal push-back operation with Frontex present”, Watch the Med. *Alarmphone*, 2016. Available at: https://alarmphone.org/en/2016/06/15/watchthemed-alarm-phone-denounces-illegal-push-back-operation-with-frontex-present/?post_type_release_type=post [accessed January 8, 2017]; see also: Maurice Stierl, “Every refugee boat a rebellion? Supporting border transgressions at sea”, *Open Democracy*, September 18, 2016. Available at: https://opendemocracy.net/maurice-stierl/every-refugee-boat-rebellion-supporting-border-transgressions-at-s [accessed January 8, 2017].
[^heller_26] Andoni Alonso, and Pedro J. Oiarzabal, *Diasporas in the New Media Age*, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2010, p. 5.
[^heller_27] Maurice Stierl, “A Sea of Struggle”, p. 561.
[^heller_28] We have detailed this policy shift and its effects in our report deathbyrescue.org.
[^heller_29] Maurice Stierl, “A Fleet of Mediterranean Border Humanitarians”, *Antipode*, 2017. Available at: doi:10.1111/anti.12320 [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_30] Quoted in Silja Klepp, “A Contested Asylum System: The European Union between Refugee Protection and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea”, *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 12, 2010, pp. 1–21.
[^heller_31] See for example Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation*, London, Verso, 2007.
[^heller_32] Cp. Paolo Cuttitta, “Le monde-frontière. Le contrôle de l’immigration dans l’espace globalise”, *Cultures & Conflits*, 68, 2007, pp. 61–84.
[^heller_33] Cp. Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006. See also Philip E. Steinberg, “Lines of Division, Lines of Connection: Stewardship in the World Ocean”, *Geographical Review*, 89(2), 1999, pp. 254–264 and Philip E. Steinberg, “Free sea”, in: Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos*, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 268–275.
[^heller_34] Brett Neilson, “Between Governance and Sovereignty: Remaking the Borderscape to Australia’s North”, *Local-Global Journal*, 8, 2010: pp. 124–140, here: p. 126. Available at: http://mams.rmit.edu.au/56k3qh2kfcx1.pdf [accessed June 10, 2017].
[^heller_35] Cp. Philip E. Steinberg, *The Social Construction of the Ocean*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tanja E. Alberts, “Sovereignty at Sea: The Law and Politics of Saving Lives in the Mare Liberum”, *DIIS Working Paper* 18, 2010; Juan Luis Suárez de Vivero, *Jurisdictional Waters in the Mediterranean and Black Seas*, Bruxelles, European Parliament, 2010.
[^heller_36] Étienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, Princeton, University Press, 2004, p. 109.

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@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ What migration studies are investigating under the technical terminus of a “se
The securization of discourses on migration is paralleled by the militarisation and technologisation of border controls, whereas border security and border management rely increasingly on markets for electronic border protection facilities,[^kuster_6] as well as for virtual or intelligent borders: Tracking is the main paradigm of contemporary border security, where technologies such as biometrics, thermographic cameras and other sensor-technologies, radars and drones are employed. This leads to some authors referring to a “EU security-industrial complex”[^kuster_7]. A complex, which assures “internal security” to also be executed through the external EU borders, and addresses the relationship between military and police actors, security agencies, governments and the mostly transnational industries of advanced technology, security and defence (important European players are e.g. the Thales Group, Finmeccanica, Sagem, Accenture and Morpho, both part of Safran S.A., Airbus Group, Indra Sistemas S.A., BAE Systems and last but not least Siemens), which operate within the global border security technology market. This networked security-industrial-complex horizontally connects political and private enterprise elites throughout Europe. The securization of discourses on migration is paralleled by the militarisation and technologisation of border controls, whereas border security and border management rely increasingly on markets for electronic border protection facilities,[^kuster_6] as well as for virtual or intelligent borders: Tracking is the main paradigm of contemporary border security, where technologies such as biometrics, thermographic cameras and other sensor-technologies, radars and drones are employed. This leads to some authors referring to a “EU security-industrial complex”[^kuster_7]. A complex, which assures “internal security” to also be executed through the external EU borders, and addresses the relationship between military and police actors, security agencies, governments and the mostly transnational industries of advanced technology, security and defence (important European players are e.g. the Thales Group, Finmeccanica, Sagem, Accenture and Morpho, both part of Safran S.A., Airbus Group, Indra Sistemas S.A., BAE Systems and last but not least Siemens), which operate within the global border security technology market. This networked security-industrial-complex horizontally connects political and private enterprise elites throughout Europe.
At the level of *security policies*, the entangled processes of institutionalisation of politics and economy have already largely been conflated. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Laura Horn describe these reciprocal integrations and entanglements as a process of “marketization of European corporate control”[^kuster_8], which implies a social and political constitution of markets. However, it seems important to also consider those new forms of politics especially present in the area of border management, which is increasingly mediated by expanding agencies and their projects, operations (e.g. Mare Nostrum or the Frontex-Operation Triton respectively), missions (e.g. EUNAVFOR Med to supress trafficking networks) or programs.[^kuster_9] Formally assigned to technical, economic and administrative tasks, agencies like Frontex or eu-LISA increasingly direct their working structure towards networks and partners from within the private sector.[^kuster_10] At the level of _security policies_, the entangled processes of institutionalisation of politics and economy have already largely been conflated. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Laura Horn describe these reciprocal integrations and entanglements as a process of “marketization of European corporate control”[^kuster_8], which implies a social and political constitution of markets. However, it seems important to also consider those new forms of politics especially present in the area of border management, which is increasingly mediated by expanding agencies and their projects, operations (e.g. Mare Nostrum or the Frontex-Operation Triton respectively), missions (e.g. EUNAVFOR Med to supress trafficking networks) or programs.[^kuster_9] Formally assigned to technical, economic and administrative tasks, agencies like Frontex or eu-LISA increasingly direct their working structure towards networks and partners from within the private sector.[^kuster_10]
## Technoscience & Venture Science ## Technoscience & Venture Science
The analytical concept of technoscience describes a dispositif, in which science appears as cosmoplastic, expedited and constituted through technologies and their instruments/devices. Science creates *technofacts*. In addition to this concept, the role of science and research can be considered as *Venture Science*. Kaushik Sunder Rajan coins this terminology through his research on the symbiosis of venture capital and biotechnology.[^kuster_11] It is meant to emphasize the futurity, the hype and the promise of a scientific knowledge production – including the contingency of whether or not a certain prediction will apply. *Venture Science Capitalism*, or the projects ascribing to this prognostic type of knowledge, do not require fundamental research in a traditional sense. As knowledge is ‘produced’ directly by corporations, knowledge bases generate themselves straight from a user perspective. This is of vital importance for critical corporate control, or for technological impact assessment informed by social sciences. For if science is user generated instead of user oriented, the boundaries between provider and user or consumer blur and become impulsive factors of knowledge production – such is the case here with security research by governmental or EU-institutions. *Venture Science* creates technofacts through research financed collectively by the public sector, private investors and large industrial syndicates.[^kuster_12] The analytical concept of technoscience describes a dispositif, in which science appears as cosmoplastic, expedited and constituted through technologies and their instruments/devices. Science creates _technofacts_. In addition to this concept, the role of science and research can be considered as _Venture Science_. Kaushik Sunder Rajan coins this terminology through his research on the symbiosis of venture capital and biotechnology.[^kuster_11] It is meant to emphasize the futurity, the hype and the promise of a scientific knowledge production – including the contingency of whether or not a certain prediction will apply. _Venture Science Capitalism_, or the projects ascribing to this prognostic type of knowledge, do not require fundamental research in a traditional sense. As knowledge is ‘produced’ directly by corporations, knowledge bases generate themselves straight from a user perspective. This is of vital importance for critical corporate control, or for technological impact assessment informed by social sciences. For if science is user generated instead of user oriented, the boundaries between provider and user or consumer blur and become impulsive factors of knowledge production – such is the case here with security research by governmental or EU-institutions. _Venture Science_ creates technofacts through research financed collectively by the public sector, private investors and large industrial syndicates.[^kuster_12]
# II. # II.
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ In addition to presented research projects, this year’s conference includes pr
The boundaries of public research and research according to public interest are blurring into private sector research and development. This is spelled out by the implemented terminology, which the author requires some time to get used to: border guards, travellers or so-called third-country citizens are all referred to as “users”. No matter, whether they appear as clients, research partners or possibly aggrieved parties, wishing not to undergo a border check, they are all operators, or – as stated – users of the presented new systems and technical tools – products that are here advertised as “solutions”. Meanwhile, private corporations are referred to as “organizations”. The contributors, and the respectively presented problems and research projects within the Seventh Framework Programme FP7, or its continuation as a EU work programme for research and innovation Horizon 2020, also contribute to this feeling of vagueness. For example Javier Galbally, who, after his short presentation as a scientist representing JRC and as future chair of the EAB Research Conference,[^kuster_15] follows up with a second presentation, where he deputies Paolo Salieri of the EU commission and gives an overview over all EU security research projects. One can’t help but get the impression that the community meeting here is doing so for the sake of promoting each other. Galbally identifies border management to be the core focus of security research, applauding EU research programmes for recognizing the outstanding significance of biometrics as a key role. In his impression, Galbally continues, this area is assigned a growing budget each year, especially since the terror attacks in France. Indeed, the Secure Societies work programme of Horizon 2020 fosters a large part of the research presented at the conference. The boundaries of public research and research according to public interest are blurring into private sector research and development. This is spelled out by the implemented terminology, which the author requires some time to get used to: border guards, travellers or so-called third-country citizens are all referred to as “users”. No matter, whether they appear as clients, research partners or possibly aggrieved parties, wishing not to undergo a border check, they are all operators, or – as stated – users of the presented new systems and technical tools – products that are here advertised as “solutions”. Meanwhile, private corporations are referred to as “organizations”. The contributors, and the respectively presented problems and research projects within the Seventh Framework Programme FP7, or its continuation as a EU work programme for research and innovation Horizon 2020, also contribute to this feeling of vagueness. For example Javier Galbally, who, after his short presentation as a scientist representing JRC and as future chair of the EAB Research Conference,[^kuster_15] follows up with a second presentation, where he deputies Paolo Salieri of the EU commission and gives an overview over all EU security research projects. One can’t help but get the impression that the community meeting here is doing so for the sake of promoting each other. Galbally identifies border management to be the core focus of security research, applauding EU research programmes for recognizing the outstanding significance of biometrics as a key role. In his impression, Galbally continues, this area is assigned a growing budget each year, especially since the terror attacks in France. Indeed, the Secure Societies work programme of Horizon 2020 fosters a large part of the research presented at the conference.
After the opening, the programme continues with project presentations. Amongst them, Fidelity, a research project (which is now concluded) coordinated by Safran Security and promoted through FP7 where solutions were developed for “people who work on multiple identities”. The project website, concentrating on quality management and standardising breeder documents[^kuster_16] and thereby supposedly providing the eponymous confidence, encompasses so-called “white papers” – an umbrella term in the IT sector for standards and technical outline reports. Fidelity, however, generates a “white paper” on privacy, for example, and another on ePassport acceptance. This brings us to a highly important subject, which is also continuously brought up throughout the conference, so-called “privacy by design”. The advantage here lies within the ability to abstain from storing personal biometric data, as the templates can be secured, or transformed into pseudonymous identifiers, e.g. through *bloom filter based pseudonymous identifiers*, without this process being irrevocable. Another project within FP7 is up next: Fast Pass is continued until March 2017 and incorporates 27 partners. *Smooth*, *fast*, automatic, obstacle-free and unopposed, totally *trouble-free*, that is how this project imagines borders, an image that is projected in great plasticity within the video presentation consistent mostly of simulations. These do show human-human, human-machine and machine-machine interactions, but get by completely without voiceovers. Instead, typical Muzak or elevator music aimed at immobilizing the viewers accompanies them. These sounds are so overly frivolous that I wonder whether the engineers within these projects might not have a certain dystopian relationship to the worlds they are working on. FastPass itself implements a user-focused approach so as to automatize border controls and harmonious architectures, with which they mean border-control-scenarios. The project has expanded the classic setting at the airport (Vienna) to include case studies involving gates (*mantraps*) or stalls for the Registered Traveller Program (RTP)[^kuster_17] at harbours (Piraeus) and country borders (Moravita, Romania). FastPass is working on “next generation sensors”, for “on the move face verification” or a “person separation algorithm”, which is supposed to verify that only one person is located within the gate at a time. Furthermore, FastPass is attempting “document reader interoperability”, developing algorithms to support multimodal biometrics, which is supposed to undermine so-called spoofing – biometric deception. However, it is obvious: FastPass is thought of first and foremost for “Exit Schengen” – or as a conference participant put it: After the opening, the programme continues with project presentations. Amongst them, Fidelity, a research project (which is now concluded) coordinated by Safran Security and promoted through FP7 where solutions were developed for “people who work on multiple identities”. The project website, concentrating on quality management and standardising breeder documents[^kuster_16] and thereby supposedly providing the eponymous confidence, encompasses so-called “white papers” – an umbrella term in the IT sector for standards and technical outline reports. Fidelity, however, generates a “white paper” on privacy, for example, and another on ePassport acceptance. This brings us to a highly important subject, which is also continuously brought up throughout the conference, so-called “privacy by design”. The advantage here lies within the ability to abstain from storing personal biometric data, as the templates can be secured, or transformed into pseudonymous identifiers, e.g. through _bloom filter based pseudonymous identifiers_, without this process being irrevocable. Another project within FP7 is up next: Fast Pass is continued until March 2017 and incorporates 27 partners. _Smooth_, _fast_, automatic, obstacle-free and unopposed, totally _trouble-free_, that is how this project imagines borders, an image that is projected in great plasticity within the video presentation consistent mostly of simulations. These do show human-human, human-machine and machine-machine interactions, but get by completely without voiceovers. Instead, typical Muzak or elevator music aimed at immobilizing the viewers accompanies them. These sounds are so overly frivolous that I wonder whether the engineers within these projects might not have a certain dystopian relationship to the worlds they are working on. FastPass itself implements a user-focused approach so as to automatize border controls and harmonious architectures, with which they mean border-control-scenarios. The project has expanded the classic setting at the airport (Vienna) to include case studies involving gates (_mantraps_) or stalls for the Registered Traveller Program (RTP)[^kuster_17] at harbours (Piraeus) and country borders (Moravita, Romania). FastPass is working on “next generation sensors”, for “on the move face verification” or a “person separation algorithm”, which is supposed to verify that only one person is located within the gate at a time. Furthermore, FastPass is attempting “document reader interoperability”, developing algorithms to support multimodal biometrics, which is supposed to undermine so-called spoofing – biometric deception. However, it is obvious: FastPass is thought of first and foremost for “Exit Schengen” – or as a conference participant put it:
> “I was just wondering, if the project could also be used for Entry Schengen, because you could also hide people in the trunk of your car.”[^kuster_18] > “I was just wondering, if the project could also be used for Entry Schengen, because you could also hide people in the trunk of your car.”[^kuster_18]
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Carolan seems happy to share the relevant results of the study, as:
> “this is why meetings such as this one are so important. So that we can tell you, what research is needed.”[^kuster_27] > “this is why meetings such as this one are so important. So that we can tell you, what research is needed.”[^kuster_27]
Richard Rinkens, project manager for biometrics at DG Home Affairs, picks up on this line of impact in his contribution titled “Requirements for research derived from the Smart Border Concepts”. So does the final panel “Mind the gap – what research is needed for current and future operational biometric systems”[^kuster_28]. The bouquet of results and assessments of technological gaps within the EES presented here translate into a direct work assignment for the EAB Research Projects Conference’s audience. The EES clearly aims at surveying the group of *overstayers*. This is by no means disguised, but directly addressed. As things are now, the survey made easily possible through EES, would theoretically be calculated from each stamped passport in an arduous process without it – an almost unfeasible task according to Rinkens, whose presentation style is lively, popular and humorous (fig. 9). Richard Rinkens, project manager for biometrics at DG Home Affairs, picks up on this line of impact in his contribution titled “Requirements for research derived from the Smart Border Concepts”. So does the final panel “Mind the gap – what research is needed for current and future operational biometric systems”[^kuster_28]. The bouquet of results and assessments of technological gaps within the EES presented here translate into a direct work assignment for the EAB Research Projects Conference’s audience. The EES clearly aims at surveying the group of _overstayers_. This is by no means disguised, but directly addressed. As things are now, the survey made easily possible through EES, would theoretically be calculated from each stamped passport in an arduous process without it – an almost unfeasible task according to Rinkens, whose presentation style is lively, popular and humorous (fig. 9).
Figure 9: Rinkens and the EES Figure 9: Rinkens and the EES
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ Figure 11: EU’s silo approach
The conclusion Rinkens draws from this is a EU-wide “identity repository” as a long-term goal. The conclusion Rinkens draws from this is a EU-wide “identity repository” as a long-term goal.
>“A common repository of data at EU level for different systems is the most ambitious long-term approach to interoperability. This core module would contain basic identity data while specific data (e.g. visa data, entry/exit records, ETIAS records) would be stored in specific modules. This would overcome the current fragmentation of the EU’s data architecture.” > “A common repository of data at EU level for different systems is the most ambitious long-term approach to interoperability. This core module would contain basic identity data while specific data (e.g. visa data, entry/exit records, ETIAS records) would be stored in specific modules. This would overcome the current fragmentation of the EU’s data architecture.”
The DG Home Affairs, just as the police force, seem strained by all the different databases. The following discussion evolving around “large databases” vs. “centralized databases” suggests that from a technological point of view it is highly debatable, whether centralised or decentralised databases and possibly federated identity-management-systems are more vulnerable and prone to attacks. However, consensus within the conference does exist on the technological and governmental aspects, which should most likely go hand in hand, while “policy makers” are known to go against that grain. All participants of the EAB Research Project Conference hope that the developments of large European biometric data systems follow a technological decision process, instead of a political one. The DG Home Affairs, just as the police force, seem strained by all the different databases. The following discussion evolving around “large databases” vs. “centralized databases” suggests that from a technological point of view it is highly debatable, whether centralised or decentralised databases and possibly federated identity-management-systems are more vulnerable and prone to attacks. However, consensus within the conference does exist on the technological and governmental aspects, which should most likely go hand in hand, while “policy makers” are known to go against that grain. All participants of the EAB Research Project Conference hope that the developments of large European biometric data systems follow a technological decision process, instead of a political one.
@ -117,60 +117,38 @@ Figure 13: Final panel
# References # References
[^kuster_1] Special thanks to the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung for making this research possible. [^kuster_1]: Special thanks to the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung for making this research possible.
[^kuster_2]: Cp. Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos, “How to Liquefy a Body on the Move: Eurodac and the Making of the European Digital Border”, in: Raphael Bossong and Helena Carrapico (eds.), _EU Borders and Shifting Internal Security. Technology, Externalization and Accountability_, Heidelberg, Springer International Publishing, 2016, pp. 45–63.
[^kuster_3]: “Ein Beitrag zur Erhöhung der inneren Sicherheit in Europa” (transl. S.M.).
[^kuster_4]: “Dieses Jahr müssen wir zu einer politischen Einigung über die Eckpunkte eines Ein- und Ausreiseregisters (Entry-Exit-System, EES) kommen und wir sollten eine Einbeziehung von EU-Bürgern prüfen. Wir brauchen zudem noch in diesem Jahr eine Einigung über die Einrichtung eines Europäischen Reiseinformations- und Genehmigungssystems (ETIAS).” (transl. S.M.)
[^kuster_5]: Cp. David Lyon, “Identification, colonialism, and control: surveillant sorting in Israel/Palestine”, in: Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban (eds.), _Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine. Population, Territory and Power_, London/New York, Routledge, 2011, pp. 49–64.
[^kuster_6]: Examples for this include the Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior, the integrated electronic system for outdoor surveillance SIVE in Spain, or the EU-wide border surveillance system called EUROSUR.
[^kuster_7]:
Ben Hayes, _NeoConOpticon – The EU Security-Industrial Complex_, Transnational Institute in association with Statewatch, 2009. Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/
analyses/neoconopticon-report.pdf [accessed May 30, 2017].
[^kuster_2] Cp. Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos, “How to Liquefy a Body on the Move: Eurodac and the Making of the European Digital Border”, in: Raphael Bossong and Helena Carrapico (eds.), *EU Borders and Shifting Internal Security. Technology, Externalization and Accountability*, Heidelberg, Springer International Publishing, 2016, pp. 45–63. [^kuster_8]: Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Laura Horn, “The Marketisation of European Corporate Control: A Critical Political Economy Perspective”, _New Political Economy_, 12(2), 2007, pp. 211–235. According to these authors, the process of European integration, which has been driven by a project of neoliberal marketization since the late 1980s, has played a leading role in the emergence of European shareholder capitalism. Entering new markets is important in terms of the competition European industries face through the USA and China. On a global scale, the security industry is expanding powerfully, and has seen a growth of almost tenfold in the last ten years. 2011 it amounted to a market size of 100 billion.
[^kuster_9]: The authors of a paper published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP titled “Border Security, Camps, Quotas: The Future of European Refugee Policy?” highlight that Frontex has ten times as many employees as when the agency was founded, while their annual budget has risen from six to 245 million Euros. Cp. Steffen Angenendt, David Kipp and Anne Koch, “Border Security, Camps, Quotas: The Future of European Refugee Policy?”, SWP Comments 2016/C 32, June 2016. Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/border-security-camps-quotas-the-future-of-european-refugee-policy/ [accessed June 24, 2017].
[^kuster_10]: Frontex for example made headlines on the 27th and 28th of January 2016 through a pitch on Lesbos. Securiport LLC, Crossmatch, Unisys, Thales and 3M were invited to present suggestions for a design of smartphone apps and databases to track refugees arriving in Europe. For a more detailed discussion see: Diane Taylor and Emma Graham-Harrison, “EU asks tech firms to pitch refugee-tracking systems”, _The Guardian_, February 18, 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/18/eu-asks-tech-firms-to-pitch-refugee-tracking-systems [accessed June 24, 2017].
[^kuster_11]: Cp. Kaushik Sunder Rajan, _Biokapitalismus. Werte im postgenomischen Zeitalter_, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 2009, p. 122.
[^kuster_12]: Central to this, especially when considered as switch points or points of intersections of the EU-network between the private sector and the EU-administration, as well as the legislative, are above all the EU research framework programmes, such as Horizon 2020, which concern the “research and innovation” programmes. For example, the Seventh Framework Programme FP7, initiated in 2007, focuses heavily on security. The commission has provided the programme with 1,4 billion Euros with a run-time until 2013. The follow-up project Horizon 2020 categorizes the subject of border management under “societal challenges” and collectively frames these under the heading “secure societies – Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens”. Horizon 2020 has received a budget of around 80 billion Euros for a run-time of seven years (2014-2020). This comes in addition to any private investments it can draw on. Cp. Chris Jones, “Analysis. The visible hand: the European Union’s Security Industrial Policy”, _Statewatch_, August 2016. Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-297-security-industrial-policy.pdf [accessed June 24, 2017].
[^kuster_13]: The Fraunhofer IGD (Institute for graphic data processing) broadly speaking engages with the problems and possibilities in operating with computer data within hard- and software. Founded in 1992, it upholds a total of twelve research and development divisions located in Darmstadt, Rostock, Graz and Singapur, which work closely with the respective technical universities, as well as with clients and partners from industrial and economic sectors. The Fraunhofer IGD is internationally recognized as a leader in applied research of visual computing and is a part of the “Fraunhofer Gesellschaft”, the biggest research organisation for application-oriented research in Europe.
[^kuster_14]: The main slogan “We are doing science for policy” designates the core tasks of the research center, which was founded in 1957, to provide current EU politics with independent information and evidencing.
[^kuster_15]: Javier Galbally, who is a volunteer at the conference in 2016, is supposed to be the chairperson of the EAB conference in 2017. Galbally is engaged as an expert on “reverse biometrics”, “spoofing”, “anti-spoofing” and “biometric vulnerabilities” at the JRC’s department of “E-Space, Security and Migration”, third division for “Cyber & Digital Citizens’ Security”. Currently, the third division is compiling a feasibility report on SIS II, by proxy of the commission, for instance. The division also has an advisory function to the DG Justice with regards to the fingerprint-identification system of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS). Galbally himself is currently working on the integration of AFIS for SIS II and on a mobile app for third-country nationals to download, so they can be registered within the Entry-Exit-System in advance.
[^kuster_16]: A breeder document is a real or forged document, which serves as a basis for other identification documents, which can also be fraudulently attained.
[^kuster_17]: The RTP was conceptualized since 2008 and 2013 respectively as part of the so-called Smart Border Package proposed by the commission. After repeated criticism by the European council and parliament with regards to the cost, technological feasibility and implementation, as well as a critical public consultation in 2015, the commission presented a re-worked legislative proposal for smart borders on the 6th of April 2016, which now entailed only the Entry-Exit-System. The realisation of the RTP is therefore left to the single member states.
[^kuster_18]: “Ich habe mich nur gefragt, ob das Projekt auch auf Entry Schengen ausgerichtet ist, weil man ja auch Leute im Kofferraum verstecken könnte.” (transl. S.M.)
[^kuster_19]: One of the slides on the projected power point presentation states, 2009 saw almost 13900 cases of document fraud in France. 6.300 of those were uncovered by the border police, in 4011 of these cases, French documents were affected: 1.640 birth certificates, 1.070 identity cards, 1.035 passports and 266 drivers’ licenses.
[^kuster_20]: One example, with which the speaker illustrated the virulence of the project, was also telling the case of a French woman, married to an Algerian on paper, who claimed that the document was fraudulent. This confronted her with an extremely complicated burden of proof.
[^kuster_21]: “Strategien einer flexiblen Identität” (trans. S.M.).
[^kuster_22]: Dennis Broeders, “A European ‘Border’ Surveillance System under Construction”, in: Huub Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer (eds.), _Migration and the New Technological Borders of Europe_, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 40–67. It shall be explicitly stated here, that the modulation of exclusion described by Broeder, does not end with citizenship, as most cases of “reversible citizenship” in Europe show, cf. hic: Vassilis Tsianos and Marianne Pieper, “Postliberale Assemblagen: Rassismus in Zeiten der Gleichheit”, in Sebastian Friedrich (ed.), _Rassismus in der Leistungsgesellschaft_, Münster, Ed. Assemblage, 2011, pp. 114–132.
[^kuster_23]: “Datenschutz durch Technikgestaltung und durch datenschutzfreundliche Voreinstellungen” (trans. S.M.).
[^kuster_24]: Cp. European Commission, “establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011”, _Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council_, COM(2016) 194 final, April 6, 2016. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we do/policies/securing eu borders/legal documents/docs/20160406/regulation_proposal_entryexit_system_borders_package_en.pdf [accessed April 6, 2016].
[^kuster_25]:
On the fire, cp. e.g.: Die Welt, “Tausende Flüchtlinge irren nach Brand auf Insel umher”, September 20, 2016. Available at: https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/
article158262874/Tausende-Fluechtlinge-irren-nach-Brand-auf-Insel-umher.html [accessed September 20, 2016]. On the hotspot Moria cp e.g.: Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis S. Tsianos, _Hotspot Lesbos. Eine Publikation der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung_, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, August 2016. Available at: https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/
160802_e paper_kuster_tsianos_hotspotlesbos_v103.pdf [accessed June 24, 2017].
[^kuster_3] “Ein Beitrag zur Erhöhung der inneren Sicherheit in Europa” (transl. S.M.). [^kuster_26]: “Meine Vision ist, dass jemand die Funktion aktiviert auf seinem Handy, durchgeht durch den Korridor, und die Funktion dann wieder ausschaltet.” (transl. S.M.)
[^kuster_27]: “Deshalb sind Treffen wie dieses so wichtig, damit wir euch sagen, welche Forschung gebraucht wird.” (transl. S.M.)
[^kuster_4] “Dieses Jahr müssen wir zu einer politischen Einigung über die Eckpunkte eines Ein- und Ausreiseregisters (Entry-Exit-System, EES) kommen und wir sollten eine Einbeziehung von EU-Bürgern prüfen. Wir brauchen zudem noch in diesem Jahr eine Einigung über die Einrichtung eines Europäischen Reiseinformations- und Genehmigungssystems (ETIAS).” (transl. S.M.) [^kuster_28]: The subject of cryptotechnology and the area of behavioural biometrics were also mentioned here, although Rasa Karbauskaite of Frontex spoke of “nervous behaviour” at the border and stated that Rumania had conducted “respective test series”. Jean-Christophe Fondeur of Safran Identity & Security stated in following that behavioural biometrics were an “immature technology”.
[^kuster_5] Cp. David Lyon, “Identification, colonialism, and control: surveillant sorting in Israel/Palestine”, in: Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban (eds.), *Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine. Population, Territory and Power*, London/New York, Routledge, 2011, pp. 49–64.
[^kuster_6] Examples for this include the Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior, the integrated electronic system for outdoor surveillance SIVE in Spain, or the EU-wide border surveillance system called EUROSUR.
[^kuster_7] Ben Hayes, *NeoConOpticon – The EU Security-Industrial Complex*, Transnational Institute in association with Statewatch, 2009. Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/
analyses/neoconopticon-report.pdf [accessed May 30, 2017].
[^kuster_8] Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Laura Horn, “The Marketisation of European Corporate Control: A Critical Political Economy Perspective”, *New Political Economy*, 12(2), 2007, pp. 211–235. According to these authors, the process of European integration, which has been driven by a project of neoliberal marketization since the late 1980s, has played a leading role in the emergence of European shareholder capitalism. Entering new markets is important in terms of the competition European industries face through the USA and China. On a global scale, the security industry is expanding powerfully, and has seen a growth of almost tenfold in the last ten years. 2011 it amounted to a market size of 100 billion.
[^kuster_9] The authors of a paper published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP titled “Border Security, Camps, Quotas: The Future of European Refugee Policy?” highlight that Frontex has ten times as many employees as when the agency was founded, while their annual budget has risen from six to 245 million Euros. Cp. Steffen Angenendt, David Kipp and Anne Koch, “Border Security, Camps, Quotas: The Future of European Refugee Policy?”, SWP Comments 2016/C 32, June 2016. Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/border-security-camps-quotas-the-future-of-european-refugee-policy/ [accessed June 24, 2017].
[^kuster_10] Frontex for example made headlines on the 27th and 28th of January 2016 through a pitch on Lesbos. Securiport LLC, Crossmatch, Unisys, Thales and 3M were invited to present suggestions for a design of smartphone apps and databases to track refugees arriving in Europe. For a more detailed discussion see: Diane Taylor and Emma Graham-Harrison, “EU asks tech firms to pitch refugee-tracking systems”, *The Guardian*, February 18, 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/18/eu-asks-tech-firms-to-pitch-refugee-tracking-systems [accessed June 24, 2017].
[^kuster_11] Cp. Kaushik Sunder Rajan, *Biokapitalismus. Werte im postgenomischen Zeitalter*, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 2009, p. 122.
[^kuster_12] Central to this, especially when considered as switch points or points of intersections of the EU-network between the private sector and the EU-administration, as well as the legislative, are above all the EU research framework programmes, such as Horizon 2020, which concern the “research and innovation” programmes. For example, the Seventh Framework Programme FP7, initiated in 2007, focuses heavily on security. The commission has provided the programme with 1,4 billion Euros with a run-time until 2013. The follow-up project Horizon 2020 categorizes the subject of border management under “societal challenges” and collectively frames these under the heading “secure societies – Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens”. Horizon 2020 has received a budget of around 80 billion Euros for a run-time of seven years (2014-2020). This comes in addition to any private investments it can draw on. Cp. Chris Jones, “Analysis. The visible hand: the European Union’s Security Industrial Policy”, *Statewatch*, August 2016. Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-297-security-industrial-policy.pdf [accessed June 24, 2017].
[^kuster_13] The Fraunhofer IGD (Institute for graphic data processing) broadly speaking engages with the problems and possibilities in operating with computer data within hard- and software. Founded in 1992, it upholds a total of twelve research and development divisions located in Darmstadt, Rostock, Graz and Singapur, which work closely with the respective technical universities, as well as with clients and partners from industrial and economic sectors. The Fraunhofer IGD is internationally recognized as a leader in applied research of visual computing and is a part of the “Fraunhofer Gesellschaft”, the biggest research organisation for application-oriented research in Europe.
[^kuster_14] The main slogan “We are doing science for policy” designates the core tasks of the research center, which was founded in 1957, to provide current EU politics with independent information and evidencing.
[^kuster_15] Javier Galbally, who is a volunteer at the conference in 2016, is supposed to be the chairperson of the EAB conference in 2017. Galbally is engaged as an expert on “reverse biometrics”, “spoofing”, “anti-spoofing” and “biometric vulnerabilities” at the JRC’s department of “E-Space, Security and Migration”, third division for “Cyber & Digital Citizens’ Security”. Currently, the third division is compiling a feasibility report on SIS II, by proxy of the commission, for instance. The division also has an advisory function to the DG Justice with regards to the fingerprint-identification system of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS). Galbally himself is currently working on the integration of AFIS for SIS II and on a mobile app for third-country nationals to download, so they can be registered within the Entry-Exit-System in advance.
[^kuster_16] A breeder document is a real or forged document, which serves as a basis for other identification documents, which can also be fraudulently attained.
[^kuster_17] The RTP was conceptualized since 2008 and 2013 respectively as part of the so-called Smart Border Package proposed by the commission. After repeated criticism by the European council and parliament with regards to the cost, technological feasibility and implementation, as well as a critical public consultation in 2015, the commission presented a re-worked legislative proposal for smart borders on the 6th of April 2016, which now entailed only the Entry-Exit-System. The realisation of the RTP is therefore left to the single member states.
[^kuster_18] “Ich habe mich nur gefragt, ob das Projekt auch auf Entry Schengen ausgerichtet ist, weil man ja auch Leute im Kofferraum verstecken könnte.” (transl. S.M.)
[^kuster_19] One of the slides on the projected power point presentation states, 2009 saw almost 13900 cases of document fraud in France. 6.300 of those were uncovered by the border police, in 4011 of these cases, French documents were affected: 1.640 birth certificates, 1.070 identity cards, 1.035 passports and 266 drivers’ licenses.
[^kuster_20] One example, with which the speaker illustrated the virulence of the project, was also telling the case of a French woman, married to an Algerian on paper, who claimed that the document was fraudulent. This confronted her with an extremely complicated burden of proof.
[^kuster_21] “Strategien einer flexiblen Identität” (trans. S.M.).
[^kuster_22] Dennis Broeders, “A European ‘Border’ Surveillance System under Construction”, in: Huub Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer (eds.), *Migration and the New Technological Borders of Europe*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 40–67. It shall be explicitly stated here, that the modulation of exclusion described by Broeder, does not end with citizenship, as most cases of “reversible citizenship” in Europe show, cf. hic: Vassilis Tsianos and Marianne Pieper, “Postliberale Assemblagen: Rassismus in Zeiten der Gleichheit”, in Sebastian Friedrich (ed.), *Rassismus in der Leistungsgesellschaft*, Münster, Ed. Assemblage, 2011, pp. 114–132.
[^kuster_23] “Datenschutz durch Technikgestaltung und durch datenschutzfreundliche Voreinstellungen” (trans. S.M.).
[^kuster_24] Cp. European Commission, “establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011”, *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council*, COM(2016) 194 final, April 6, 2016. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we do/policies/securing eu borders/legal documents/docs/20160406/regulation_proposal_entryexit_system_borders_package_en.pdf [accessed April 6, 2016].
[^kuster_25] On the fire, cp. e.g.: Die Welt, “Tausende Flüchtlinge irren nach Brand auf Insel umher”, September 20, 2016. Available at: https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/
article158262874/Tausende-Fluechtlinge-irren-nach-Brand-auf-Insel-umher.html [accessed September 20, 2016]. On the hotspot Moria cp e.g.: Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis S. Tsianos, *Hotspot Lesbos. Eine Publikation der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung*, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, August 2016. Available at: https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/
160802_e paper_kuster_tsianos_hotspotlesbos_v103.pdf [accessed June 24, 2017].
[^kuster_26] “Meine Vision ist, dass jemand die Funktion aktiviert auf seinem Handy, durchgeht durch den Korridor, und die Funktion dann wieder ausschaltet.” (transl. S.M.)
[^kuster_27] “Deshalb sind Treffen wie dieses so wichtig, damit wir euch sagen, welche Forschung gebraucht wird.” (transl. S.M.)
[^kuster_28] The subject of cryptotechnology and the area of behavioural biometrics were also mentioned here, although Rasa Karbauskaite of Frontex spoke of “nervous behaviour” at the border and stated that Rumania had conducted “respective test series”. Jean-Christophe Fondeur of Safran Identity & Security stated in following that behavioural biometrics were an “immature technology”.

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title = "Digital Mobility, Logistics, and the Politics of Migration" title = "Digital Mobility, Logistics, and the Politics of Migration"
+++ +++
[Mohammad Khalefeh](https://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/article152540522/Ohne-Facebook-waere-ich-nicht-angekommen.html), a 17-year-old boy from Syria, spoke on behalf of many refugees when interviewed about his journey across ten European countries in 2015, on foot, by boat, bus, car, and train: “without Facebook and Google Maps I really do not think I would have made it to Germany.” And he was keen to emphasise that this was only possible with a strong network of relatives and friends, constantly exchanging information and knowledge. Maria Ullrich’s article in this issue of _spheres_ explores these new forms of media use by migrants and refugees focusing on the so-called Balkan route, during and after the “summer of migration” in 2015. And she makes a remarkable contribution to the understanding of this incorporation of logistical technologies and infrastructures (within the very fabric) of migration. Taking an “actor-centered” perspective of the “autonomy of migration approach”, she sheds light on the uneven and contested process of the formation of “mobile commons” and “migrant digitalities”[^mezzadra_1] that support and facilitate border crossings and geographical mobility.
[Mohammad Khalefeh](https://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/article152540522/Ohne-Facebook-waere-ich-nicht-angekommen.html), a 17-year-old boy from Syria, spoke on behalf of many refugees when interviewed about his journey across ten European countries in 2015, on foot, by boat, bus, car, and train: “without Facebook and Google Maps I really do not think I would have made it to Germany.” And he was keen to emphasise that this was only possible with a strong network of relatives and friends, constantly exchanging information and knowledge. Maria Ullrich’s article in this issue of *spheres* explores these new forms of media use by migrants and refugees focusing on the so-called Balkan route, during and after the “summer of migration” in 2015. And she makes a remarkable contribution to the understanding of this incorporation of logistical technologies and infrastructures (within the very fabric) of migration. Taking an “actor-centered” perspective of the “autonomy of migration approach”, she sheds light on the uneven and contested process of the formation of “mobile commons” and “migrant digitalities”[^mezzadra_1] that support and facilitate border crossings and geographical mobility.
Migrants’ use of digital technologies is a relatively well-researched topic by now. To take a couple of examples, for several years now, Dana Diminescu has investigated how new digital communication technologies (DCTs) have resulted in the emergence of the “connected migrant”, with deep implications for the experience of diaspora, as well as for the structure of transnational networks and spaces.[^mezzadra_2] The use of smartphones and social media by refugees and migrants to counter isolation and to negotiate effects of distance, has been also explored in several sites, including the city of Naples and detention centres on islands in the Indian Ocean.[^mezzadra_3] Maria Ullrich’s intervention connects to recent scholarly work on the topic and uses the experiences across the Balkan route to study the ways in which digital and geographical mobility intersect to foster the ‘collective power’ of migrants and refugees. This is what makes up the unconventional nature of her study. I will briefly discuss her study by raising some questions that seem particularly important to me in order to pursue further research in the direction foreshadowed by Ullrich. Migrants’ use of digital technologies is a relatively well-researched topic by now. To take a couple of examples, for several years now, Dana Diminescu has investigated how new digital communication technologies (DCTs) have resulted in the emergence of the “connected migrant”, with deep implications for the experience of diaspora, as well as for the structure of transnational networks and spaces.[^mezzadra_2] The use of smartphones and social media by refugees and migrants to counter isolation and to negotiate effects of distance, has been also explored in several sites, including the city of Naples and detention centres on islands in the Indian Ocean.[^mezzadra_3] Maria Ullrich’s intervention connects to recent scholarly work on the topic and uses the experiences across the Balkan route to study the ways in which digital and geographical mobility intersect to foster the ‘collective power’ of migrants and refugees. This is what makes up the unconventional nature of her study. I will briefly discuss her study by raising some questions that seem particularly important to me in order to pursue further research in the direction foreshadowed by Ullrich.
I spoke above of *logistical* technologies and infrastructures with respect to smartphones and social media used by migrants. One has only to think of the roles they play in the working of so-called “platform capitalism”[^mezzadra_4] to intuitively understand the meaning of the reference to logistics. More generally, it is necessary to stress that the new developments in logistics, be it in the reorganisation of global supply chains or of urban spaces, prompted the emergence of a new “mobility paradigm”, which lies at the heart of contemporary processes of capitalist globalisation.[^mezzadra_5] We are now starting to realize that this new mobility paradigm also has deep implications for human mobility and its management. Just think of the prominence within policy debates and experimentations of the “just-in-time” and “to-the-point” labour migration recruitment schemes. Are we not confronted here with a logistical fantasy, with a kind of delivery model implemented within the field of human mobility? Processes of “logistification” are also reshaping border regimes, as the European instance demonstrates in a particularly clear way. Again, just think of the relevance of terms such as ‘hotspots’, ‘corridors’, ‘platforms’, and ‘hubs’ in recent attempts to reorganise border regimes after the challenges and disruptions of the “summer of migration”.[^mezzadra_6] I spoke above of _logistical_ technologies and infrastructures with respect to smartphones and social media used by migrants. One has only to think of the roles they play in the working of so-called “platform capitalism”[^mezzadra_4] to intuitively understand the meaning of the reference to logistics. More generally, it is necessary to stress that the new developments in logistics, be it in the reorganisation of global supply chains or of urban spaces, prompted the emergence of a new “mobility paradigm”, which lies at the heart of contemporary processes of capitalist globalisation.[^mezzadra_5] We are now starting to realize that this new mobility paradigm also has deep implications for human mobility and its management. Just think of the prominence within policy debates and experimentations of the “just-in-time” and “to-the-point” labour migration recruitment schemes. Are we not confronted here with a logistical fantasy, with a kind of delivery model implemented within the field of human mobility? Processes of “logistification” are also reshaping border regimes, as the European instance demonstrates in a particularly clear way. Again, just think of the relevance of terms such as ‘hotspots’, ‘corridors’, ‘platforms’, and ‘hubs’ in recent attempts to reorganise border regimes after the challenges and disruptions of the “summer of migration”.[^mezzadra_6]
We know that what is presented as a smooth process of selection and management of human mobility, in reality has unbearable human costs, produces stranded populations, and harshly targets and punishes any form of ‘unruly’ mobility. But while it is crucial to continue to politically denounce all this, there is also a need to investigate the contours of the new logistical rationality that is concurring to reshape border regimes. To situate refugees and migrants’ media use in this framework highlights the tensions and contradictions that criss-cross that rationality. And it once again positions migration as a challenge to border regimes. We know that what is presented as a smooth process of selection and management of human mobility, in reality has unbearable human costs, produces stranded populations, and harshly targets and punishes any form of ‘unruly’ mobility. But while it is crucial to continue to politically denounce all this, there is also a need to investigate the contours of the new logistical rationality that is concurring to reshape border regimes. To situate refugees and migrants’ media use in this framework highlights the tensions and contradictions that criss-cross that rationality. And it once again positions migration as a challenge to border regimes.
@ -19,24 +18,16 @@ The autonomy of migration finds its expressions at this juncture between invisib
# References # References
[^mezzadra_1] Dimitris Parsanoglou, Nicos Trimikliniotis and Vassilis Tsianos, *Mobile Commons. Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City*, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. [^mezzadra_1]: Dimitris Parsanoglou, Nicos Trimikliniotis and Vassilis Tsianos, _Mobile Commons. Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City_, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015.
[^mezzadra_2]: Cp. Dana Diminescu, “Digital Methods for the Exploration, Analysis, and Mapping of e-Diasporas”, _Social Science Information_, 51(4), 2012, pp. 451–458.
[^mezzadra_2] Cp. Dana Diminescu, “Digital Methods for the Exploration, Analysis, and Mapping of e-Diasporas”, *Social Science Information*, 51(4), 2012, pp. 451–458. [^mezzadra_3]Cp. Nicholas Harney, “Precarity, Affect and Problem Solving with Mobile Phones by Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Migrants in Naples, Italy”, _Journal of Refugee Studies_, 26(4), 2013, pp. 541–557; Kate Coddington and Alison Mountz, “Countering isolation with the use of technology: how asylum-seeking detainees on islands in the Indian Ocean use social media to transcend their confinement”, _Journal of the Indian Ocean Region_, 10(1), 2014, pp. 97–112.
[^mezzadra_3]Cp. Nicholas Harney, “Precarity, Affect and Problem Solving with Mobile Phones by Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Migrants in Naples, Italy”, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 26(4), 2013, pp. 541–557; Kate Coddington and Alison Mountz, “Countering isolation with the use of technology: how asylum-seeking detainees on islands in the Indian Ocean use social media to transcend their confinement”, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 10(1), 2014, pp. 97–112. [^mezzadra_4]: Nick Srnicek, _Platform Capitalism_, London, Polity, 2016.
[^mezzadra_5]: Deborah Cowen, _The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade_, Minneapolis, MI, University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
[^mezzadra_4] Nick Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism*, London, Polity, 2016. [^mezzadra_6]: See for instance Bernd Kasparek, “Routes, Corridors, and Spaces of Exception: Governing Migration and Europe”, _Near Futures Online_, 1, 2016. Available at: http://nearfuturesonline.org/routes-corridors-and-spaces-of-exception-governing-migration-and-europe/ [accessed May 22, 2017].
[^mezzadra_7]: See for instance Martina Tazzioli and William Walters, “The Sight of Migration. Governmentality, Visibility and Europe’s Contested Borders”, _Global Society_, 30(3), 2016, pp. 445–464.
[^mezzadra_5] Deborah Cowen, *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade*, Minneapolis, MI, University of Minnesota Press, 2014. [^mezzadra_8]: See for instance Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds.), _The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration_, London/New York, Routledge, 2013.
[^mezzadra_9]: Cp. Bernd Kasparek and Marc Speer, “Of Hope. Ungarn und der lange Sommer der Migration”, _Bordermonitoring.eu_, 2015. Available at: http://bordermonitoring.eu/ungarn/2015/09/of-hope/ [accessed May 22, 2017].
[^mezzadra_6] See for instance Bernd Kasparek, “Routes, Corridors, and Spaces of Exception: Governing Migration and Europe”, *Near Futures Online*, 1, 2016. Available at: http://nearfuturesonline.org/routes-corridors-and-spaces-of-exception-governing-migration-and-europe/ [accessed May 22, 2017]. [^mezzadra_10]: Michel de Certeau, _The Practice of Everyday Life_, Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1984, p. xix.
[^mezzadra_11]: Maurice Stierl, “A Sea of Struggle – Activist Border Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea”, _Citizenship Studies_, 20(5), 2016, pp. 561–578.
[^mezzadra_7] See for instance Martina Tazzioli and William Walters, “The Sight of Migration. Governmentality, Visibility and Europe’s Contested Borders”, *Global Society*, 30(3), 2016, pp. 445–464.
[^mezzadra_8] See for instance Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds.), *The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration*, London/New York, Routledge, 2013.
[^mezzadra_9] Cp. Bernd Kasparek and Marc Speer, “Of Hope. Ungarn und der lange Sommer der Migration”, *Bordermonitoring.eu*, 2015. Available at: http://bordermonitoring.eu/ungarn/2015/09/of-hope/ [accessed May 22, 2017].
[^mezzadra_10] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1984, p. xix.
[^mezzadra_11] Maurice Stierl, “A Sea of Struggle – Activist Border Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea”, *Citizenship Studies*, 20(5), 2016, pp. 561–578.

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# References # References
[^stenum_1] Tech in Asia: According to 6Wresearch, Global Biometrics Market is projected to reach $ 21,9 billion by 2020. Cp. 6Wresearch, “Global Biometrics Market is Projected to Touch $21.9 Billion by 2020”, _Linkedin_, Mai 31, 2016. Available at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/global-biometrics-market-projected-touch-219-billion-2020- [accessed June 27, 2017]. Another market research company projects Biometric System Market worth $ 32,73 Billion by 2022: “The biometric system market size is expected to increase from USD 10.74 Billion in 2015 to USD 32.73 Billion by 2022, at a CAGR of 16.79% between 2016 and 2022”. Markets and Markets, “Biometric System Market worth 32.73 Billion USD by 2022”, _Press Releases_, n.d. Available at: http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/biometric-technologies.asp [accessed November 30, 2016]. [^stenum_1]: Tech in Asia: According to 6Wresearch, Global Biometrics Market is projected to reach $ 21,9 billion by 2020. Cp. 6Wresearch, “Global Biometrics Market is Projected to Touch $21.9 Billion by 2020”, _Linkedin_, Mai 31, 2016. Available at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/global-biometrics-market-projected-touch-219-billion-2020- [accessed June 27, 2017]. Another market research company projects Biometric System Market worth $ 32,73 Billion by 2022: “The biometric system market size is expected to increase from USD 10.74 Billion in 2015 to USD 32.73 Billion by 2022, at a CAGR of 16.79% between 2016 and 2022”. Markets and Markets, “Biometric System Market worth 32.73 Billion USD by 2022”, _Press Releases_, n.d. Available at: http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/biometric-technologies.asp [accessed November 30, 2016].
[^stenum_2]: Cp. Kartikay Mehrota, “Retailers Experiment With Surveillance Tools Used by Police”, _Bloomberg Businessweek_, March 3, 2016. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-03/retail-stores-experiment-with-surveillance-tools-used-by-police [accessed November 29, 2016].
[^stenum_2] Cp. Kartikay Mehrota, “Retailers Experiment With Surveillance Tools Used by Police”, _Bloomberg Businessweek_, March 3, 2016. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-03/retail-stores-experiment-with-surveillance-tools-used-by-police [accessed November 29, 2016]. [^stenum_3]: Anti-citizen is someone portrayed as a risk to the wellbeing, virtue, norms and values of society – for example criminals and undocumented migrants. Cp. Jonathan Xavier Inda, _Targeting immigrants: Government, technology, and ethics_, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005; Sharam Koshravi, _The ‘Illegal’ traveller: an auto-ethnography of borders_, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
[^stenum_4]: Nikolas Rose, “Government and control”, _British Journal of Criminology_, 40, 2000, pp. 321–339; Nikolas Rose, _Powers of freedom. Reframing political thought_, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[^stenum_3] Anti-citizen is someone portrayed as a risk to the wellbeing, virtue, norms and values of society – for example criminals and undocumented migrants. Cp. Jonathan Xavier Inda, _Targeting immigrants: Government, technology, and ethics_, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005; Sharam Koshravi, _The ‘Illegal’ traveller: an auto-ethnography of borders_, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. [^stenum_5]: Cp. Martin Ruhs, and Bridget Anderson, “Semi-compliance in the migrant labour market”, _COMPAS Working Paper_, 30, 2006.
[^stenum_6]: Cp. Nicholas de Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and deportability in everyday life”, _Annual Review of Anthropology_, 31, 2002, pp. 419–447; Nicholas de Genova, _Working the boundaries: Race, space, and “Illegality” in Mexican Chicago_, Durham, Duke University Press Books, 2005.
[^stenum_4] Nikolas Rose, “Government and control”, _British Journal of Criminology_, 40, 2000, pp. 321–339; Nikolas Rose, _Powers of freedom. Reframing political thought_, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. [^stenum_7]: Cp. Dennis Broeders, “Return to sender? Administrative detention of irregular migrants in Germany and the Netherlands?”, _Punishment & Society_, 12 (2), 2010, pp. 169–186, here: p. 47; John Torpey, _The invention of the passport surveillance, citizenship and the state_, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 33.
[^stenum_8]: Kim Rygiel, “Bordering solidarities: Migrant activism and the politics of movement and camps at Calais”, _Citizenship Studies_, 15 (1), 2011, pp. 1–19.
[^stenum_5] Cp. Martin Ruhs, and Bridget Anderson, “Semi-compliance in the migrant labour market”, _COMPAS Working Paper_, 30, 2006. [^stenum_9]: Liisa H. Malkki, “Refugees and exile: From ‘refugee studies’ to the national order of things”, _Annual Review of Anthropology_, 24, 1995, pp. 495–523.
[^stenum_10]: Broeders 2010.
[^stenum_6] Cp. Nicholas de Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and deportability in everyday life”, _Annual Review of Anthropology_, 31, 2002, pp. 419–447; Nicholas de Genova, _Working the boundaries: Race, space, and “Illegality” in Mexican Chicago_, Durham, Duke University Press Books, 2005. [^stenum_11]: Cp. European Commission, “on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person], for identifying an illegally stayingthird-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast)”, _Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council_, COM(2016), 272 final, May 4, 2016. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-272-EN-F1-1.PDF [accessed June 20, 2017]; “Eurodac is a computerised system consisting of a central unit, which operates the central database of biometric data, and of a communication infrastructure for transmitting the data between the Member States and the central unit. […] Member States are required to record the fingerprint data of all persons who are seeking asylum or who have been apprehended crossing the external border irregularly.” EPRS, “Recast EUrodac regulation”, October 2016, not accessible anymore.
[^stenum_12]: Cp. Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Ben Hayes, Nicholas Hernanz, and Julien Jeandesboz, “Justice and home affairs databases and a smart borders system at EU external borders. An evaluation of current and forthcoming proposals”, _CEPS paper in Liberty and Security_, 52, 2012.
[^stenum_7] Cp. Dennis Broeders, “Return to sender? Administrative detention of irregular migrants in Germany and the Netherlands?”, _Punishment & Society_, 12 (2), 2010, pp. 169–186, here: p. 47; John Torpey, _The invention of the passport surveillance, citizenship and the state_, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 33. [^stenum_13]: The term Biometrics covers a range of different physical and behavioural elements linked to the body: e.g. fingerprints, face recognition, iris scan, DNA, vein analysis, gait, and heart rhythm.
[^stenum_14]: Based on the Prüm Convention: Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. Cp. Auswärtiges Amt, “Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourgh, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, Prüm/Eifel, 27 May 2005”, _Auswärtiges Amt_, 2015. Available at: http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/607270/publicationFile/165214/Statusliste-EN.pdf [accessed June 27, 2017].
[^stenum_8] Kim Rygiel, “Bordering solidarities: Migrant activism and the politics of movement and camps at Calais”, _Citizenship Studies_, 15 (1), 2011, pp. 1–19. [^stenum_15]: The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a large-scale information system that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States. The Visa Information System (VIS) allows Schengen States to exchange visa data. It consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links this central system to national systems. Cp. European Commission, “Schengen Area”, _Migration and Home Affairs_, 2017. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_16]: Cp. European Commission, “Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security and justice”, _Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council_, COM(2010) 385 final, July 20, 2010. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2010/EN/1-2010-385-EN-F1-1.Pdf [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_9] Liisa H. Malkki, “Refugees and exile: From ‘refugee studies’ to the national order of things”, _Annual Review of Anthropology_, 24, 1995, pp. 495–523. [^stenum_17]: Cp. European Commission, “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security”, _Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council_, COM(2016) 205 final, June 4, 2016. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-205-EN-F1-1.PDF [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_18]: Cp. European Commission, COM(2016) 205 final, p. 4.
[^stenum_10] Broeders 2010. [^stenum_19]: Cp. Peter Nyers, _Rethinking refugees. Beyond states of emergency_, London/New York, Routledge, 2006.
[^stenum_20]: Cp. European Commission, COM(2016), 272 final.
[^stenum_11] Cp. European Commission, “on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person], for identifying an illegally stayingthird-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast)”, _Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council_, COM(2016), 272 final, May 4, 2016. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-272-EN-F1-1.PDF [accessed June 20, 2017]; “Eurodac is a computerised system consisting of a central unit, which operates the central database of biometric data, and of a communication infrastructure for transmitting the data between the Member States and the central unit. […] Member States are required to record the fingerprint data of all persons who are seeking asylum or who have been apprehended crossing the external border irregularly.” EPRS, “Recast EUrodac regulation”, October 2016, not accessible anymore. [^stenum_21]: Terms often used to describe development of databases containing personal information, here Wisman (2013): “The use of technology to perform a function it was not originally intended for constitutes function creep. […] The use of data for a different goal than it was collected for results in purpose creep.” Tijmen Wisman, “Purpose and function creep by design: Transforming the face of surveillance through the internet of things”, _European Journal of Law and Technology_, 4 (2), 2013.
[^stenum_22]: European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 2.
[^stenum_12] Cp. Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Ben Hayes, Nicholas Hernanz, and Julien Jeandesboz, “Justice and home affairs databases and a smart borders system at EU external borders. An evaluation of current and forthcoming proposals”, _CEPS paper in Liberty and Security_, 52, 2012. [^stenum_23]: Cp. James C. Scott, _Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed_, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998; Helle Stenum, “Making migrants governable: counting and defining the ‘illegal migrant’”, _Nordic Journal of Migration Research_, 2 (4), 2012, pp. 280–288.
[^stenum_24]: European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 3.
[^stenum_13] The term Biometrics covers a range of different physical and behavioural elements linked to the body: e.g. fingerprints, face recognition, iris scan, DNA, vein analysis, gait, and heart rhythm. [^stenum_25]: Cp. Malkki 1995.
[^stenum_26]: Sergio Carrera, and Nicholas Hernanz, “Re-framing mobility and identity controls: The next generation of the EU migration management”, _Journal of Borderlands Studies_, 30 (1), 2015, pp. 69–84, here: p. 71.
[^stenum_14] Based on the Prüm Convention: Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. Cp. Auswärtiges Amt, “Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourgh, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, Prüm/Eifel, 27 May 2005”, _Auswärtiges Amt_, 2015. Available at: http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/607270/publicationFile/165214/Statusliste-EN.pdf [accessed June 27, 2017]. [^stenum_27]: Cp. European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final.
[^stenum_28]: European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 3.
[^stenum_15] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a large-scale information system that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States. The Visa Information System (VIS) allows Schengen States to exchange visa data. It consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links this central system to national systems. Cp. European Commission, “Schengen Area”, _Migration and Home Affairs_, 2017. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en [accessed June 20, 2017]. [^stenum_29]: Cp. Inda 2005; William Walters, “Reflections on migration and governmentality”, _Movements. Journal für Kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung_, 1 (1), 2015, pp. 1–25; Rose, _Powers of freedom. Reframing political thought_.
[^stenum_30]: European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 14.
[^stenum_16] Cp. European Commission, “Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security and justice”, _Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council_, COM(2010) 385 final, July 20, 2010. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2010/EN/1-2010-385-EN-F1-1.Pdf [accessed June 20, 2017]. [^stenum_31]: European Parliament, “Briefing EU Legislation in Progress”, October 2016, not accessible anymore.
[^stenum_32]: Cp. European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final.
[^stenum_17] Cp. European Commission, “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security”, _Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council_, COM(2016) 205 final, June 4, 2016. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-205-EN-F1-1.PDF [accessed June 20, 2017]. [^stenum_33]: Malkki 1995.
[^stenum_34]: European Data Protection Supervisor, “EDPS: Opinion on the First reform package on the Common European Asylum System (Eurodac, EASO and Dublin regulations)”, _Opinion 07/2016_, September 21, 2016. Available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-09-21_ceas_opinion_en.pdf [accessed June 20, 2017], p. 18.
[^stenum_18] Cp. European Commission, COM(2016) 205 final, p. 4. [^stenum_35]: Cp. European Commission, “Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe”, _Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council_, COM(2016) 197 final, April 6, 2016. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposalimplementationpackage/docs/20160406/towards_a_reform_of_the_common_european_asylum_system_and_enhancing_legal_avenues_to_europe_-_20160406_en.pdf [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_36]: “The collection of facial images will be the pre-cursor to introducing facial recognition software in the future and will bring EURODAC in line with the other systems such as the Entry/Exit System. Eu-LISA should first conduct a study on facial recognition software that evaluates its accuracy and reliability prior to this software being added to the Central System”. European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 4f.
[^stenum_19] Cp. Peter Nyers, _Rethinking refugees. Beyond states of emergency_, London/New York, Routledge, 2006. [^stenum_37]: Cp. European Commission, “Smart borders – options and the way ahead”, _Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council_, COM(2011) 680 final, October 25, 2011. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2011/EN/1-2011-680-EN-F1-1.Pdf [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_38]: Cost-benefit is also calculated by the Commission regarding the entry/exit and Frequent Travellers system, predicting that member states “could have a net cost savings already after the second year of operation” stemming from reduction in border control resources by around 40% (equivalent to EUR 500 million/year). Development cost for the first three years and with some of the biometrics added later is estimated to around EUR 390 million, and yearly operational costs in a period of 5 years of operation is estimated to be 189 million EUR. In this 8 year span costs are estimated to be EUR 1,335 million). Cp. European Commission, COM(2011) 680 final.
[^stenum_20] Cp. European Commission, COM(2016), 272 final. [^stenum_39]: Marie Martin, “Extension of mobility partnerships with euro-mediterranean partners”, _Panorama_, 2012, pp. 279–283, here: p. 281.
[^stenum_40]: Cp. Walters 2015; Didier Bigo, “Freedom and speed in enlarged borderzones”, in: Vicki Squire (ed.), _The contested politics of mobility: Borderzones and irregularity_, Abingdon, Routledge, 2011, pp. 31–50.
[^stenum_21] Terms often used to describe development of databases containing personal information, here Wisman (2013): “The use of technology to perform a function it was not originally intended for constitutes function creep. […] The use of data for a different goal than it was collected for results in purpose creep.” Tijmen Wisman, “Purpose and function creep by design: Transforming the face of surveillance through the internet of things”, _European Journal of Law and Technology_, 4 (2), 2013. [^stenum_41]: Cp. Zygmunt Bauman, _Globalization_, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998.
[^stenum_42]: Cp. David Lyon (ed.), _Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk, and automated discrimination_, London, Routledge, 2005.
[^stenum_22] European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 2. [^stenum_43]: Cp. Bigo et al. 2012.
[^stenum_44]: “Alienage” as defined by Bosniak: “the position of the marginalized non-citizen or the degree of ‘alienage’ are produced by nation-states exercising sovereignty and ‘managing migration’, and framing conditions for mobility and residence of migrants. ‘Alienage entails the introjection of borders”. Linda Bosniak, _The citizen and the alien_, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 5.
[^stenum_23] Cp. James C. Scott, _Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed_, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998; Helle Stenum, “Making migrants governable: counting and defining the ‘illegal migrant’”, _Nordic Journal of Migration Research_, 2 (4), 2012, pp. 280–288. [^stenum_45]: See for example Frontex, “Smarter, Faster, Safer?”, _Feature Stories_, 2011. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/smarter-faster-safer--KfKGq2 [accessed June 21, 2017].
[^stenum_46]: Cp. Mark Maguire, “The birth of biometric security”, _Anthropology Today_, 25, 2009, pp. 9–14; Louise Amoore, “Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror”, _Political Geography_, 25, 2006, pp. 336–351.
[^stenum_24] European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 3. [^stenum_47]: Amoore 2006, p. 342.
[^stenum_48]: Cp. Arjun Appadurai, _Modernity at large_, Minneapolis/London, University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
[^stenum_25] Cp. Malkki 1995. [^stenum_49]: Amoore 2006, p. 342.
[^stenum_50]: Cp. Simon A. Cole, _Suspect identities: A history of fingerprinting and criminal identification_, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002.
[^stenum_26] Sergio Carrera, and Nicholas Hernanz, “Re-framing mobility and identity controls: The next generation of the EU migration management”, _Journal of Borderlands Studies_, 30 (1), 2015, pp. 69–84, here: p. 71. [^stenum_51]: Cp. Cole 2002.
[^stenum_52]: Cp. Cole 2002; John Torpey, _The invention of the passport surveillance, citizenship and the state_, Cambridge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[^stenum_27] Cp. European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final. [^stenum_53]: Rose 1999; 2000.
[^stenum_54]: Bigo 2011, p. 33.
[^stenum_28] European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 3. [^stenum_55]: Cp. Shoshana Amielle Magnet, _When biometrics fail: Gender, race, and the technology of identity_, Durham/London, Duke University Press, 2011; Joseph Pugliese, _Biometrics: Bodies, technologies, biopolitics_, London/New York, Routledge, 2010; Rygiel 2011; Irma van der Ploeg, “Biometrics and the body as information: Normative issues in the socio-technical coding of the body”, in: David Lyon (ed.), _Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk, and automated discrimination_, London, Routledge, 2002, pp. 57–73; Btihaj Ajana, _Governing through biometrics: The biopolitics of identity_, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; Keith Breckenridge, _Biometric State. The global politics of identification and surveillance in South Africa, 1850 to the Present_, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014; and others.
[^stenum_56]: Magnet 2011, p. 50.
[^stenum_29] Cp. Inda 2005; William Walters, “Reflections on migration and governmentality”, _Movements. Journal für Kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung_, 1 (1), 2015, pp. 1–25; Rose, _Powers of freedom. Reframing political thought_. [^stenum_57]: SANS Institute presents itself as a cooperative research and education organization, providing computer security training and information security research.
[^stenum_58]: SANS Institute, “Biometric Scanning Technologies: Finger, Facial and Retinal Scanning”, _SANS Institute. InfoSec Reading Room_, 2003. Available at: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/authentication/biometric-scanning-technologies-finger-facial-retinal-scanning-1177 [accessed June 21, 2017].
[^stenum_30] European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 14. [^stenum_59]: Pugliese 2010, p. 62.
[^stenum_60]: Richard Dyer, _White: Essays on race and culture_, London/New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 89.
[^stenum_31] European Parliament, “Briefing EU Legislation in Progress”, October 2016, not accessible anymore. [^stenum_61]: Pugliese 2010, p. 114.
[^stenum_62]: Facial recognition can be understood in continuation of Dyer’s analysis of on camera and photo technology analysed by Dyer for the built-in white bias.
[^stenum_32] Cp. European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final. [^stenum_63]: Cp. Bigo et al. 2012.
[^stenum_64]: Rose 1999.
[^stenum_33] Malkki 1995. [^stenum_65]: Helle Stenum, “Biometric citizenship and alienage: new and re-structuring technology of government of mobility?” Paper presented at the conference: Reconfiguring borders and mobility in times of crisis, September, 26-28, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2012. Available at: http://forskning.ruc.dk/site/da/publications/biometric-citizenship-and-alienage(1c5b48bf-2510-412e-bf56-5164c4b4f89a).html [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_66]: Giorgio Agamben, “Bodies without words: Against the biopolitical tattoo”, _German Law Journal_, 5 (2), 2004, pp. 168–169.
[^stenum_34] European Data Protection Supervisor, “EDPS: Opinion on the First reform package on the Common European Asylum System (Eurodac, EASO and Dublin regulations)”, _Opinion 07/2016_, September 21, 2016. Available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-09-21_ceas_opinion_en.pdf [accessed June 20, 2017], p. 18. [^stenum_67]: Agamben 2004, p. 169.
[^stenum_35] Cp. European Commission, “Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe”, _Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council_, COM(2016) 197 final, April 6, 2016. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposalimplementationpackage/docs/20160406/towards_a_reform_of_the_common_european_asylum_system_and_enhancing_legal_avenues_to_europe_-_20160406_en.pdf [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_36] “The collection of facial images will be the pre-cursor to introducing facial recognition software in the future and will bring EURODAC in line with the other systems such as the Entry/Exit System. Eu-LISA should first conduct a study on facial recognition software that evaluates its accuracy and reliability prior to this software being added to the Central System”. European Commission, COM(2016) 272 final, p. 4f.
[^stenum_37] Cp. European Commission, “Smart borders – options and the way ahead”, _Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council_, COM(2011) 680 final, October 25, 2011. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2011/EN/1-2011-680-EN-F1-1.Pdf [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_38] Cost-benefit is also calculated by the Commission regarding the entry/exit and Frequent Travellers system, predicting that member states “could have a net cost savings already after the second year of operation” stemming from reduction in border control resources by around 40% (equivalent to EUR 500 million/year). Development cost for the first three years and with some of the biometrics added later is estimated to around EUR 390 million, and yearly operational costs in a period of 5 years of operation is estimated to be 189 million EUR. In this 8 year span costs are estimated to be EUR 1,335 million). Cp. European Commission, COM(2011) 680 final.
[^stenum_39] Marie Martin, “Extension of mobility partnerships with euro-mediterranean partners”, _Panorama_, 2012, pp. 279–283, here: p. 281.
[^stenum_40] Cp. Walters 2015; Didier Bigo, “Freedom and speed in enlarged borderzones”, in: Vicki Squire (ed.), _The contested politics of mobility: Borderzones and irregularity_, Abingdon, Routledge, 2011, pp. 31–50.
[^stenum_41] Cp. Zygmunt Bauman, _Globalization_, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998.
[^stenum_42] Cp. David Lyon (ed.), _Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk, and automated discrimination_, London, Routledge, 2005.
[^stenum_43] Cp. Bigo et al. 2012.
[^stenum_44] “Alienage” as defined by Bosniak: “the position of the marginalized non-citizen or the degree of ‘alienage’ are produced by nation-states exercising sovereignty and ‘managing migration’, and framing conditions for mobility and residence of migrants. ‘Alienage entails the introjection of borders”. Linda Bosniak, _The citizen and the alien_, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 5.
[^stenum_45] See for example Frontex, “Smarter, Faster, Safer?”, _Feature Stories_, 2011. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/smarter-faster-safer--KfKGq2 [accessed June 21, 2017].
[^stenum_46] Cp. Mark Maguire, “The birth of biometric security”, _Anthropology Today_, 25, 2009, pp. 9–14; Louise Amoore, “Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror”, _Political Geography_, 25, 2006, pp. 336–351.
[^stenum_47] Amoore 2006, p. 342.
[^stenum_48] Cp. Arjun Appadurai, _Modernity at large_, Minneapolis/London, University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
[^stenum_49] Amoore 2006, p. 342.
[^stenum_50] Cp. Simon A. Cole, _Suspect identities: A history of fingerprinting and criminal identification_, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002.
[^stenum_51] Cp. Cole 2002.
[^stenum_52] Cp. Cole 2002; John Torpey, _The invention of the passport surveillance, citizenship and the state_, Cambridge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[^stenum_53] Rose 1999; 2000.
[^stenum_54] Bigo 2011, p. 33.
[^stenum_55] Cp. Shoshana Amielle Magnet, _When biometrics fail: Gender, race, and the technology of identity_, Durham/London, Duke University Press, 2011; Joseph Pugliese, _Biometrics: Bodies, technologies, biopolitics_, London/New York, Routledge, 2010; Rygiel 2011; Irma van der Ploeg, “Biometrics and the body as information: Normative issues in the socio-technical coding of the body”, in: David Lyon (ed.), _Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk, and automated discrimination_, London, Routledge, 2002, pp. 57–73; Btihaj Ajana, _Governing through biometrics: The biopolitics of identity_, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; Keith Breckenridge, _Biometric State. The global politics of identification and surveillance in South Africa, 1850 to the Present_, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014; and others.
[^stenum_56] Magnet 2011, p. 50.
[^stenum_57] SANS Institute presents itself as a cooperative research and education organization, providing computer security training and information security research.
[^stenum_58] SANS Institute, “Biometric Scanning Technologies: Finger, Facial and Retinal Scanning”, _SANS Institute. InfoSec Reading Room_, 2003. Available at: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/authentication/biometric-scanning-technologies-finger-facial-retinal-scanning-1177 [accessed June 21, 2017].
[^stenum_59] Pugliese 2010, p. 62.
[^stenum_60] Richard Dyer, _White: Essays on race and culture_, London/New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 89.
[^stenum_61] Pugliese 2010, p. 114.
[^stenum_62] Facial recognition can be understood in continuation of Dyer’s analysis of on camera and photo technology analysed by Dyer for the built-in white bias.
[^stenum_63] Cp. Bigo et al. 2012.
[^stenum_64] Rose 1999.
[^stenum_65] Helle Stenum, “Biometric citizenship and alienage: new and re-structuring technology of government of mobility?” Paper presented at the conference: Reconfiguring borders and mobility in times of crisis, September, 26-28, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2012. Available at: http://forskning.ruc.dk/site/da/publications/biometric-citizenship-and-alienage(1c5b48bf-2510-412e-bf56-5164c4b4f89a).html [accessed June 20, 2017].
[^stenum_66] Giorgio Agamben, “Bodies without words: Against the biopolitical tattoo”, _German Law Journal_, 5 (2), 2004, pp. 168–169.
[^stenum_67] Agamben 2004, p. 169.

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@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ title = "Media Use During Escape – A Contribution to Refugees’ Collective Ag
# 1 Introduction[^ullrich_1] # 1 Introduction[^ullrich_1]
According to the popular[^ullrich_2] German boulevard newspaper *The BILD*, it was a historical tweet of 140 characters from August 2015 that resulted in Germany becoming the primary country to receive Syrian refugees via the Balkan route.[^ullrich_3] The tweet by the German National Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) stated that from that moment, the Dublin Regulation should not apply to Syrian refugees, meaning they would not be sent back to the country they first entered in the Schengen Area. According to the popular[^ullrich_2] German boulevard newspaper _The BILD_, it was a historical tweet of 140 characters from August 2015 that resulted in Germany becoming the primary country to receive Syrian refugees via the Balkan route.[^ullrich_3] The tweet by the German National Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) stated that from that moment, the Dublin Regulation should not apply to Syrian refugees, meaning they would not be sent back to the country they first entered in the Schengen Area.
The BILD blamed Merkel for the tweet in their article. There was a widely shared belief that the spread of ‘welcoming’ information through social media was one of the main reasons why many Syrian refugees considered Germany as their preferred country of arrival.[^ullrich_4] The access to social media and the welcoming messages spread using these platforms, were cited as significant pull factors for Syrian refugees to continue walking towards Western Europe from Hungary at the beginning of September 2015.[^ullrich_5] The BILD blamed Merkel for the tweet in their article. There was a widely shared belief that the spread of ‘welcoming’ information through social media was one of the main reasons why many Syrian refugees considered Germany as their preferred country of arrival.[^ullrich_4] The access to social media and the welcoming messages spread using these platforms, were cited as significant pull factors for Syrian refugees to continue walking towards Western Europe from Hungary at the beginning of September 2015.[^ullrich_5]
According to the assumption that communication through social media directly leads to action, the refugees’ behaviour is described as deterministic. According to the assumption that communication through social media directly leads to action, the refugees’ behaviour is described as deterministic.
>“[…] as if the new technologies themselves with no human agency, no sociality and no social struggles are automatically revolutionizing the world”[^ullrich_6]. > “[…] as if the new technologies themselves with no human agency, no sociality and no social struggles are automatically revolutionizing the world”[^ullrich_6].
On the contrary, the idea of this paper is to take a closer look at the nexus of media usage and refugee movements with an actor-centred perspective following the thesis that it is the refugees that do move and make use of media for their own sake. Following this perspective the refugees do not follow social media information blindly, but rather use different forms of media actively and in a self-determined manner to organize their escape. How do the refugees use media during their flight and how does that contribute to their agency? On the contrary, the idea of this paper is to take a closer look at the nexus of media usage and refugee movements with an actor-centred perspective following the thesis that it is the refugees that do move and make use of media for their own sake. Following this perspective the refugees do not follow social media information blindly, but rather use different forms of media actively and in a self-determined manner to organize their escape. How do the refugees use media during their flight and how does that contribute to their agency?
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The refugees’ movements can be assigned to different types of collective agenc
Communication processes between the refugees are central. That networks are the key for understanding processes of migration and escape, is a commonly shared view within new theories of migration research.[^ullrich_15] [^ullrich_16] The movements appear as social processes that are made possible through exchange and networking between groups. The decisions on the followed route depend on the networks a person belongs to. From this perspective, refugees’ behaviour can only be understood by considering them as members of groups with shared interests going beyond personal connections. It is not primarily an individual process.[^ullrich_17] Consequently, Papadopoulos and Tsianos describe migration as Communication processes between the refugees are central. That networks are the key for understanding processes of migration and escape, is a commonly shared view within new theories of migration research.[^ullrich_15] [^ullrich_16] The movements appear as social processes that are made possible through exchange and networking between groups. The decisions on the followed route depend on the networks a person belongs to. From this perspective, refugees’ behaviour can only be understood by considering them as members of groups with shared interests going beyond personal connections. It is not primarily an individual process.[^ullrich_17] Consequently, Papadopoulos and Tsianos describe migration as
>“a constitutive moment of the current social transformation; a moment which is primarily sustained by cooperation, solidarity, the use of broad networks and resources, shared knowledge, collective anticipation”[^ullrich_18]. > “a constitutive moment of the current social transformation; a moment which is primarily sustained by cooperation, solidarity, the use of broad networks and resources, shared knowledge, collective anticipation”[^ullrich_18].
Using this theoretical background as well as the distinction between invisible and visible forms of refugees’ agency, I will analyse empirical data on media usage of refugees and show how media contributes to collective refugees’ agency. Using this theoretical background as well as the distinction between invisible and visible forms of refugees’ agency, I will analyse empirical data on media usage of refugees and show how media contributes to collective refugees’ agency.
@ -74,11 +74,11 @@ Social media use also contributed to the visible agency of refugees fleeing thro
> “The march toward the West, which quickly became known under the hashtag #marchofhope, progressed relatively fast and soon reached a two-lane motorway. The images of this march will surely find their place in the iconography of this long summer of migration: a line of people formed who, after a week of waiting, reappropriated their own mobility to collectively and defiantly leave Budapest. […] Under the pressure of these images and with the knowledge that a repressive strategy had failed, Germany and Austria announced that they would open their borders and admit the migrants.”[^ullrich_41] > “The march toward the West, which quickly became known under the hashtag #marchofhope, progressed relatively fast and soon reached a two-lane motorway. The images of this march will surely find their place in the iconography of this long summer of migration: a line of people formed who, after a week of waiting, reappropriated their own mobility to collectively and defiantly leave Budapest. […] Under the pressure of these images and with the knowledge that a repressive strategy had failed, Germany and Austria announced that they would open their borders and admit the migrants.”[^ullrich_41]
Following this quotation the use of social media and their contribution to the visibility of the refugees was highly successful. Nevertheless also other media than social networks can help to make migrant agency visible. Phones, for example. Boat refugees crossing the Mediterranean set up alarms with their mobile phones when they have naval accidents. Accordingly, the *WatchTheMed-Alarmphone*, an independent hotline for boat people in distress, had been contacted several hundred times since its launch in autumn 2014.[^ullrich_42] This shows that refugees use mobile phones for their rescue. They might organise themselves in groups and share mobile phones[^ullrich_43] – especially when they have little money – or they act within an exchange system. Using a phone in this case and setting an emergency makes the refugees visible for the rescue services and allows them to be brought safely to the European borders where they can demand asylum. Following this quotation the use of social media and their contribution to the visibility of the refugees was highly successful. Nevertheless also other media than social networks can help to make migrant agency visible. Phones, for example. Boat refugees crossing the Mediterranean set up alarms with their mobile phones when they have naval accidents. Accordingly, the _WatchTheMed-Alarmphone_, an independent hotline for boat people in distress, had been contacted several hundred times since its launch in autumn 2014.[^ullrich_42] This shows that refugees use mobile phones for their rescue. They might organise themselves in groups and share mobile phones[^ullrich_43] – especially when they have little money – or they act within an exchange system. Using a phone in this case and setting an emergency makes the refugees visible for the rescue services and allows them to be brought safely to the European borders where they can demand asylum.
# Conclusion # Conclusion
The examples presented highlight the types of media used by refugees, how they use them and how networking through them contributes to their collective agency. Social media provide easy access to various information and can contribute to spreading information to the public, to raise awareness for the situation of refugees and therefore to support or rescue them or to put pressure to politics. The above described case of media usage on the Balkan route presents convincing arguments in favour of considering social media as significantly important for visible collective migrant agency. However, also traditional media, like phones can contribute to refugees’ visibility as the case from the Mediterranean Sea and *WatchTheMed-Alarmphone* showed. The examples presented highlight the types of media used by refugees, how they use them and how networking through them contributes to their collective agency. Social media provide easy access to various information and can contribute to spreading information to the public, to raise awareness for the situation of refugees and therefore to support or rescue them or to put pressure to politics. The above described case of media usage on the Balkan route presents convincing arguments in favour of considering social media as significantly important for visible collective migrant agency. However, also traditional media, like phones can contribute to refugees’ visibility as the case from the Mediterranean Sea and _WatchTheMed-Alarmphone_ showed.
The Mexican border with the U.S. gives more insights into the relationship between migrant media usage and route circumstances as well as consequent invisible agency strategies of refugees. Mobile media is exactly not used to stay invisible. Smartphones are desired objects for robbers or traffickers because of their value and their personal-contacts information. On the other hand examples from the Balkan route draws attention to the use of mobile media with the same intention: to stay invisible because real-time information allows to have knowledge about the actual border situation and consequently to bypass controls. The Mexican border with the U.S. gives more insights into the relationship between migrant media usage and route circumstances as well as consequent invisible agency strategies of refugees. Mobile media is exactly not used to stay invisible. Smartphones are desired objects for robbers or traffickers because of their value and their personal-contacts information. On the other hand examples from the Balkan route draws attention to the use of mobile media with the same intention: to stay invisible because real-time information allows to have knowledge about the actual border situation and consequently to bypass controls.
@ -86,89 +86,46 @@ The different forms of media usage and the respective migrant strategy shows the
# References # References
[^ullrich_1] Warm thanks to Magdalena Freudenschuss, Franziska Mönnich and Javier Contesse for their constructive feedback and support. [^ullrich_1]: Warm thanks to Magdalena Freudenschuss, Franziska Mönnich and Javier Contesse for their constructive feedback and support.
[^ullrich_2]: BILD is the German newspaper with the highest circulation.
[^ullrich_2] BILD is the German newspaper with the highest circulation. [^ullrich_3]: Cp. n.n., “Historische 140 Zeichen. Der Tweet, der Deutschland zum Zufluchtsort machte”, _Bild Online_, September 19, 2015. Available at: http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/twitter/kurznachricht-die-deutschland-zum-zufluchtsort-machte-42642974.bild.html [accessed November 4, 2016].
[^ullrich_4]: Although research results suggest that a lot of the welcoming information might not even have been received by refugees before their arrival. Cp. Martin Emmer, Carola Richter, Marlene Kunst, _Flucht 2.0. Mediennutzung durch Flüchtlinge vor, während und nach der Flucht_, Research Report, Freie Universität Berlin, 2016. Available at: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/kommwiss/arbeitstellen/internationale_kommunikation/Media/Flucht-2_0.pdf [accessed February 5, 2017].
[^ullrich_3] Cp. n.n., “Historische 140 Zeichen. Der Tweet, der Deutschland zum Zufluchtsort machte”, *Bild Online*, September 19, 2015. Available at: http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/twitter/kurznachricht-die-deutschland-zum-zufluchtsort-machte-42642974.bild.html [accessed November 4, 2016]. [^ullrich_5]: This idea was later shared by other leading newspapers see for example Nicola Abé et al., “Herzdame”, _Spiegel Online_, September 19, 2015. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-138749214.html [accessed November 1, 2016].
[^ullrich_6]: Dimitris Parsanoglou, Nicos Trimikliniotis, and Vassilis S. Tsianos, _Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City_, Basingstoke/Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 9.
[^ullrich_4] Although research results suggest that a lot of the welcoming information might not even have been received by refugees before their arrival. Cp. Martin Emmer, Carola Richter, Marlene Kunst, *Flucht 2.0. Mediennutzung durch Flüchtlinge vor, während und nach der Flucht*, Research Report, Freie Universität Berlin, 2016. Available at: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/kommwiss/arbeitstellen/internationale_kommunikation/Media/Flucht-2_0.pdf [accessed February 5, 2017]. [^ullrich_7]: See several field studies that were undertaken since the expansion of the Balkan route, for example Marie Gillespie et al., _Mapping Refugee Media Journeys. Smartphones and Social Media Networks_, Research Report, The Open University/France Médias Monde, 2016. Available at: http://www.open.ac.uk/ccig/sites/www.open.ac.uk.ccig/files/Mapping%20Refugee%20Media%20Journeys%2016%20May%20FIN%20MG_0.pdf [accessed May 2, 2017; Emmer et al. 2016; Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”, _Migration Media Usage Survey_, June 1, 2016. Available at: http://www.mict-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/mictbrief_en_20160623.pdf [accessed November 9, 2016].
[^ullrich_8]: Including processes of escape.
[^ullrich_5] This idea was later shared by other leading newspapers see for example Nicola Abé et al., “Herzdame”, *Spiegel Online*, September 19, 2015. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-138749214.html [accessed November 1, 2016]. [^ullrich_9]: Cp. Yann Moulier Boutang, “Interview”, in: Materialien für einen neuen Antiimperalismus (ed.), _Strategien der Unterwerfung, Strategien der Befreiung – Thesen zur Rasissmusdebatte_, Berlin/Göttingen: Schwarze Risse, pp. 29–56.
[^ullrich_10]: Cp. Stephan Scheel, “Das Konzept der Autonomie der Migration überdenken”, in _Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung_, 1(2), 2015. Available at: http://movements-journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/14.scheel--autonomie-der-migration.html [accessed January 25, 2016].
[^ullrich_6] Dimitris Parsanoglou, Nicos Trimikliniotis, and Vassilis S. Tsianos, *Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City*, Basingstoke/Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 9. [^ullrich_11]: Cp. Dimitris Papodopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, _Escape Routes. Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century_, London/Ann Arbor, Pluto Press, 2008, p. 202.
[^ullrich_12]: Cp. Yann Moulier Boutang, “Thesen zur Autonomie der Migration und zum notwendigen Ende des Regimes der Arbeitsmigration”, _Jungle World_, 15, April 3, 2002. Available at: http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2002/14/24171.html [accessed January 24, 2016].
[^ullrich_7] See several field studies that were undertaken since the expansion of the Balkan route, for example Marie Gillespie et al., *Mapping Refugee Media Journeys. Smartphones and Social Media Networks*, Research Report, The Open University/France Médias Monde, 2016. Available at: http://www.open.ac.uk/ccig/sites/www.open.ac.uk.ccig/files/Mapping%20Refugee%20Media%20Journeys%2016%20May%20FIN%20MG_0.pdf [accessed May 2, 2017; Emmer et al. 2016; Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”, *Migration Media Usage Survey*, June 1, 2016. Available at: http://www.mict-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/mictbrief_en_20160623.pdf [accessed November 9, 2016]. [^ullrich_13]: I prefer the term “agency” instead of “autonomy” because it does not suggest an independence towards structures as “autonomy” does and leaves room for how this agency can be explained. However I speak about the “Autonomy of Migration” when I refer to the approach going back to Moulier Boutang.
[^ullrich_14]: This distinction derives from research by Wilcke and Lambert who in turn derived the invisible character of agency from Rancière’s notion of politics (u.a.: 2002) conception of politics and the visible one from reflections on Imperceptible Politics by Papadopoulos et al. Cp. Holger Wilcke, and Laura Lambert, “Die Politik des O-Platzes. (Un-)Sichtbare Kämpfe einer Geflüchtetenbewegung”, in _Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung_, 1(2), 2015. Available at: http://movements-journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/06.wilcke,lambert--oplatz-k%C3%A4mpfe-gefl%C3%BCchtete-bewegung.html [accessed January 25, 2016]; Jacques Rancière, _Das Unternehmen. Politik und Philosophie_, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 2002; Papadopoulos et al. 2008.
[^ullrich_8] Including processes of escape. [^ullrich_15]: Cp. Sonja Haug, _Klassische und neuere Theorien der Migration_, Working Paper 30, Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2000.
[^ullrich_16]: This includes research on forced migration or refugee studies.
[^ullrich_9] Cp. Yann Moulier Boutang, “Interview”, in: Materialien für einen neuen Antiimperalismus (ed.), *Strategien der Unterwerfung, Strategien der Befreiung – Thesen zur Rasissmusdebatte*, Berlin/Göttingen: Schwarze Risse, pp. 29–56. [^ullrich_17]: There is an individual type of refugees’ agency based on pragmatism, self-esteem and purposefulness I explored during field research in Italy about movements of refugees, illegals and asylum seekers within Schengen. But considering media which are basically used for networking the individual type is not relevant here.
[^ullrich_18]: Dimitris Papadopoulos, and Vassilis Tsianos, “The Autonomy of Migration. The Animals of Undocumented Mobility”, in: Anna Hickey-Moody, and Peta Malins (eds.), _Deleuzian Encounters. Studies in Contemporary Social Issues_, Basingstoke/Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 223–235, here: 230f.
[^ullrich_10] Cp. Stephan Scheel, “Das Konzept der Autonomie der Migration überdenken”, in *Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung*, 1(2), 2015. Available at: http://movements-journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/14.scheel--autonomie-der-migration.html [accessed January 25, 2016]. [^ullrich_19]: Cp. Vassilis Tsianos, “Smartphones sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”, _Wired Deutschland_, August 23, 2015. Available at: https://www.wired.de/collection/life/ohne-smartphones-hatten-fluchtlinge-kaum-eine-chance-sagt-der-migrationsforscher [accessed November 9, 2016].
[^ullrich_20]: Cp. Rianne Dekker, and Godfried Engbersen, _How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration_, Working Paper 64, Oxford, University of Oxford, 2012.
[^ullrich_11] Cp. Dimitris Papodopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, *Escape Routes. Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century*, London/Ann Arbor, Pluto Press, 2008, p. 202. [^ullrich_21]: Cp. Dekker and Engbersen, _How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration_, p. 1.
[^ullrich_22]: Cp. Tsianos, “Smartphone sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”.
[^ullrich_12] Cp. Yann Moulier Boutang, “Thesen zur Autonomie der Migration und zum notwendigen Ende des Regimes der Arbeitsmigration”, *Jungle World*, 15, April 3, 2002. Available at: http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2002/14/24171.html [accessed January 24, 2016]. [^ullrich_23]: Cp. Tsianos, “Smartphone sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”.
[^ullrich_24]: Cp. Tsianos, “Smartphone sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”.
[^ullrich_13] I prefer the term “agency” instead of “autonomy” because it does not suggest an independence towards structures as “autonomy” does and leaves room for how this agency can be explained. However I speak about the “Autonomy of Migration” when I refer to the approach going back to Moulier Boutang. [^ullrich_25]: Most likely those must have fled along the Balkan region.
[^ullrich_26]: Cp. Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”. Interviews were conducted in Germany with refugees that at the most had been living two years there.
[^ullrich_14] This distinction derives from research by Wilcke and Lambert who in turn derived the invisible character of agency from Rancière’s notion of politics (u.a.: 2002) conception of politics and the visible one from reflections on Imperceptible Politics by Papadopoulos et al. Cp. Holger Wilcke, and Laura Lambert, “Die Politik des O-Platzes. (Un-)Sichtbare Kämpfe einer Geflüchtetenbewegung”, in *Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung*, 1(2), 2015. Available at: http://movements-journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/06.wilcke,lambert--oplatz-k%C3%A4mpfe-gefl%C3%BCchtete-bewegung.html [accessed January 25, 2016]; Jacques Rancière, *Das Unternehmen. Politik und Philosophie*, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 2002; Papadopoulos et al. 2008. [^ullrich_27]: Cp. Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”, p. 5.
[^ullrich_28]: Cp. Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”, p. 7.
[^ullrich_15] Cp. Sonja Haug, *Klassische und neuere Theorien der Migration*, Working Paper 30, Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2000. [^ullrich_29]: Cp. Morten Freidel, “Schlag nach bei Facebook”, in _FAZ Online_, September 20, 2015. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/auf-dem-fluechtlingstreck-schlag-nach-bei-Facebook-13812602.html [accessed November 10, 2016], p. 2.
[^ullrich_30]: Trimikliniotis et al., _Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City_, p. 8.
[^ullrich_16] This includes research on forced migration or refugee studies. [^ullrich_31]: Cp. Trimikliniotis et al., _Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City_, p. 1.
[^ullrich_32]: Cp. Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”, p. 7.
[^ullrich_17] There is an individual type of refugees’ agency based on pragmatism, self-esteem and purposefulness I explored during field research in Italy about movements of refugees, illegals and asylum seekers within Schengen. But considering media which are basically used for networking the individual type is not relevant here. [^ullrich_33]: Cp. Stephan Dörner et al. “WhatsApp und Facebook machen Flucht erst möglich”, in _Die Welt Online_, September 23, 2015. Available at: https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article146756198/WhatsApp-und-Facebook-machen-Flucht-erst-moeglich.html [accessed November 10, 2016].
[^ullrich_34]: Newell and Gomey used the term “migrants” which I adopt here. Cp. Bryce C. Newell, and Ricardo Gomez, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”, _iConference Proceedings_, 2015.
[^ullrich_18] Dimitris Papadopoulos, and Vassilis Tsianos, “The Autonomy of Migration. The Animals of Undocumented Mobility”, in: Anna Hickey-Moody, and Peta Malins (eds.), *Deleuzian Encounters. Studies in Contemporary Social Issues*, Basingstoke/Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 223–235, here: 230f. [^ullrich_35]: Cp. Newell and Gomey, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”.
[^ullrich_36]: Cp. Newell and Gomey, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”, p. 6.
[^ullrich_19] Cp. Vassilis Tsianos, “Smartphones sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”, *Wired Deutschland*, August 23, 2015. Available at: https://www.wired.de/collection/life/ohne-smartphones-hatten-fluchtlinge-kaum-eine-chance-sagt-der-migrationsforscher [accessed November 9, 2016]. [^ullrich_37]: Newell and Gomey, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”.
[^ullrich_38]: Cp. Newell and Gomey, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”, pp. 7–8.
[^ullrich_20] Cp. Rianne Dekker, and Godfried Engbersen, *How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration*, Working Paper 64, Oxford, University of Oxford, 2012. [^ullrich_39]: Cp. Newell and Gomey 2015, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”, p. 8.
[^ullrich_40]: Cp. Trimikliniotis et al., _Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City_, p. 13.
[^ullrich_21] Cp. Dekker and Engbersen, *How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration*, p. 1. [^ullrich_41]: Bernd Kasparek, “Routes, Corridors, and Spaces of Exception. Governing Migration and Europe”, _Near Futures Online_, 1: Europe at a Crossroads, March 2016. Available at: http://nearfuturesonline.org/routes-corridors-and-spaces-of-exception-governing-migration-and-europe [accessed February 5, 2017], p. 5.
[^ullrich_42]: Cp. Maruice Stierl, “The WatchTheMed alarm phone. A disobedient border intervention”, in _Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung_, 1(2), 2015. Available at: http://movements journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/13.stierl--watchthemed-alarmphone.html [accessed November 13, 2016].
[^ullrich_22] Cp. Tsianos, “Smartphone sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”. [^ullrich_43]: Cp. Tsianos, “Smartphone sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”.
[^ullrich_23] Cp. Tsianos, “Smartphone sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”.
[^ullrich_24] Cp. Tsianos, “Smartphone sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”.
[^ullrich_25] Most likely those must have fled along the Balkan region.
[^ullrich_26] Cp. Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”. Interviews were conducted in Germany with refugees that at the most had been living two years there.
[^ullrich_27] Cp. Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”, p. 5.
[^ullrich_28] Cp. Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”, p. 7.
[^ullrich_29] Cp. Morten Freidel, “Schlag nach bei Facebook”, in *FAZ Online*, September 20, 2015. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/auf-dem-fluechtlingstreck-schlag-nach-bei-Facebook-13812602.html [accessed November 10, 2016], p. 2.
[^ullrich_30] Trimikliniotis et al., *Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City*, p. 8.
[^ullrich_31] Cp. Trimikliniotis et al., *Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City*, p. 1.
[^ullrich_32] Cp. Media in Cooperation and Transition – MiCT, “Information to go”, p. 7.
[^ullrich_33] Cp. Stephan Dörner et al. “WhatsApp und Facebook machen Flucht erst möglich”, in *Die Welt Online*, September 23, 2015. Available at: https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article146756198/WhatsApp-und-Facebook-machen-Flucht-erst-moeglich.html [accessed November 10, 2016].
[^ullrich_34] Newell and Gomey used the term “migrants” which I adopt here. Cp. Bryce C. Newell, and Ricardo Gomez, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”, *iConference Proceedings*, 2015.
[^ullrich_35] Cp. Newell and Gomey, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”.
[^ullrich_36] Cp. Newell and Gomey, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”, p. 6.
[^ullrich_37] Newell and Gomey, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”.
[^ullrich_38] Cp. Newell and Gomey, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”, pp. 7–8.
[^ullrich_39] Cp. Newell and Gomey 2015, “Informal Networks, Phones and Facebook. Information Seeking and Technology Use by Undocumented Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border”, p. 8.
[^ullrich_40] Cp. Trimikliniotis et al., *Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City*, p. 13.
[^ullrich_41] Bernd Kasparek, “Routes, Corridors, and Spaces of Exception. Governing Migration and Europe”, *Near Futures Online*, 1: Europe at a Crossroads, March 2016. Available at: http://nearfuturesonline.org/routes-corridors-and-spaces-of-exception-governing-migration-and-europe [accessed February 5, 2017], p. 5.
[^ullrich_42] Cp. Maruice Stierl, “The WatchTheMed alarm phone. A disobedient border intervention”, in *Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung*, 1(2), 2015. Available at: http://movements journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/13.stierl--watchthemed-alarmphone.html [accessed November 13, 2016].
[^ullrich_43] Cp. Tsianos, “Smartphone sind für Flüchtlinge überlebenswichtig”.